The crisis in Montenegro has three causes: the desire of the state to establish control over the financial resources that the Serbian Orthodox Church (SPC) now receives, the relationship of that church to the issue of Montenegrin statehood, that is, the conflict between Serbian and Montenegrin nationalism, and preparations for the upcoming elections.
The blade of criticism of those who, under the leadership of SPC priests, peacefully protest on the streets of Montenegrin and some Serbian cities, is directed against the adopted Law on Freedom of Religion. At the same time, it is a protest against the ruling elite, which since 1997 has embraced Montenegrin nationalism and promoted Montenegro as the successor of medieval proto-state formations. The state seen in this way was formalized by a referendum in 2006. As part of the state-building project, the Montenegrin Orthodox Church (CPC) was also renewed. Since the SPC has never accepted either the Montenegrin identity as a legitimate expression of belonging, or the right to restore Montenegrin sovereignty, this is, in essence, a new manifestation of the decade-long effort to dispute the two elements mentioned. This is the point where the activities of the SPC and the parties representing the Serbian electorate in Montenegro represent a continuation of the hegemonic efforts of our northern neighbor from the early 1990s.
Before the Kingdom of Montenegro, by decisions of the so-called The Podgorica Assembly was annexed by Serbia (1918), the CPC was independent and autocephalous. In the catalog of Orthodox churches, Syntagma, from 1851, the CPC is listed as autocephalous. A little later, it appears in the same status in the Catalog which, with the approval of the Patriarchate of Constantinople, was published in Athens in 1855. The status of the CPC was also regulated by the Constitution of the Principality of Montenegro (1905). Article 40 of the Constitution states that the state religion in Montenegro is Eastern Orthodox, and that the Montenegrin Church is autocephalous.
Before 1918, the CPC had its administrative bodies headed by the Holy Synod. It functioned on the basis of several legal acts, including the Constitution of the Holy Synod in the Principality of Montenegro (1903), the Constitution of Orthodox Consistories in the Principality of Montenegro (1904), and the Law on Parish Clergy in the Principality of Montenegro (1909).
Before the annexation, property-legal relations between the church and the state were regulated so that the state was the owner, and the church had the right to use buildings and property. As was the case with his predecessors on the Montenegrin throne, until the introduction of reforms in 1868, on behalf of the state of Montenegro, Orthodox religious buildings and property were managed by Prince Nikola I Petrović. After the annexation, the ruling elite in Serbia and the SPC rationalized the takeover of church buildings and properties by referring to the revolutionary character of the so-called Podgorica Assembly and to the meeting of Orthodox leaders from the Kingdom of SHS. Known as the Assembly of All Serbian Orthodox Bishops, this meeting was held on 13-26 May 1919, five months after the annexation of Montenegro. The congregation made a decision on the unity of all Serbian Orthodox church areas and this was the basis for the later decree of Regent Aleksandar Karađorđević on the Unification of all Orthodox church areas in the Kingdom of SHS.
That the economic and not the canonical motive was the driving force behind this act of uniting the churches is shown by the canonical letter of the Ecumenical Patriarch, Melentius IV and the Holy Synod of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, promulgated on February 24, 1922. This letter recognizes the elevation of the Serbian Orthodox Church of the Kingdom of SHS to the level of the Patriarchate, with the statement that this act "is more in accordance with church economy (opportunity), than with the precision of the canonical order". The Government of the Kingdom of SHS paid 1,5 million gold francs to the Patriarchate of Constantinople for this act. Although there are hints that the autocephaly of the church has its price, it is still not clear whether the government of Montenegro is ready to loosen the purse strings to obtain Tomos for the CPC and whether such a decision would have a calming effect in the current crisis.
Although the initiators of the protests in Montenegro give everything a religious and national tone ("...we don't give holy places"... "one family"...), state ownership of church buildings is not unprecedented. It is also known in other countries, such as Italy and Croatia, for example. The question is to what extent the fear of "seizing the holy places" is founded. The more important questions are those about the reason - why was this law adopted now and why was it done this way?
I think that, apart from the issue of controlling the significant financial income that the SPC is now collecting and the long-term conflict over the nature of Montenegrin statehood and the legitimacy of Montenegrin identity, this is also about the effort of the conflicting parties to establish a new and stabilize the existing level of political influence in Montenegro. The pre-election strengthening of the ruling coalition's position among resigned sovereignist voters and the homogenization of the opposition electorate of the Democratic Front were a strong motive for the adoption of this law now, that is, for the emphatically aggressive reaction of the DF in the Assembly of Montenegro. In this conflict, both political rivals lost significant political capital.
The hasty adoption of the law after the arrest of the DF opposition parliamentary group is not the brightest example of democratic practice, so the ruling coalition bears a certain degree of responsibility for the resulting crisis. On the other hand, by causing an incident in the assembly hall and threatening to tear off the hands of those who vote for the aforementioned law, the DF declared itself as a radical political structure that coordinates its activities with political actors from the neighboring country. Truth be told, this radicalism is also a consequence of the strong political and judicial pressure that DF has been exposed to for several years.
The peaceful protest marches of thousands of believers and the distancing from political parties are a clear message that the SPC is a structure that is, de facto, the most serious competitor to the ruling coalition in Montenegro. It is obvious that the numbers are on the side of the SPC, and that the church's ability to bring a large number of believers to the streets can easily be used in a future election game. It is also clear that Metropolitan Amfilohije will not allow any other Montenegrin Serb leader to exist in Montenegro, apart from him. The message about the political strength of the Serbian Orthodox Church was sent to the authorities in Belgrade at the same time.
The SPC will use this confirmation of its political strength as an argument in the upcoming negotiations regarding the Basic Agreement between the SPC and the state of Montenegro. After the successful demonstration of the power of the SPC, and after the demonstrated willingness of the state to refrain from significant use of force to control the demonstrators, both sides seem ready to start negotiations regarding the distribution of income from the property now managed by the church, but also regarding the form and scope of the church's political influence in Montenegro. The religious leaders of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Montenegro said that their goal is a significant correction of the adopted law, not a change of government. It would be a surprise if the Government of Montenegro rejects this call for negotiations.
Until now, the strongest opposition structure, DF, is the biggest loser in this political game. By initiating and leading protest marches, the SPC in Montenegro (whether by accident or as part of a coordinated plan) denied the DF the opportunity to politically articulate the dissatisfaction of believers and isolated this political alliance even more. This caused serious damage to the DF, which the ruling coalition will use in the election campaign. The DF was forced to return to its earlier demand for a change of power through a hard-to-achieve technical government model.
One gets the impression that the situation is calming down, and that the mosaic of new political actors and power relations in Montenegro is slowly coming together, in which there is less and less space for the DF, and more and more space for dignitaries of the SPC in Montenegro. Negotiations that would result in the signing of the Basic Agreement between the state of Montenegro and the SOC could lead to even greater marginalization of political actors who, until the opening of the crisis over the Law on Freedom of Religion, defined the wishes and hopes of the Serbian electorate in Montenegro.
Bonus video:
