When hostilities flared up in Gaza last month, it seemed like the old story was repeating itself. The world once again experienced a bloody and senseless wave of violence between Israel and Hamas in which the main victims were innocent civilians who were maimed and killed on both sides.
This time, however, things were not as they seemed, as significant changes had taken place in the Middle East over the past two years. The political epicenter of this troubled region has shifted from the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians to the Persian Gulf and the struggle for regional dominance between Iran on the one hand and Saudi Arabia, Turkey and now Egypt on the other. In the current struggle between Shiite and Sunni forces in the region, the old Middle Eastern conflict has become secondary.
Today, the key conflict in this struggle for power is the civil war in Syria, in which all important regional players participate either directly or indirectly, because it is the terrain on which the regional battle for hegemony will mostly be resolved. One thing is clear: Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and his Alawite-Shiite power base will not be able to maintain control over the Sunni majority in the country and the region as a whole. The only question is when the regime will fall.
When that happens, it will be a major defeat for Iran, not only because they will lose their main Arab ally, but also because the position of their protégé, the Lebanese Hezbollah, will be threatened. At the same time, some kind of Muslim Brotherhood will come to power in Syria, as was or will be the case almost everywhere in the Middle East as a result of the "Arab Awakening".
From Israel's point of view, the rise in power of Sunni political Islam in the region over the past two years will have an unpredictable outcome. Although weakening Iran benefits Israel's strategic interests, the Jewish state will have to count on Sunni Islamist forces everywhere in its vicinity, which will directly lead to the strengthening of Hamas. The rise of the Muslim Brotherhood and its offshoots has come at the expense of secular Arab nationalism and the military dictatorships that supported it. Thus, the rise of the Brothers de facto resolves the internal struggle for power among the Palestinians. With the recent war in Gaza, the Palestinian National Movement will join, under the leadership of Hamas, this development in the region. Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas and his Fatah party won't be able to argue much - especially in light of Hamas' break with Iran (regardless of current arms deliveries) a year ago.
This development of events most likely puts an end to the prospect of a two-state solution, because neither Israel, nor Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood have any interest in it. Hamas and the Brotherhood reject the territorial compromise, because for them a Palestinian state means a Palestine that includes all of Israel.
This in no way means a tactical position or an expression of political naivety. On the contrary, the territorial issue has been reshaped into a religious one, thus fundamentally redefining the conflict.
Hamas is playing the long game. As long as he lacks the strength to achieve his ambitious goals, his uncompromising nature will in no way preclude negotiations with Israel, or even peace agreements, as long as such agreements support his long-term goals. However, such agreements will only produce shorter or longer truces, not a comprehensive solution to end the conflict.
The recent success of Abbas in the UN General Assembly - upgrading the status of Palestine to a non-member state - will not change the basic aspects of this trend. The promotion of Palestine represents an alarming diplomatic defeat for Israel and is an indication of its increasing international isolation, but it does not mean a return to the two-state solution.
Paradoxically, the position of Hamas corresponds to the political right in Israel, because it also gives a glimmer of hope for a two-state solution. However, neither the Israeli left (of which little is left) nor Fatah are strong enough to preserve the two-state option. For Israel, the future of a binational state entails high long-term risk, unless the option of a confederation between the West Bank and Jordan, which was lost in the 1980s, is rediscovered. This is again a possibility. Indeed, after the fall of Bashar al-Assad's regime, Jordan could become the next crisis flashpoint, which could revive the debate about Jordan as a "real" Palestinian state. Israel's settlement policy in the West Bank would then have a different foundation and gain new political significance. While I do not believe that the option of a confederation between the West Bank and Jordan could ever be viable, it could still be the final nail in the coffin of a two-state solution.
Along with Syria, these two issues will determine the new future of the Middle East: Egypt's path led by the Muslim Brotherhood and the outcome of the conflict with Iran over its nuclear program and regional role.
The Egyptian issue is already at the top of the agenda; in fact, it spilled into the streets as President Mohamed Morsi attempted a nonviolent coup. Morsi's timing was remarkable: a day after winning international praise for successfully brokering a ceasefire in Gaza, he launched a frontal attack on Egypt's fledgling democracy.
The question is whether the Brothers will prevail, both on the streets and with the help of the new Egyptian constitution (which they mostly write). If they succeed, will the West withhold support for Egyptian democracy in the name of "stability"? That would be a big mistake.
The question of what to do with Iran's nuclear program will return as a punishment in January after the second presidential inauguration of Barack Obama in the US and the general election in Israel, and will require an answer within a few months.
The New Middle East will have a bad time next year. But one thing doesn't change: it's still the Middle East, where it's almost impossible to know what's around the corner.
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