British William Hudson, also known as "Mark", hid thousands of pounds in gold and diamonds sent to finance war activities against the Germans in Yugoslavia in World War II.
This British officer, supposedly the inspiration to the writer Jan Fleming for creating the character of one of the most famous secret agents in the world - James Bond, was sent to Yugoslavia with the task of reconciling two resistance movements against the German occupier.
"He was the first British liaison officer in Yugoslavia from a special unit for war operations throughout Europe and the only one who maintained contact with both Josip Broz Tito and General Draž Mihailović," Nik Ilić, the Serbian military attaché of the British Embassy in Belgrade, told the BBC. .
Hudson, however, quickly realized that the mission of reconciling Tito's partisans and Mihailović's Chetniks would be very difficult.
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Brits in opans and sajkačas
Simultaneously with the active resistance against the Germans in Europe, the British government formed an intelligence-sabotage group in 1940 - the Special Unit for Military Operations (SOE) in the occupied European states.
At the exhibition "The British in Yugoslavia in the Second World War", prepared by Ilić, you can see photos of officers and non-commissioned officers of the British army who were sent to Yugoslavia.
Some of them are in opans or with sajkačas and in peasant suits, before war operations.
"The first officers were already in Belgrade in 1940, and their base was the British embassy.
"At that time, they were preparing plans for the case that Yugoslavia signs a pact with Germany and how to make it impossible to supply Germany through Yugoslav territory," Ilić says.
Back then, the British imported large quantities of weapons and explosives, which they hid around Belgrade, says Ilić.
10 wagons with weapons and explosives were also ready at the border of Greece and Yugoslavia, as an additional arsenal.
Members of the Special Unit (SOE), led by George Taylor, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill's intelligence officer, found collaborators in Serbia, opponents of the pact signed with the Germans.
In a telegram sent from the British Embassy in Belgrade on March 27, 1941, when a military coup was carried out and the government controlled by Prince Pavle Karađorđević was overthrown, Taylor informed the government in London that SOE had spent at least £100.000 since he took over the leadership of this unit, reported the paper "Weekly".
The money, it is added, mainly went to finance the Agricultural Party and other forms of support.
Nik Ilić, however, says that the British were not involved in organizing the demonstrations that followed and the coup.
"British officers were in contact here with forces that were not in favor of the pact, for example, with the Serbian Agrarian Party and other groups.
"But the British had nothing to do with those who carried out the coup," says Ilić.
All the plans, which the British officers agreed with these groups, including "the destruction of the bridges, all failed."
"Such a quick German attack and occupation was not expected".
Preparations for war
In a telegram, Taylor advised that they were working "on preparing a coup".
"It will take more time, especially because our friends cannot feel the general's pulse so quickly in order to provide a certain degree of military support," Taylor wrote, "Nedeljnik" reported.
However, historians have established that the British were not involved in the coup, says Dejan Djokic, professor of history at Goldsmiths College, University of London.
"Before the Second World War, and especially after the war began in September 1939, the 'Great Powers', primarily Germany and Italy, but also Britain, through various channels, official and unofficial, pushed their interests in the then still neutral states, among which was Yugoslavia," Đokić tells the BBC in Serbian.
He adds that they were not always successful, nor did they always do it skillfully.
"The British, for example, financially helped two Serbian organizations - the Agricultural Party and the Chetnik veteran Ilija Trifunović Birčanin.
"But the 'farmers' were a relatively small party without any major influence in the country, while Trifunović Birčanin was also without any major influence," Đokić emphasizes.
Even before the First World War, Trifunović harbored anti-German sentiments and believed that Yugoslavia should not be in an alliance with the countries that signed the so-called Triple Pact in Berlin at the end of September 1940 - Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and Imperial Japan).
"But then, during the occupation of Yugoslavia, he openly collaborated with the Italians, even though he was formally part of Draža Mihailović's movement," says Đokić.
The putsch, he says, was organized by officers of the Yugoslav Army, led by Air Force Generals Bora Mirković and Dušan Simović.
"They were against the foreign policy of the government of Cvetković-Maček and prince-regent Pavle, but that was not the only reason for their dissatisfaction.
