No region of Europe is so marked by secession as the Western Balkans. Where Tito's Yugoslavia used to be - a small empire between Slovenia in the north and Macedonia in the south - today seven small and mini-states are pushing. All of them, except Kosovo, which unilaterally seceded to Serbia in 2008, are members of the UN. Slovenia and Croatia belong to the EU, and the two countries, together with Montenegro, are also members of NATO.
Catalan secessionism and reactions to it are being watched very carefully in the Balkans. The most active in Serbia. Belgrade is irritated that Brussels and EU members are now unquestioningly supporting Madrid. It is "hypocrisy", says Vučić, that in the case of Spain, the international law that was denied to Serbia during the secession of Kosovo applies. One of the EU spokespersons said that Spain is a member of the EU after all, which only enraged Serbia, so Belgrade asked the question: does international law apply only in the EU. Brussels replied that no, but that Kosovo is a sui generis case, a special case, which cannot be compared with Catalan or similar aspirations for independence. Of course it can be compared. But in doing so, first of all, the differences stand out: after the abolition of autonomy in 1989 (and the abolition of autonomy also follows Catalonia), Belgrade established an apartheid regime in Kosovo. Towards the end of the 1990s, the rebel province descended into violence. But it is not the violence of the conflicts that makes Kosovo a "special case": the Kurds, whose struggle for independence is accompanied by the most terrible reprisals, are not supported by the international community of states.
It is specific that in the case of Yugoslavia, the international community first refrained, and then reacted more and more energetically: the climax was the bombing of Yugoslavia lasting 78 days, by NATO, which paved the way for Kosovo's independence. It is against this background that Madrid is so vigorously opposed to the "internationalization" of the feud. "We are not Yugoslavia. There is nothing to mediate here," the Belgrade newspaper "Vreme" quotes Pablo Casado, spokesman for the Spanish ruling party.
At the beginning of the Yugoslav conflict, the overburdened EU had neither the will nor the instruments to intervene. Thus, in August 1991, she founded a commission, whose work had many consequences. Badinter's commission, which had to assess whether and when any of the successor states of Yugoslavia could be recognized by the EU countries. In November 1991, this commission concluded that Yugoslavia was in a state of "disintegration", and in January 1992, that the Yugoslav republics, which had become independent, had to keep their borders. Kosovo, which was a province of Serbia, did not fall into that category. Between December 1990 (Slovenia) and spring 1992 (BiH), referendums on independence took place, which the Serbian minority boycotted. New states were recognized by the EU.
The excruciating siege of Sarajevo and the genocide in Srebrenica in 1995 were prerequisites for the case of Kosovo to be "internationalized" against the will of Serbia. When, in 1998, attacks by the KLA (KLA) and counterattacks by the security forces, also against the civilian population, started a spiral of violence, an OSCE observation mission was sent to the province in the fall. With this, the KLA achieved a significant success: it was no longer just a handful of insurgents, but a party in a conflict, in which the international community effectively became the judge.
And it retained that role even after NATO, with its war from the air, expelled Serbian troops from Kosovo in 1999 and when the UN established a protectorate over it. The Declaration of Independence from 2008 was the work of the Contact Group (USA, Great Britain, Germany, France, Italy) and not the result of negotiations between Pristina and Belgrade. Most EU countries have accepted it as such. Five still refuse to do so, including Spain.
The balance of Western intervention in the secessionist conflicts of Yugoslavia is not very clear. In Bosnia, they only intervened when a lot of blood had been shed: 100.000 victims. In Kosovo, airstrikes did not prevent mass persecutions or massacres of civilians - in many cases they even provoked them. BiH and Kosovo are today only partially functioning states. Interventions did not end conflicts, but only stopped them.
It has been shown that secessions often cause new secessions, because in new states new minorities arise: both in Bosnia and Kosovo there is a tendency for Serbs to secede. It can be noted as a positive that, thanks to the intervention, these countries have entered the orbit of the European peace order. With the fact that since 2003, when they were promised EU membership as a "prospect", nothing has changed. And finally: the EU has also lost a lot of its shine. If it turns out that even in the EU, borders can be changed unilaterally - why would countries like Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia or Kosovo even approach it?
(Neue Zuercher Zeitung / NZZ)
Translation: Mirko VULETIĆ
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