Geopolitics after the pandemic

No future exists until it happens, and any effort to imagine post-Covid-19 geopolitics must include a range of possible versions of the future. I propose five possible images of the future in 2030, although others can obviously be imagined.

The end of the global liberal order.

The world order established by the USA after World War II created a system of institutions that led to an extraordinary liberalization of international trade and finance. But even before the start of the covid-19 pandemic, he began to be challenged by the rise of China and the growth of populism in Western democracies. That order suited China, but since the country is strategically gaining weight, it is actively trying to set standards and rules. The United States is resisting, institutions are atrophying, and calls are increasingly being made for increased sovereignty. America remains out of the World Health Organization and the Paris Climate Agreement. Kovid-19 increases the probability of the realization of this scenario, because it weakens the US as the "manager of the system".

The challenge of authoritarianism, as in the 1930s. Mass unemployment, increased inequality and a decline in the population's standard of living due to the changes caused by the pandemic create excellent conditions for authoritarian policies. Now there is no shortage of political entrepreneurs who are ready to use nationalist populism to come to power. Nationalism and protectionism are on the rise. More tariffs and quotas are imposed on goods and people, and immigrants and refugees are turned into scapegoats. Authoritarian states seek to consolidate regional spheres of interest, and various types of intervention increase the risk of armed conflict. Some of these tendencies were visible even before 2020, but the weak prospects of economic recovery due to the inability of the authorities to deal with the covid-19 pandemic increase the possibility of realizing this scenario.

World order with dominant China. As China successfully copes with the pandemic, the economic distance between it and other powers is radically changing. By the mid-2020s, China's economy is overtaking America's in decline and expanding its lead over once-potential rivals including India and Brazil. In the diplomatic marriage of accounts with Russia, China is clearly the senior partner. Unsurprisingly, China is beginning to demand recognition and respect as its power grows. The Belt and Road Initiative is used not only to influence neighboring countries but also to distant partners in Europe and Latin America. Voting against China in world institutions becomes too expensive, as it threatens the receipt of Chinese aid or investment, as well as access to the world's largest market. Since the pandemic has made Western countries weaker compared to China, the Chinese government and big companies are given the opportunity to reorganize institutions and establish standards as they wish.

International Green Agenda. Not all scenarios are negative. Public opinion in many democratic countries is beginning to give more priority to climate change issues and companies are reorganizing to address these issues. Even before covid-19, it was possible to assume that in 2030 the international agenda will be defined by the attention of states to "green" issues. By highlighting the connection between the health of the planet and people, the pandemic accelerates acceptance of those agendas. For example, American society has paid attention to the fact that defense spending in the amount of 700 billion dollars did not help to prevent the covid-19 disease and killed more Americans than died in all US wars after 1945. In the changed domestic political situation , the US president may propose a "Marshall Plan to fight Covid" with the aim of providing rapid access to vaccines to poor countries and strengthening their health systems. The Marshall Plan of 1948 corresponded to the interests of America itself, but at the same time to the interests of other countries; he profoundly influenced the formation of geopolitics in the decade that followed. By 2030, the "green" agenda becomes a good domestic policy, with an equally important geopolitical effect.

Continuation of the previous one. The covid-19 pandemic will look as bad in 2030 as the Great Flu of 1918-1920 did in the 1930s, and its long-term geopolitical impact is just as limited. The previous conditions remain. Nevertheless, in addition to the strengthening of Chinese power, the growth of internal populism and polarization in the West, as well as authoritarian regimes, a certain level of economic globalization has been preserved thanks to the difficult and reluctant recognition that no country can solve similar problems acting alone. The US and China are finding room for cooperation on pandemic and climate change issues even as they continue to be competitors on other issues (for example, restrictions on navigation in the South and East China Seas). Friendship is limited and rivalry under control. Some institutions are slowly fading, some are being reformed, and some are being formed from scratch. America remains the leading power, but without the degree of influence it once had.

Each of the first four scenarios has about a one in ten chance of becoming the future in 2030. In other words, the chances that the consequences of the covid-19 pandemic will profoundly change geopolitics by 2030 are less than 50%. A number of factors will change those odds. For example, the rapid discovery of effective, reliable and cheap vaccines that would be widely distributed throughout the world would increase the chances of a continuation of the current situation and reduce the likelihood of an authoritarian and Chinese scenario.

However, if the eventual re-election of Donald Trump would weaken the ties between America and international institutions or cause damage to democracy within the country, then the probability of the continuation of the previous or "green scenario" decreases. On the other hand, if the European Union, which was weakened at the beginning of the pandemic, manages to pool the costs to fight it, then it can become an important international player capable of increasing the probability of the realization of the "green" scenario.

Other types of impact are also possible: covid-19 can lead to important internal changes related to inequality in the sphere of health care and education, and also encourage the creation of better institutional mechanisms to prepare for the next pandemic.

Assessing the long-term consequences of today's pandemic is not a prediction of the future, but an exercise to gauge probability and adjust current policies.

The author is a professor at Harvard

Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2020.