With the military invasion and annexation of Crimea, and the ensuing war in Eastern Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin has clearly shown that he does not intend to respect the inviolability of borders and the primacy of international law. The time has come when Europeans, when it comes to the order of things on the continent (which is determined by the rule of law), should stop presenting wishes as the real state. Unfortunately, the world is not like that. It is much more complex and governed by force.
Russia's military involvement in Syria and the European refugee crisis have highlighted this fact. Europe must recognize that sooner or later, if it does not address its own geopolitical interests, crises from neighboring regions will arrive on its doorstep.
Unlike the USA, Europe is not a continent, an island, isolated by an ocean. It is the western part of the huge Eurasian continental massif. Eastern Europe, the Middle East and North Africa are the first neighbors and this unstable neighborhood represents the greatest risk for the security of Europe in the XNUMXst century.
How should Europe fight with Russia, which implements a great state policy and practically makes the same mistakes as the USSR (which relied on authoritarianism), should it not reconcile the ambitions of a military superpower with the reality of moderate development and a newly modernized economy?
Russia is a neighbor of Europe and this modus vivendi has an important meaning. At the same time, Russia's geopolitical ambitions, as before, are full of threats to the security of Europe. For this reason, a strong transatlantic relationship remains essential for Europe, as does the renewal of its nuclear deterrence potential.
In the foreseeable future, relations with Russia will likely be determined by efforts to end the war in Eastern Ukraine, preserve NATO territories in the east, and prevent the crisis from spreading to the southwest and the Balkans. However, outside the scope of today's crisis, a far more serious strategic challenge is emerging.
At the moment, Europe is pursuing a policy towards China that is based on a haphazard and contradictory mix of concern for human rights and corporate profits. Here, Europe must also demonstrate a significantly greater awareness of geopolitical risks and its own interests.
China, located in the eastern part of Eurasia, plans to rebuild the continental Silk Road through Central Asia and Russia, towards Europe. The pragmatic explanation for that gigantic strategic project (the volume of investments is about 3 trillion dollars) is the necessity of the development of western China, which practically did not gain anything from the economic success of the coastal regions. However, in reality, the project has primary importance mainly on the geopolitical plane: China, a powerful military power, wants to challenge the potential economic and political influence of the US, a military-naval power, in Eurasia.
From a practical point of view, China's Silk Road project will create a strategic alternative to Western transatlantic structures, with Russia either assuming the role of junior partner or risking conflict with China in Central Asia. But the choice between an Eastern and Western orientation is not in Europe's interest. On the contrary, it would tear Europe apart, both politically and economically. Europe, which is more closely related to America on the normative and economic level, needs guarantees of transatlantic security.
This is precisely why, in relations with Russia, the EU must stick to a course of consistent adherence to its principles and to NATO. However, at the same time, it needs good relations with China and cannot block the Silk Road project. That is why in relations with China, Europe must have a precise idea of its interests, which require a higher degree of unity of positions.
Meanwhile, the refugee crisis highlights the primary importance, for Europe, of the Balkan Peninsula (including Greece), which is the land route to the Near and Middle East. In this sense, Turkey is even more important for Europe. European leaders seriously recalculated at the beginning of the negotiations for Turkey's entry into the EU, assuming that, due to close ties, conflicts in the Middle East would become Europe's problem. As today's experience shows, in the absence of strong ties with Turkey, European influence in the region and beyond its borders - from the Black Sea to Central Asia - is practically zero.
The internal events in Turkey under President Erdogan and the renewed militarization of the Kurdish issue make the political approach far from simple. But Europe has no alternative (not only because of the refugees). All this is intensifying because the appearance of Russia in Syria and the de facto alliance between the Kremlin and Iran are once again pushing Turkey towards Europe and the West. It represents a real chance for a new beginning.
However, the potential for European influence in the Middle East remains low, and the region will remain dangerous for a long time to come. Europe must avoid taking sides in the conflicts between Shiites and Sunnis or between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Instead, Europe's interests will be best served if it pursues a course of strategic ambiguity.
At the same time, this is impossible to do in the Eastern Mediterranean. The entire Mediterranean region, including the strategic coast of North Africa, plays a decisive role in European security calculations. The selection reads: Mare Nostrum and the region of instability and uncertainty.
In this regard, the EU's policy towards Africa must, finally, renounce colonial models of thinking in favor of its own European interests. The priority must be the stabilization of North Africa, humanitarian aid and long-term support for political, economic and social progress. And closer ties must include opportunities for legal migration to Europe.
The return of geopolitics means that the fundamental choice facing Europe in the XNUMXst century will be between self-determination and external domination. And how Europe will consider this issue will determine not only its fate, but also that of the West.
The author was the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Vice Chancellor of Germany in 1998-2005.
Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2015.
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