REBEL REALIST

Ukraine, the soul of Europe

Russia's goal is not to occupy Ukraine in a military sense, but to prevent political and economic stability - a strategy that may include the de facto secession of a significant part of eastern Ukraine
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Maidan
Maidan
Disclaimer: The translations are mostly done through AI translator and might not be 100% accurate.
Ažurirano: 15.10.2014. 09:38h

In November of this year, it will be one year since the uprising on Kyiv's Euromaidan. The majority of the population of Ukraine switched to the opposition after the then president refused to sign the agreement on the country's accession to the European Union (reached after many years of negotiations), all in favor of entering the customs union with Russia. This would lead to Ukraine's turning to the East, along with Russian President Vladimir Putin's entry into the Eurasian Alliance, and ruling out any possibility of joining the EU, at any time.

Given that the crisis in Ukraine continues, the starting point is the following - it is the first pro-European revolution in the XNUMXst century caused by opposition to Russian influence and post-Soviet corruption and inefficiency. This is important to keep in mind. A lot has happened since then: Russia started an undeclared war, first by occupying and then annexing Crimea. In the east of Ukraine, the Kremlin continues the war - from a military point of view for Kiev, it seems hopeless - in the Donbass region.

Russia's goal is not to occupy Ukraine in a military sense, but to prevent political and economic stability - a strategy that may include the de facto secession of a significant part of eastern Ukraine. In addition, Putin will use the full range of instruments at his disposal - including, of course, energy supplies - to suppress and keep pressure on Ukraine this winter. Europeans must prepare for what will happen. Putin is counting on time being on his side; he is convinced that he will still be in the same position when all his Western colleagues - Obama, Cameron, Hollande and Merkel - have long since left the political scene.

From a military point of view, Ukraine has never had, nor will it have, a chance against the Russian army. But the fate of the country will not be decided only on the battlefield, but also on the economic, legal, administrative and political terrain. The fateful question is this: will Ukraine be able to successfully become more European if it is under enormous pressure of military aggression from a much larger and stronger neighbor. Let's be direct: either the country will follow the example of Poland's successful transition to Europe, or it will once again fall under the long-term influence of Russia. For Europe, the fate of Ukraine is a vitally important strategic issue, because its independence was the cornerstone of the European order in the post-Cold War period and its basis for peace.

Russia's subjugation of Ukraine by military force will bring down the curtain on that order and its fundamental principles: non-violence, immutability of borders and popular self-determination, not spheres of influence. This will entail enormous consequences for security not only in Eastern Europe, but also on the continent as a whole. Revanchist Russia will again - in addition to Kaliningrad and the Baltic countries - get a longer common border with the European Union and will seek another, more prominent role: the restoration of a great European power. For Europe, it would be a fundamental change for the worse.

Cooperation will give way to confrontation, trust to mistrust, and arms control to additional armaments. If the EU and its members (with the exception of Poland and the Baltic countries) can be blamed for something, it cannot be reaching an agreement with Ukraine on free trade, but ignoring the importance of Ukraine in the European order in the post-Cold War period, which is reflected in insufficient support for modernization countries.

Western politicians had to admit that the Ukrainian Orange Revolution of 2004, triggered by Yanukovych's attempt to steal the presidential election, represented both a warning and an opportunity, because the same goals and principles they insist on today were valid then. Ultimately, the Orange Revolution failed because the new leadership lacked the ability and incentive to implement far-reaching economic and other internal reforms, which is partly related to the lack of interest in the West.

With winter approaching, the Euromaidan revolution has reached that point again, and the challenge (task) remains the same as ten years ago. Will the West provide the large-scale and vigorous assistance Ukraine needs to become more European from within and break free from corruption and oligarchic rule in its post-Soviet economy and society? Ukraine remains a potentially rich country, and it is today closer to Europe - and vice versa - than at any time in its recent past. In the event that Ukraine succeeds in breaking its post-Soviet chains, then there will be no obstacles to its EU membership. In addition, the West, at last, seems to understand what is at stake on the map of Ukraine - precisely the future of the European order.

The success of the Euromaidan revolution depends to a decisive extent on the Ukrainian people and their ability to break free from the structures and forces of the past, and also on the support of the West, its generosity and perseverance. In Goethe's Faust, Mephistopheles describes himself as "part of that force which eternally wills evil, and eternally does good." After all, the same can be applied to Putin.

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