"Predominantly Serbian officers were not enthusiastic about the creation of the Banovina of Croatia in August 1939, which enjoyed a high degree of autonomy, while the rest of the country was under a centralist regime in which the borders of the 'Serbian lands' were not clearly defined," says Professor Đokić.
In March 1941, the Serbian Orthodox Church also openly supported the demonstrations against the alliance with the Triple Pact, and then the coup on March 27.
"The British, of course, were interested in replacing the government that on March 25 signed the accession to the Triple Pact in Vienna's 'Belvedere' castle - the same one from which Franjo Ferdinand left for Sarajevo at the end of June 1914", before the assassination that introduced Europe and world in the First World War.
"Therefore, they supported the coup that replaced the government and deposed Prince Pavle, by declaring King Petar II of age 6 months before his 18th birthday," says Đokić.
He recalled Winston Churchill's famous statement at the time that "Yugoslavia has found its soul".
"However, London did not organize a military coup in Belgrade, nor did the Serbian officers of the Yugoslav army who carried out the coup seek advice from abroad," Đokić points out.
Nik Ilić says that British operatives then took part in organizing numerous operations in Yugoslavia until the fall of Nazi Germany - attacks on vital communications, blockade of the Danube, demolition of the railway bridge near Maribor, demolition of the bridge over the Sava near Belgrade, among others.
That the British special forces "became related" to the population is evidenced by the photographs in the exhibition, which show how together with the Chetniks, but also with Tito's partisans, they devised and carried out actions.
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Hudson's mission and what Tito and Draža said about each other
The British wanted the resistance movement in Yugoslavia to make it impossible to supply the Germans via the Balkans, Ilić says.
In the beginning, the help of the British was aimed at the movement headed by Draža Mihailović.
However, the British government soon begins to receive reports of another resistance movement, led by Tito.
Hudson, who before the war worked as an engineer in a mine near Krupnje in western Serbia, was given the task of returning to Yugoslavia from Egypt, where he had been staying since the beginning of the German occupation.
Đokić points out that Hudson was not sent to reconcile the two resistance movements, because neither he nor anyone in London knew exactly what was happening in the occupied country, that is, no one knew about the existence of different movements.
During the summer and early autumn of 1941, news reached London - where the Yugoslav government and the king in exile had been since July - about the rebellion of a group of officers and the action against the enemy in western Serbia.
But the details are not known, and certainly no one there had even heard of Tito at that time, says Đokić.
"When it became known in September 1941 that a group resisting the Germans had gathered around the then colonel Mihailović, the British and the Yugoslav government sent a mission, which included two Yugoslav officers, Majors Lalatović and Ostojić".
They landed secretly in Montenegro and that's when Hudson learned about the second resistance movement.
"On October 23, he met Tito in Uzice. At that time, the joint uprising of partisans and Chetniks in western Serbia against the Germans was already waning, then they started to clash with each other," says Đokić.
Two days later, Hudson met Draž Mihailović at Ravna Gora.
He was the only officer who maintained contact with both Tito and Draž, immediately realizing that the two resistance movements did not want to cooperate with each other, according to Ilić.
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The accompanying exhibition catalog stated that Hudson's task seemed impossible - to try to unite them in the fight against a common enemy.
"Tito asked me what I came to do. I answered him - to coordinate resistance movements. He asked me if I had contacts with Russia. I told him that I had orders to go to Mihailovic".
"He warned me that it would not be easy for me to deal with him and that he was not in good standing", said Hudson, it is written in the catalog.
Mihailović was harsher in his conversation with Hudson.
"Captain Hudson, we've been waiting for you for a long time. Serbs don't like communism, so I don't think you should give Tito any importance".
"I don't want to do what the communists do - start a fire here, kill a policeman there and then run away and leave the people to burn down their village and kill 100 for one in retaliation".
The attitude of the British towards Draža Mihailović
In December 1941, the Yugoslav government-in-exile promoted Colonel Draža Mihailović to the rank of general, and in 1942 he was elected as the minister of military in the government (the only minister who was in the country).
"That government was an ally of Great Britain, and it is not illogical that the British supported Mihailović," Djokić explains.
