During the long night of negotiations regarding the situation in Greece, from July 12 to 13, something that has a fundamental meaning for the European Union was cracked. From that moment on, Europeans live in a changed EU.
That evening, the Germany that Europeans knew after the end of World War II changed. On the surface, it was negotiated to prevent the exit of Greece from the Eurozone (the so-called Grexit) and the severe consequences for Greece and the monetary union. Deep down, however, it was about the role played in Europe by its most populous and economically powerful country.
The reconstruction of Germany after the Second World War and the restoration of trust in it in the world (culminating in the agreement for German unification), was built on solid foundations of domestic and foreign policy. On the domestic front, a stable democracy based on the rule of law quickly emerged. The economic success of Germany's welfare state became a model for Europe. And the readiness of the Germans to unreservedly admit the crimes of the Nazis constantly tempted deep-rooted skepticism in relation to all military matters.
On the foreign policy front, Germany built confidence by joining Western integration and Europeanization. A country in the center of Europe will no longer be a threat to the continent or itself. In this way, the goal of the Western Allies after 1945 - in contrast to their goals after the First World War - was not to isolate and weaken Germany economically, but to protect itself militarily and firmly embed itself in Western politics. And indeed, Germany's reconciliation with its sworn enemy, France, remains the basis of today's European Union, allowing Germany to join the single European market, with the aim of possible political unification of Europe.
But, to today's Germany, such ideas seem hopelessly "Euro-romantic", because their time has passed. From today, in affairs concerning Europe, Germany will first look at its national interests, like all other countries.
But that thinking is based on a false assumption. The path Germany must take in the XNUMXst century - towards "European Germany" or "German Europe" - has been a fundamental historical question at the very heart of German foreign policy for two centuries. The answer was found that long night in Brussels: German Europe defeated European Germany.
That decision was fateful, both for Germany and for Europe. The question arises - did Chancellor Angela Merkel and Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble know what they were doing?
One must not ignore, as many Germans do, the fierce criticism of Germany and its leading players that followed the Greek diktat. Of course, there was meaningless propaganda of the IV Reich and empty-headed references to the Fuehrer. But, in its essence, the critique formulates the insightful knowledge that Germany has broken with its entire post-war European policy.
For the first time in its recent history, Germany does not want to be tied to Europe anymore, but vice versa - it wants less. Germany's position on the night between July 12 and 13 revealed its desire to turn the Eurozone from a European project into a sphere of influence. Merkel had to choose between Schäuble and France (and Italy).
The question was fundamental: her finance minister wanted to force a member of the eurozone to leave "voluntarily", applying very strong pressure. Greece could either leave (fully realizing the disastrous consequences for the country and for Europe) or accept a program that effectively turns it into a European protectorate without any hope of improving its economic situation. They are now trying to heal Greece through the continuation of strict austerity, which has yielded results in the past and which is intended only for Germany's internal needs.
But that big conflict with France and Italy (the second and third largest economies of the Eurozone) has not ended, because for Schäuble, the exit of Greece from the Eurozone remains one of the options for solving the situation. Claiming that debt relief is only "legally" possible outside the eurozone, he wants to redirect the problem to ensure a "voluntary" exit of Greece.
Schäuble's position has highlighted a fundamental issue between Southern and Northern Europe, as he threatens to stretch the eurozone to its limits. The belief that the euro can be used to "re-educate" Southern Europe is a dangerous delusion... and not only in Greece. The French and Italians already know that because of such a view, the entire EU project, built on the foundations of diversity and solidarity, will be under threat. Germany has managed to benefit greatly from European integration - both economically and politically. One only needs to compare the history of Germany in the first and second half of the XNUMXth century. Bismarck's unification of Germany in the XNUMXth century took place at a time when European nationalism was at its peak. According to German thinking - power has become inextricably linked to nationalism and militarism. In the end, unlike France, Great Britain or the USA, which legalized foreign policy under the conditions of a "civilizing mission", Germany recognizes its power in terms of brute military force.
The foundation of the second, only German nation-state in 1989 was created by Germany's irrevocable western orientation and Europeanization. The Europeanization of German politics filled and as before fills the gap in civilization, embodied in the German state. Distancing or, worse, rejecting that thinking altogether would be stupidity of the highest order. Precisely because of this, in the European Union that appeared on the morning of July 13, both Germany and Europe risk losing a lot.
The author was the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Germany 1998-2005; he is one of the founders of the German Green Party, which he led for almost two decades.
Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2015
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