This year marks the centenary of the beginning of the First World War, which is reason enough to reflect on what this European disaster, which left many consequences, teaches us today. Indeed, the consequences of the Great War on international relations and the global system of states are still being felt. So, have we learned anything from the political failures of governments, institutions and international diplomacy that occurred in the summer of 1914?
Large parts of the Northern Hemisphere still struggle with the legacies of the great European empires - Habsburg, Russian and Ottoman - that collapsed after the First World War, or whose decline, as in the case of the British Empire, began with this war and a generation later sealed in an even bloodier conflict. The resulting cleavage zones – for example in the Balkans and the Middle East – are today the source of some of the greatest risks to regional and even world peace.
After the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet successor to the Russian Empire, war returned to the Balkans under circumstances very similar to those that dominated the period before 1914, with an aggressive nationalism that eventually reshaped the disintegrating Yugoslavia into six separate states. Of course, Serbian President Slobodan Milošević, whose call for a "Greater Serbia" was the trigger for the war, was not alone: for a moment, Europe was in danger of returning to the conflicts of 1914, because France and the United Kingdom supported Serbia, and Germany and Austria were on Croatia's side.
Fortunately, there was no repeat, as the West learned from its historical mistakes. Today, there are three factors that are important to avoid a catastrophe: the US military presence in Europe, the progress of European integration, and the fact that Europe has abandoned the politics of the struggle for supremacy. However, there is no point in fooling ourselves: today's fragile peace in the region will last as long as the Balkan countries believe in the European Union and the benefits of membership in the bloc.
There is currently no such hope for the Middle East, whose modern political borders were largely drawn by Britain and France during the First World War, when diplomats Mark Sykes and François Georges-Picot negotiated the division of the Ottoman Empire. Similarly, the creation of Israel dates back to the Balfour Declaration of 1917, on the basis of which the later British administration in Palestine supported the formation of a Jewish national state.
The Middle East created then is more or less the Middle East we know today. But we are currently witnessing its disintegration, since Sykes-Picot's idea always implied a strong external hegemonic power (or two) willing and able to maintain stability by channeling (or quelling) numerous conflicts in the region. Great Britain and France, the first hegemons, were succeeded by the United States and the Soviet Union - and then only the USA.
Because of America's failure in Iraq, its exhaustion as a world power and its reluctance to maintain its previous level of commitment to the region, the idea of Sykes and Picot has become unsustainable, because there is no longer any external force to maintain order. The vacuum that followed was filled by various currents of political Islam, terrorism, protest movements, insurgencies, secessionist attempts by national or religious minorities, and rising regional hegemons (Iran and Saudi Arabia).
In fact, the partial US withdrawal indicates that ending the imposed stability of the old Middle East will not preserve the Sykes-Picot borders. Events in Syria and Iraq already foreshadow a lot, and the future of Jordan and Lebanon is becoming increasingly uncertain.
One of the few positive features of the region is that there are now no rivalries between global powers. However, a regional struggle for supremacy between Iran and Saudi Arabia (with Israel as a third player) could turn out to be even more dangerous, given the prevailing - and deep-rooted - mentality of a traditional struggle for supremacy. In the region, there are hardly any institutions and traditions that advocate for a common solution to the conflict.
The memory of 1914 can also trigger concern in East Asia, where all the elements of a similar catastrophe have accumulated: nuclear weapons, the rise of China as a global power, unresolved territorial and border disputes, the division of the Korean peninsula, historical intolerance, an obsession with status and prestige, and almost no mechanisms for joint solution.
Mistrust and the struggle for supremacy are the order of the day.
And yet there are grounds for optimism in East Asia. From the summer of 1914 onwards, the world changed drastically. There were two billion people in the world then; now there are seven billion. This, along with the communications revolution, has created even more interdependence and forced governments to cooperate more - as has the continued presence of the US as a stabilizer in the region, which has proven necessary. Moreover, although nuclear weapons pose a constant threat, they also inhibit the risks of war as a means of struggle for supremacy because they make mutual destruction predictable.
In the hundred years since the First World War began, a lot has changed - military technology, the mindset of politicians and citizens, the structure of international diplomacy and many other things. And yes - we even learned a few things from history that make the world safer. But we have forgotten the last one: in the summer of 1914, most of the actors considered the approaching catastrophe impossible.
The author was the German head of diplomacy and vice chancellor (1998-2005); he was the founder and leader of the German Green Party for almost 20 years
Translation: Danka Vraneš Redžić
Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2014.
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