Đokić states that the British were early disappointed in Mihailović, realizing, among other things, from Hudson's reports, that he was passive, ready for temporary cooperation with the enemy in order to concentrate on the fight against the communist movement.
There were also reports that he was not in control of all his commanders, some of whom openly collaborated with the Germans and Italians."
Although the partisans "often give priority to the fight against Mihailović and other Chetnik commanders, and even in March 1943 offer the Germans a truce in order to focus on the civil war, they undoubtedly fight much more actively against the foreign occupiers and their domestic helpers," says Đokić.
Professor Đokić says that Mihailović seems to have misinterpreted the missions from London as encouragement to attack the partisans.
"When he received two Yugoslav officers, Mihailović understood it as giving legitimacy to his resistance movement," Đokić states.
He adds that it is also true that the British government also cared about them being a legitimate resistance movement because of their support for the allied Yugoslav government and the king in exile.
The British, Đokić explains, did not know much about the communist resistance at the time.
On the other hand, the partisans were initially suspicious of British intelligence missions, but they cared about having support from outside.
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Historian Elizabeth Barker in the book "British policy towards Southeast Europe in the Second World War" he writes that at first the British were delighted that there was any form of resistance at all and focused their attention completely on Mihailović.
However, news soon arrived about the failed negotiations between the partisans and Mihailović in the fall of 1941, as well as secret reports mentioning Mihailović's cooperation with the Quisling government of Milan Nedić and with the Italians.
Hudson was asked for his opinion on Mihailović, and he twistedly replied that he believed that Mihailović had agreed to cooperate with the Italians and that he was "ready to come to an agreement" with the Germans, writes Barker.
Although they believed that the people in Serbia were more in favor of Mihailović's movement, the British still supported Tito.
"Partisans were a more effective resistance movement in occupied Europe. Quite simply, they inflicted more losses on the Germans and Italians than any other group in Yugoslavia," says Đokić.
Also, the British saw that Tito was the only one in a position not only to liberate, but also to unite the country after the war".
Đokić points out that even the Yugoslav government in London was not very helpful to Mihailović, in the end it replaced him.
King Petar, under pressure from the British, in September 1944 called on the Yugoslavs via London radio to support the National Liberation Movement of Marshal Tito".
"At that time, Mihailović not only lost support from the British, but practically did not even have it from his Yugoslav government and the young king," he says.
Who was destroying the bridges?
The exhibition, which was presented in several cities in Serbia, also featured photographs showing British engineers, together with Mihailović's Chetniks, preparing to demolish bridges.
One of them shows the moment when the railway bridge on Lima was blown up - the largest destroyed bridge in Yugoslavia after the German invasion.
"The bridges on Mokra Gora and near Višegrad - these are all the actions that the British organized with members of the Yugoslav Army in the homeland to prevent the supply of the Germans on the Adriatic.
"But today when you read the reports about it - the credit for it was attributed to the partisans, even though it was done by Draža's soldiers," observes Nik Ilić.
The Hudson Controversy
Hudson admitted after the war that he had hidden thousands of pounds in gold and diamonds intended to finance war activities against the Germans in Yugoslavia, the London "The Sunday Times"."
About 80.000 pounds in ducats and precious stones were sent to Yugoslavia via the Hudson, which would now be worth more than 1,75 million pounds, the daily writes.
The informant, it is added, buried the treasure under peasant huts and in forest hiding places.
Later, he allegedly tried to smuggle it out of Yugoslavia, using diplomatic channels.
However, Nik Ilić states that every British officer who came to Yugoslavia at that time carried money - the only way to finance the purchase of weapons.
"When the Republic of Užice fell, Hudson was with Tito. Partisans headed for Bosnia and Montenegro. Hudson got lost, he was somewhere in Serbia, and the local population helped him there, and he had to hide the gold somewhere," Ilić adds.
The role of British officers-communists from Cairo
More and more partisan actions against the Germans awakened London's interest in the partisans, thanks, among other things, to the numerous reports of British officers about the partisans, sent via Cairo.
