The upcoming elections are defined differently, depending on who is standing behind the microphone on the stages of town halls and squares across Montenegro. Party leaders and activists assure voters that these elections are either historic or reform, but also the most important in the recent history of Montenegro. It is said that the previous successful leadership of the country and the effort to protect its proclaimed Euro-Atlantic determination must be confirmed.
What he does not lack are promises. Between the ceremonial opening of empty clinics, the prime minister's grape picking, the offering of keys that will open the government's doors, and seven hundred and seven points of recovery, the Montenegrin electorate lies and grumbles. There is a significant difference between the offered versions of the future and voters in Montenegro should choose carefully. We should not forget that the omnipotence of politicians is one of the basic characteristics of every election campaign, so Montenegro is no exception.
No matter how you frame these elections politically and ideologically, several characteristics separate them from previous contests of political forces in Montenegro.
First, it is now clearer (much more than it was the case before) that the DPS has been ruling all these years and because its campaign is based on electoral theft, spreading fear of endangering national interests and blackmailing weaker political actors. It is actually a kind of package of fear that DPS leaders open as needed and depending on which part of Montenegro they are campaigning in before the elections: Montenegro is in danger of disappearing as an independent state; the Montenegrin language and identity are in danger of being erased; the non-Montenegrin population is frightened by hints that the climate of the XNUMXs may return; Montenegro can be sold to white world tycoons, etc. All this comes from a party that sent Montenegrin youth to kill and die for the sake of Yugoslavia, which "has no alternative" and which provided systemic and logistical support for the crimes committed against Muslim-Bosniaks, and transferred its wealth and resources into private hands, regardless of whether domestic or parties.
Second, it is obvious that the recent minor coalition partner, SDP, is going into a well-deserved political retirement. Despite the efforts of its leader, this party will be remembered as an agile accomplice in the decade-long plunder of Montenegrin resources and in the process of cementing the autocratic rule of M. Đukanović.
Third, since it mainly turned to economic and social issues, DF this time took a very important central position in the pre-election process. Despite the heterogeneity of political views of the constituents, this coalition managed to make a significant departure from identity themes and issues in the election campaign. The experience of the autumn protests was a lesson to work on organization and a clearer socio-economic message to the voters. With its actions so far, DF deconstructs the logic according to which DPS will rule forever and shows that this party can be defeated through the ballot box. This coalition has established itself as a rallying point for opposition forces and the results are already visible, and a significant election result is projected. Of course, the opposition's post-election negotiation struggles are yet to come, as it will not be easy to overcome personal ambitions and animosities, and the ability and willingness of the DPS to attract some of its former sympathizers should not be ignored either.
Fourth, it becomes obvious to what extent the minority parties have been instrumentalized by the ruling DPS. Their memberships are becoming aware of the fact that the party elites are prospering while they are wallowing in debt, unemployed and forgotten in the periods between elections. It is to be expected that this kind of realization will manifest itself on election day.
Fifth, and no less important, is the coalition performance of DEMOS, SNP and the civil association URA. This is an attempt to simultaneously consolidate what is seen as a Montenegrin and sovereignist electorate, and to introduce actors from the political past into the game, and to achieve cooperation across the Montenegrin-Serbian dividing line. Such an ambitious plan may come at the expense of the most important opposition group, the Democratic Front. In addition, it clearly shows the significant leadership and presidential aspirations of M. Lekić.
In the end, the issue of foreign influence on political events and election processes in Montenegro has lost the importance it had before. Mutual accusations about the American or Russian intention to influence the election result have become a Montenegrin echo of the American pre-election scandals. In addition, the newspaper comments and political advice of the American ambassador are only a confirmation that Montenegro is at the crossroads of foreign influences and that any story about the complete electoral or political independence of the actors is just a fairy tale and nothing else.
The most important message of this pre-election campaign is that in Montenegro it is possible to change the government in the elections only if the political leaders manage to overcome the "narcissism of small differences," and the voters are led to the polls by economic and social logic, and not by the flag, anthem, and national enthusiasm.
University of Alberta, Canada
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