From the very beginning of the Greek crisis that erupted in 2010, the main European players had to understand what risks and consequences it brought to the European Union. But, viewed from the side, one gets the impression that they do not understand it.
This crisis has always not only concerned Greece: the disorderly notification of insolvency threatened to drag others, located on the EU's southern borders, including quite large ones, into the fiscal-budget abyss, dragging with it the main European banks and insurance companies. .
This could have led to a push into another world crisis, which would have caused an earthquake like the one that happened in the fall of 2008. It would also mean the collapse of the Eurozone, which would in turn harm the common market.
For the first time in history, the very survival of the European project was called into question. The behavior of the EU and its most important states proved to be both decisive and confusing, because there was national egoism and a crushing absence of leadership principles.
States can go bankrupt just like companies, but unlike companies, states cannot disappear. That is why states do not punish and their current interests cannot be underestimated.
The insolvent state needs help to implement restructuring, both in the financial sector and far beyond its framework, so that they can work out ways out of the crisis.
This applies entirely to Greece, whose structural problems are much broader than its financial difficulties. Until now, the EU and the government in Athens have not been able to agree on Greece's structural problems, but they need to work out and finance an appropriate economic reconstruction strategy so that the Greeks, and also the unstable markets, understand that there is light at the end of the tunnel.
Everyone knows that Greece is not capable of designing its way out of the crisis without the inevitability of a huge debt burden. The question is whether the process of restructuring the country's debt will be carried out evenly and under control, or whether it will be chaotic and spill over into other countries.
In any case, the disputes that are going on in Greece now about whether to pay the Greek debts are ridiculous. Refusal to pay is a way that will not breathe life, because Germany and other eurozone members are in the same boat as Greece.
Bankruptcy in Greece threatens them as well, because it would immediately create a problem of the solvency of European banks and insurance companies of systemic importance.
What will happen to the leaders of the governments of the eurozone countries? Or do they not want to tell the truth to their people for fear of damaging their own political reputation?
In fact, the European financial crisis is a political crisis, because EU leaders cannot decide on the necessary measures. In fact, time is spent on secondary problems that essentially relate to domestic policy issues.
In principle, it is correct to say that banks should participate in solving the debt crisis. But there is very little point in insisting that all bank losses, which remain "too big to fail", should do so, can trigger a repeat of the crisis.
Any chance of solving that problem, which appeared in 2009, would require a major overhaul of the entire financial system, but that opportunity was wasted.
To the extent that the political crisis that threatens the existence of the EU continues, its financial crisis will also continue and threaten the Union. At the heart of the solution to the crisis lies the belief that the euro - and with it the EU as a single entity - will not survive without a major European political unification.
If Europeans want to save the euro, they must start moving towards a political alliance now, otherwise, whether we like it or not, the euro and European integration will be lost. Europe will then lose practically everything it gained in half a century when it crossed the line of nationalism. In light of the emerging world order, it would be a tragedy for Europeans.
Unfortunately, when, leaving the post of President of the European Central Bank, Jean-Claude Trichet proposed to take a step in that direction, saying that it is necessary to introduce the function of the European Minister of Finance, the leaders of states and governments decisively rejected the idea. Practically no one in the European Commission wants, as they say, to confirm the depth of the crisis that the EU has reached.
The solution to this crisis requires more Europe and more interaction, not less. And yes: rich economies - Germany in the first place - must pay to get out of the situation.
Germany and France, the two main players in this crisis, must work out a joint strategy because they, working together, can realize the given solution. The problem is that in the referendum on the EU Constitution in 2005, the French voted for further political integration, at a time when economic integration can backfire, and Germany will be to blame for that.
Therefore, all we need is an open Franco-German dialogue on a comprehensive reorganization of the monetary union. Since it is impossible to change the agreement, other ways must be found to make the partnership between France and Germany even more meaningful.
Regardless of the political crisis and paralysis of the EU, Europeans must not forget how important its existence is, and that it must continue to exist. For that, they only need to look back, to the first half of the XNUMXth century, to understand why.
Copyright: Project Syndicate/Institute for Human Sciences, 2011
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