At that time, there was a group of officers in Egypt who were sympathetic to the partisan-communists and wanted them to come to power after the end of the war, says Nik Ilić.
In May 1943, Winston Churchill gave the "green light" for two British officers to be in Tito's headquarters on Sutjeska.
One of them was killed, and the other was wounded together with Tito.
"All the reports that were sent to London talked about the heroic struggle of the partisans to break through the German encirclement," says Ilić.
In September 1944, Churchill sent a high-ranking envoy to Tito - Brigadier Fitzroy McClain.
At the end of 1944, the British government changed its policy according to the developments in Yugoslavia.
The British were preparing the operation "It will happen now" to demolish the bridges on the Ibar and ordered Mihailović to carry it out.
He agreed, but the operation was suddenly stopped at the behest of another British "stream" from Cairo, sympathetic to Tito's partisans, Ilić says.
The non-execution was understood as Mihailović not fulfilling the task - which was one of the turning points in the relationship of British policy towards Yugoslavia in the Second World War, he adds.
"All the information that Churchill received from the field, as well as from intercepted German reports, said that the partisans fought against the Germans, and the Yugoslav army (Draž's Chetniks) did not," says Ilić.
Today, it is easy to analyze why Churchill waited so long to make a U-turn and turn to Tito, he explains.
"It should have been in his shoes at the time."
"Churchill made decisions based on the information he received. Officers on both sides presented information that was not entirely true."
McClain himself, in an interview in 1996, "admitted that he used information from partisans to make a report, which means that he did not go to the field alone and scout.
"The officers who were with Mihailović constantly went to the field".
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However, many reports did not arrive on time, while some from Cairo were "recut in order to present the partisans in a better light", says Ilić.
Hudson was also dissatisfied with the reports that arrived in London from Cairo, because allegedly some were changed, confirms Dejan Đokić.
"After the war, he saw the same reports that London was getting and he realized that they were not necessarily the way he originally sent them," Djokić adds.
However, he says that one should not exaggerate the "significance of the manipulation of reports of events on the ground."
"Mihailović's successes in 1941 were somewhat exaggerated - the British public needed good news from at least part of occupied Europe - and partisan victories were also attributed to him," notes Đokić.
After 1943, "probably the successes of the partisans are exaggerated and some actions carried out by Mihailović's men are attributed to them," he says.
"However, the partisans won, first of all, because they were much better organized and more effective as a resistance movement."
Allied bombing of Belgrade in 1944 - agreement with the partisans
Three years after the Germans razed Belgrade to the ground, the Allied bombing followed on Easter 1944.
"Yes, people always look at it as if the Allies beat Yugoslavia, Belgrade and the Serbian people, and no one looks at how, say, it was in France," Ilić replies to remarks that the Allies did the same as the Germans.
"Aviation always goes ahead of the army to attack all enemy targets, to make resistance and retreat impossible".
Until Italy was liberated, the Allies had no opportunity to attack the Germans from the air.
Vladimir Velebit was the chief liaison officer in front of the partisans in Italy and he "said which locations in Belgrade should be targeted and thus weaken the Germans.
"He said: 'Here and there, here and here. Bombs should be thrown there'."
"Yes, the allies bombed. But everything was according to plan and in agreement with the partisans," says Ilić.
The British, Yugoslav aviation and the "Air Bridge" operation
The British helped establish the Balkan Air Force in mid-1944, which supplied Partisan units with weapons, food and clothing.
They also participated in the evacuation of the wounded and sick to bases in Italy.
The British also helped form the Partisan squadron.
During the Second World War, the "Air Bridge" operation was organized on the territory of Yugoslavia.
The Allies, in cooperation with Chetniks and Partisans, evacuated a total of 2.400 pilots.
"Thanks to the planes, we saved 19.000 wounded partisans and civilians. They were transferred to southern Italy by RAF planes.
"About 30.000 Dalmatians were rescued via Vis, where the air base of the British air force was located, who were then in the United Nations camp in El Shat in Egypt," says Ilić.
The Commonwealth War Cemetery in Belgrade also contains the graves of 471 sailors, soldiers and pilots of Great Britain. Among them are 16 members of the British Special Operations Unit.
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