Apparently, something like this is happening to the European Union for the first time: the government of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych pretended to be conducting negotiations on the Association Agreement, only to abandon it at the last moment. EU leaders felt cheated, and Moscow was in a festive mood on the occasion.
As we now understand, Yanukovych's real motive in the negotiations was the desire to raise the price that Russia should pay in order to keep Ukraine in its strategic orbit. Only a few days later, Yanukovych and Russian President Vladimir Putin disclosed information about a Russian loan of 15 billion US dollars, a reduction in the price of natural gas, and also about various trade agreements.
From Yanukovych's point of view, the deal made sense in the short term: the gas deal would help Ukraine survive the winter, the loan would keep the country from going bankrupt due to debt, and the Russian market, on which the economy depends, would remain open. However, in the medium term, the rejection of the EU and rapprochement with Russia will put Ukraine at risk of losing its own independence - on which the post-Soviet order in Europe depends.
From the point of view of its strategic orientation, Ukraine is a divided country. Its eastern and southern regions (especially Crimea) want to return to Russia, while its western and northern regions insist on moving towards Europe. In the foreseeable future, that conflict can be resolved, if such a thing is even possible, only with a large amount of violence, as demonstrated by the mass protests in Kyiv. However, no sane person could wish for such an outcome. Ukraine needs a peaceful and democratic solution, and it can only be found within the framework of preserving the status quo.
The behavior of the European Union requires an explanation. Yanukovych has always been an ally of the Kremlin. Indeed, his election in 2010 ended the pro-European Orange Revolution in Ukraine (which came down to his attempt to falsify the 2004 presidential election) and ensured that Ukraine remained in the Russian camp. So why did the EU insist on signing the Association Agreement, without being able to offer Ukraine even something similar to what Russia offered?
The answer can be found in the relations between Europe and Russia. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia not only lost its superpower status; in Europe, she was forced to return beyond the borders she had extended in the west in the time of Peter the Great - ultimately towards the Elbe and Thuringia. When Putin succeeded Yeltsin as president of the Russian Federation, he pursued the three strategic goals he still has today: end post-Soviet Russia's dependence on the West, re-establish sovereignty over most of the former Soviet republics, or at least enough control over them to stop NATO expansion to the east and, in the end, gradually restore Russia's superpower status.
The realization of these goals should not be achieved with the help of the Red Army, but with the help of Russia's economic potential, especially with the help of a strategic energy policy made possible by huge natural gas reserves. This will require securing control over those resources. In addition, it will require the creation of new export routes to Europe, bypassing Ukraine, which will make it more susceptible to blackmail, because denying gas to Ukraine will no longer concern Europe. The ultimate goal is to regain control over Ukraine's gas pipeline network. In that case, it will be possible to persuade Ukraine to join Putin's "Eurasian Union," Russia's alternative to the EU, which aims to keep the former Soviet republics in Russia's sphere of influence.
Along with using the Nord Stream and South Stream pipelines to eliminate Ukraine from Russian energy exports to Europe, the Kremlin has successfully blocked European access to the hydrocarbon-rich Caspian Sea and Central Asia. Russia's gas pipeline network is virtually the only export route to the West for countries such as Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. The only exception is the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, extended by the US and connecting Azerbaijan and Turkey; Europe has done nothing similar.
None of this is a secret to European capitals; on the contrary, Putin's final goal - a far-reaching revision of the strategic order in Europe, established after the end of the Cold War - is becoming more and more obvious as Russia gets closer to its realization. However, neither the EU nor the USA were willing or able (so far) to give an effective response.
The EU initiative in Ukraine should have been an attempt to provide such an answer. Europe played at high stakes, because the loss of Ukraine's independence in any form would pose a threat to European security – it is a risk that is most felt in Poland and the Baltic countries. With Yanukovych's rejection of the Association Agreement, the EU lost its stake.
Putin should not be blamed for his skillful interpretation of Russian interests. The blame for the consequences in Ukraine falls on the EU leaders who have so badly represented the interests of Europe. Grand gestures and paper-thin statements cannot hide that Europe has neglected its own strategic interests, which will not be useful in its mutual relations with Russia. If Europeans want to change that, they will have to invest in their own interests, and also work out an effective approach that will guarantee that those investments will pay off.
It is fair not only in relation to Ukraine. At the end of 2013, Russian diplomacy could look back on a year of striking successes: Syria, the nuclear agreement with Iran, and now Ukraine's rejection of Europe. A serious question remains whether European leaders have seen the connections and understood the consequences. This fact alone causes serious concern.
The author was the German Minister of Foreign Affairs and Vice-Chancellor from 1998-2005; he was the head of the German Green Party for almost two decades
Translation: N. RADOIČIĆ
Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2013.
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