No one could have predicted the victory of Hassan Rouhani in the presidential elections in Iran. Even Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was probably more than surprised by his victory in the first round after a campaign that started with eight candidates. As a result, negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program, as well as the civil war in Syria, could take on a new dynamic.
However, it is the same with the situation in the Middle East: you never know what will happen next.
This year marks the tenth anniversary of the launch of negotiations at the level of foreign ministers between Iran and the European triumvirate - Germany, France and Britain - on Iran's nuclear program. I was there, representing Germany; there was also Rouhani, who led the Iranian delegation.
Negotiations have continued to date - in an expanded format that includes Germany and the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (P+1) - without any tangible results. Now Rouhani is returning to the risky issue of Iran's nuclear program. This time as president. What can we - and he - expect?
Based on my personal experience, Rohani is polite and open. Unlike outgoing President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, he is surrounded by highly skilled and experienced diplomats. However, there is no doubt that he is a man of the regime - a realist and a moderate member of the political elite of the Islamic Republic - and not a representative of the opposition. And, of course, he supports Iran's nuclear program.
If Rouhani is to succeed in office, he will have to keep his promise to improve the living standards of Iranians without endangering the Islamic Republic in the process. It won't be easy; it might actually be unfeasible.
The economic progress that voters demanded with Rouhani's election is almost certainly possible only if international sanctions are lifted. However, the lifting of international sanctions requires progress in the nuclear negotiations.
It may also require at least a temporary shift in the field of major regional conflicts. The Middle East has changed dramatically in the last ten years. America has reduced its involvement, withdrawing troops from Iraq and reducing engagement in Afghanistan. At the same time, we are witnessing the disintegration of the old Middle East created by France and Britain after the First World War, when the two major European colonial powers imposed territorial administration in Palestine, Syria (including today's Lebanon), Transjordan and Iraq.
A new regional order is not yet recognized, which points to a future full of risk and chaos. As Iran seeks to assert its influence and interests as well as those of its Shiite allies, its dispute with the Security Council over its nuclear program has become closely linked to its regional ambitions. After all, the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iraq would most likely exacerbate violent conflict and a nuclear arms race in the region. As a result, these issues may have to be successfully addressed before any lifting of sanctions.
Iran and its international interlocutors should learn from the past and adjust expectations accordingly. There won't be any quick fixes (if any at all), given the diametrically opposed interests of the parties involved, their domestic obstacles, and the deep lack of trust on all sides.
Moreover, apart from negotiations with the P5+1, Iran should initiate direct negotiations with the US. He would probably need to improve relations with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states and change his behavior towards Israel if a positive outcome is to be achieved.
Similarly, the West will have to understand that the Islamic Republic is not a monolithic dictatorship. The regime has multiple centers of power, which influence and constrain each other's decisions. The office of the president is not just one center of power. The same applies to the supreme leader, who, despite the title, is not an absolute ruler.
Iran has tried two political approaches in the past ten years: a reformist model during the tenure of President Muhammad Khatami and hard-line radicalism during Ahmadinejad's rule. Both approaches failed. The reformists could not overcome conservative opposition while the radicals could not defeat the domestic economic realities imposed by their foreign and nuclear policies.
Rouhani must seek a path that will not cost him the support of most of the regime's power centers, but that also allows him to fulfill the mandate he received from the voters. At home, massive mistrust will further complicate an already difficult task.
In America and in the West, many will likely see Rouhani as the friendly face of the Islamic Republic, while Ahmadinejad was its true – and therefore more radical – embodiment. Many Iranians, in turn, see Obama as a friendly face of the US who still wants regime change in their country, while his predecessor, George W. Bush, was a more honest - therefore more radical - representative of America. Both perceptions distort reality, although there is truth in both.
Despite these perceptions - or precisely because of them - Rouhani's presidency offers an unexpected chance for both nuclear negotiations and a political solution in Syria. Iran's participation in the international peace conference is absolutely necessary, if only to test Rouhani's seriousness. During the 2001 Bonn conference on Afghanistan, Iran acted pragmatically and pursued results - an approach that the US did not reward.
As for the nuclear negotiations, the P5+1 will focus on objective guarantees that leave Iran no path to military use of its nuclear facilities. For Iran, the main point of its efforts will be the recognition of the right to civilian use of nuclear energy in accordance with the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and its protocols. Both issues seem simpler than they are: the devil is in the details, and the details leave a lot of room for disagreement over definition, oversight, and imposition of conditions. Once again, it is essential to maintain realistic expectations. A successful outcome of the nuclear negotiations and the resolution or even containment of major regional conflicts will be difficult to achieve. However, it would be extremely irresponsible if we do not take advantage of the unexpected opportunity created by Rouhani's election with all our strength, good faith and creativity.
Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2013.
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