Negotiations between Iran, on the one hand, and the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and Germany, on the other, regarding Iran's nuclear program are entering a new and probably decisive phase. Negotiations, with long interruptions, have been going on for almost a decade, and whether a sudden success will be achieved this time is anyone's guess. However, the situation has never been as serious as it is now, and peace is on shaky legs.
However, after the recent visits of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to Washington and Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan to Tehran, the murky situation has become clearer. US President Barack Obama appears to have bought time by drawing the line - the start of Iran's explicit nuclear weapons program - and assuring Israel of US readiness for military action if negotiations fail.
Moreover, given the threat of military conflict, the US, along with Europe and other partners, imposed tough new "smart" sanctions targeting Iran's oil exports - the country's main source of income - and largely isolated the Islamic Republic from international payments. Iran urgently needs revenues from the sale of oil, and without participation in payment transactions, the country's trade is reduced to zero. Barter and briefcases with cash are not viable alternatives. So, the Iranian economy has been shaken to its core.
Through various channels, the United States appears to have conveyed both the seriousness of the situation and its own intentions to the Iranian leadership in a credible manner. So, if this round of negotiations were to fail, a major – and entirely predictable – tragedy could ensue.
The good news is that all parties involved seem to be aware of this, which should focus officials on a serious negotiation process and a diplomatic solution. Moreover, it should be clear soon whether Iran is serious about compromise this time.
The content of such a compromise is more or less clear: acceptance that Iran is enriching low-level uranium for civilian purposes and stronger and verifiable safeguards such as more comprehensive inspection rights for the International Atomic Energy Agency inside Iran. For example, for the IAEA to gain access to Iran's previously closed nuclear facilities.
Of course, the compromise would not refer to the behavior of the Iranian regime in relation to internal issues and regional ambitions - a source of concern for both Israel and the Arab Gulf countries, primarily Saudi Arabia. However, since no one is seriously prepared to go to war for regime change in Iran, especially after the decades-long disaster in Iraq, negotiations should not be slowed down by idle aspirations.
This is equally true of Iran, where some influential people still think that the US can be driven out of the Middle East and that the status quo can be changed so that Iran becomes the hegemonic power in the region. This illusion, no less than Western hopes for Iranian regime change, could only be pursued at an indefensible high risk of war and regional chaos.
Other significant factors will play an important role in deciding the outcome of these negotiations. The first concerns Iran's internal politics and the current struggle for power within the regime - a struggle that has already made a diplomatic solution impossible, since neither conservatives nor reformists were willing to allow President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad a diplomatic triumph. There is only hope, given the seriousness of the situation, that this path to failure will be cut short.
It is equally likely that developments in Syria, Iran's last ally in the region, will play a significant role. The fall of the regime of President Bashar al-Assad would contribute to the strategic debacle of Iran, which would then face a united front of Arab countries with the support of Turkey, the US and, to some extent, Israel. It would then be difficult for Iran to maintain its foothold in Lebanon, and its position would become more complicated even in Iraq, despite the Shiite majority there. In short, his efforts at regional dominance would fail.
In light of the complexity of external factors, it would be important not to overload the nuclear negotiations with issues that are not intended to be addressed there. Syria, the future of the Iranian regime, the situation in the Persian Gulf and the wider region: all these problems must be solved at a different level and at a different time if the risk of war due to Iran's nuclear program is to be avoided.
Ever since Alexander the Great unforgettably solved the riddle of the Gordian knot with a stroke of his sword, people have dreamed of a simple military solution to complex problems. But too often the application of a military solution leads to even more problems. In Iraq, George Bush Jr., Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld showed that the use of military force only as a last resort is not only an ethical and moral imperative, but also an imperative based on realpolitik.
There are times when the use of military force becomes unavoidable, but it must never be chosen as an alternative to diplomacy. This is certainly true of today's "Persian knot".
However, today both sides face that choice - war or diplomacy.
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