Regardless of whether democratization in the "new Middle East" will succeed or whether authoritarian forms of government will once again prevail, one fundamental change has already become clear: no one will be able to rule without taking into account domestic public opinion.
That change will shift the foreign policy parameters of the conflict in the Middle East (considered both Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-Arab conflict). Despite the wars in Lebanon and Gaza and the intifadas in the occupied West Bank, these parameters have been surprisingly stable for decades, cemented by the peace accords with Egypt and Jordan and the Oslo Accords with the Palestinians.
All this is about to change. Although the tectonic shift in the region was caused by the "Arab Awakening", its participants are not limited to the Arab world or to the framework of conflicts in the Middle East. The United States, Europe, Turkey and, in a sense, Iran, have a role to play in this - some more directly than others.
Let's start with the US. President Obama's speech in Cairo two years ago created high expectations, but very few, if any, were met. Instead, the US allowed a political vacuum to be created in the absence of any initiative by the Israeli government. That vacuum has now been filled by the "Arab Awakening".
Europe, meanwhile, is preoccupied with its own crisis. However, in the past few years, the Europeans, led by German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Nicolas Sarkozy, practically slammed the door of the EU in Turkey's face. As a result, Turkey has embraced a "neo-Ottoman" foreign policy in which the Arab world - even more than the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Balkans - has a central role.
Turkey, of course, in accordance with its political, security and economic interests, has no choice but to pay attention to its southern neighbors, and must try to prevent chaotic events in that area. Turkey would face the same dangers if it were integrated into the European context, but its priorities would then be completely different.
Because of Europe's shortsightedness, Turkey has effectively abandoned its EU membership ambitions and chosen a neo-Ottoman project to become a Middle Eastern power - a political turn that reflects both interests and ideology. On the other hand, Turkey perceives regional dominance as a springboard for a greater global role; on the other hand, it sees itself as a model for the successful modernization of the Middle East on an Islamic-democratic basis.
This drive for regional dominance will sooner or later draw Turkey into a serious conflict with Iran. If Turkey prevails, Iran and radical elements in the region will be left on the losing side of history - and they know it.
While the government of Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan tries to maintain good relations with Iran, its ambitions to become the leading Sunni power in the region mean that sooner or later Turkey must challenge Iran's influence in Iraq, as well as in Syria and Palestine. And that means conflict.
The drastic deterioration of Turkey's relations with Israel is related to the emergence of this Iranian-Turkish rivalry. That rivalry certainly has a positive side from Israel's point of view - the weakening of Iran and other regional radical elements. However, it is natural that for Turkey, which wants to become a regional leader, the interests of the Palestinians are more important than its relations with Israel. This is even more realistic in light of the revolutionary changes in the Arab world and forms the core of Erdogan's foreign policy turnaround.
As a result, Israel is in an increasingly difficult situation. Without a strategic turn of its own - remaining passive is a risk in a rapidly changing world order - Israel would further lose legitimacy and isolate itself on the international stage. Israel's sustainable response to the dramatic changes in the region - and their already predictable consequences - can only take the form of a serious offer of negotiations to the Palestinian government of Mahmoud Abbas with the aim of signing a comprehensive peace agreement.
Security issues must be taken seriously, but they have less and less weight, because between the conclusion of the agreement and its full implementation, a rather long period can be left for their resolution by mutual agreement. However, Israel's current passivity - with all the negative long-term consequences for the country - is likely to continue as long as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu considers the survival of his coalition more important than a decisive peace initiative.
At the same time, the pressure of the Arab revolutions is transforming the Palestinians into a dynamic political factor. Due to the increasingly certain removal of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, the pressure of the Egyptian revolution and the new role of Islamism in the region, Hamas' alliance with Iran is becoming increasingly problematic. It remains to be seen whether the "Turkish direction" will ultimately prevail over the radical elements in Gaza.
In any case, Hamas faces risky and important decisions of its own, even more so if the current diplomatic campaign at the UN by its main rival, Abbas's Palestinian Authority, is successful. Obama promised a Palestinian state within a year and Abbas is working to fulfill it.
However, what happens next is crucial. Will Abbas be able to keep the Palestinians on a diplomatic path, or will the situation spiral back into violence and another disaster? And what will the Palestinian path to peace look like after the UN's decision to recognize some form of statehood for Palestine?
Given the current pace of change in the Middle East, we may not have to wait long for answers - or new questions.
Bonus video:
