Versatility is not really a strong point of the current generation of European leaders. They did the right thing when they prioritized the Eurozone crisis. However, all other important issues – above all, the common foreign and security policy – were almost completely ignored. And precisely here - in Europe's foreign relations - an issue that is of absolute importance for all EU citizens - renationalisation rears its ugly head again.
Today we can recognize the contours of the post-American international (non)order – not only its structure, but also its risks, threats and conflicts, all of which are intensifying. It turns out that for Europe – and for the rest of the world – the financial crisis has accelerated far-reaching changes.
In East Asia, the most dynamic and dominant region in terms of future global development, confrontation is escalating between key powers - China, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan - over issues of borders, territorial claims, prestige and unfinished historical business. To this can be added the eternal crisis on the Korean peninsula and the Taiwan conflict, which could flare up again at any moment.
East Asian regional powers function almost without any multilateral framework, a situation that can be compared to the European one at the end of the 19th century. Only the military and political presence of the United States ensures regional stability. However, at least in the medium term, that presence implies a significant risk of escalating the global conflict between China and the US. Moreover, Russia - which extends into East Asia but, due to its economic and political weakness, is a background player there - will certainly seek to benefit from such developments.
Europe, however, will not play any role in that region, simply because any such attempt would strain its resources too much. However, given Europe's growing economic dependence on East Asia, its interests are very much at stake – a disagreement that could cause the EU great discomfort in the medium term.
The same applies, to a different extent, to Europe's relations with South Asia, but there the India-Pakistan conflict, the "post-American" Afghanistan in 2014 and the uncertainty surrounding Iran and the Persian Gulf have a direct security impact on the EU. This is where discomfort comes into contact with danger.
Russia made a choice during Putin's third term. Under the banner of the "Eurasian Union", relying on its renationalized oil and gas sectors as a carrot and a stick, the Kremlin wants to connect as many former Soviet territories as possible with the motherland. At the center of this policy is Ukraine, the axis of the post-Soviet European order.
However, Putin ran into a fundamental contradiction. His Greater Russia policy requires economic strength and therefore successful modernization of the country. However, to achieve this, he must encourage reforms that would lead to a strong middle class that, as can already be seen in Russia's major cities, opposes Putin's clientelistic "supposed democracy" and the massive corruption that goes with it.
Putin's dilemma presents a real challenge for the EU and the US – but also an opportunity, if they choose significant long-term engagement. On both sides of the Atlantic, however, ignoring those issues seems to be misconstrued as politics.
This is a major oversight because it is clear that Russian foreign policy has once again taken a provocative and confrontational turn. Russia remains a staunch ally of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and does not shy away from conflict with Turkey or from creating a de facto alliance with Iran to defend the Assad regime.
Along with the clouds of war over Iran's nuclear program, the failed Israeli-Palestinian peace process and radical political changes across the Middle East, the conflict in Syria shows that southeastern Europe will continue to be a major security challenge. Yet despite Russia's ambitions to reshape its neighborhood, and despite the diminishing involvement of the US in the Middle East – Europe is hardly ready to act.
It is clear that relations between Turkey and the EU need a "reset". Otherwise, both parties will find themselves among the losers. Turkey has reached the limit of its capabilities, while the EU realizes that it can do very little in the region without Turkey.
And, from the southern side of Europe, across the Mediterranean, new risks are emerging in the vastness of North Africa and the Sahara, including the threat from the Al Qaeda state in northern Mali.
If we add to this European outline of global developments the fact that America, regardless of the outcome of the US elections, will shift its strategic focus to East Asia, everything points to the need for a strong EU foreign and security policy. Unfortunately, the exact opposite is happening: and this is where renationalization is of primary importance in the minds of the European people and decision-makers.
The question that is being asked more and more often in Berlin is: "What does this mean for Germany?" and not "What does this mean for Europe?" The same applies to other European capitals. However, the wrong question leads to the wrong answers because Europe's security interests can only be defended in the context of Europe and the West, not at the national level.
That is why it is high time for Europeans to abandon their provincialism, launch a valid common foreign policy and finally begin to invest in their future security in the right way. Europe must grow up and develop the capacity to defend its own interests because the day will soon come when others will not be as willing to do it for us as they once were.
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