About 2.500 years ago, the ancient Greek philosopher Heraclitus concluded that war is the father of all things. Perhaps he could have added that the crisis is their mother.
Fortunately, war between world powers is no longer a realistic option due to the threat of mutual nuclear annihilation. However, major international crises, such as the current global financial one, are still present - which may not be such a bad thing.
Just as in war, crises fundamentally disrupt the status quo, which means that they create a chance - without the destructive force of war - for change that would be difficult to achieve in normal times. To overcome the crisis, it is necessary to do things that were previously hardly imaginable, let alone feasible.
This is exactly what happened to the European Union in the past three years, because the global financial crisis not only shook the foundations of Europe, but also took on extremely threatening proportions.
Compared to the beginning of 2009, we are now faced with a significantly different EU – one that has become divided between the leading member states that make up the eurozone and the background ones, i.e. of those members who are outside it. The reason is not a bad intention but rather the pressure of the crisis. If they want the euro to survive, eurozone members must act, while other EU members with different levels of commitment to European integration remain on the sidelines.
Indeed, almost all the taboos that existed after the outbreak of the crisis have now been broken. Most were created at the instigation of Germany, but have now been removed with the active support of the German government.
It's an impressive list: national responsibility for bailing out banks: strict adherence to EU bailout treaty regulations; rejection of European economic governance; prohibition of direct financing of the government by the European Central Bank; refusal to support shared responsibility for debt; and finally, the transformation of the ECB from a copy of the old Bundesbank into a European Federal Reserve Bank based on the Anglo-Saxon model.
What remains is the rejection of Eurobonds, but that too will eventually disappear. The only question is whether that taboo will be broken before or after the general elections in Germany next year. The answer depends on the future direction of the crisis.
Germany, the largest economy in the Eurozone, is playing a strange, sometimes bizarre role in the crisis. Never since the founding of the Federal Republic in 1949 has that country been so strong. It became the leading power of the EU; but she is neither willing nor able to lead.
For this very reason, many changes in Europe took place despite German opposition. In the end, the German government had to resort to the art of political pivoting, and the result was that Germany, although economically strong, weakened institutionally – and this dynamic is embodied in its reduced influence on the Governing Council of the ECB.
The old Bundesbank was laid to rest on September 6, when the ECB adopted a program of "direct monetary transactions" – unlimited purchases of sovereign bonds of affected eurozone members – with only one member against: Bundesbank President Jens Weidmann. And the initiator was not ECB President Mario Draghi, but German Chancellor Angela Merkel.
The Bundesbank was not the victim of an evil conspiracy of Southern Europe, but rather made itself irrelevant. If it were her way, the Eurozone would no longer exist. Giving primacy to ideology over pragmatism is a formula for failure in any crisis.
Currently, the eurozone is on the threshold of a banking union, to be followed by a fiscal union. However, even with just a banking union, the pressure to create a political union will grow.
With 27 members (28 with the impending accession of Croatia), amendments to EU treaties will be impossible, not only because the United Kingdom remains opposed to deeper European integration, but also because referendums will be necessary in many member states.
Those plebiscites will be a verdict on the crisis policy of national governments, which no sane thinking person will want.
This means that in some future period, agreements between governments will be needed and that the Eurozone will develop in the direction of intergovernmental federalism. It promises to be exciting, as it will offer completely unexpected opportunities for political integration.
In the end, the position of the former French President Nicolas Sarkozy prevailed, because today the Eurozone is led by a de facto economic government consisting of heads of state and government (and their finance ministers). European federalists should welcome this, because the more these heads of state and government turn into the government of the eurozone as a whole, the faster their current dual role as the executive and legislative branches of the EU will become obsolete.
The European Parliament will not be able to fill the resulting vacuum, because it lacks fiscal sovereignty, which is still under the umbrella of national parliaments and will remain there indefinitely. Only national parliaments can fill that vacuum and they need a common platform within the eurozone – a kind of "euro assembly" – through which they can control European economic governance.
Federalists in the European Parliament, and in Brussels in general, should not feel threatened. On the contrary, they should recognize and use this unique chance. National and MEPs should quickly meet and clarify their relationship. In the medium term, a bicameral European Parliament could be formed.
The crisis offers Europe a huge chance. It defined the agenda for the coming years: banking union, fiscal union and political union. What is missing is an economic growth strategy for crisis states. But, given the growing unrest in southern Europe, such a strategy is inevitable. Europeans have reason to be optimistic if they recognize the opportunity created by their crisis and move boldly and decisively to take advantage of it.
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