The decision of the Constitutional Court of Poland, vociferously supported by the local executive (which, after all, de facto also "styled" the current composition of the Court, its ideological and worldview commitment and, consequently, the profile of its strategic decisions) on the primacy of the domestic Constitution over the legislature of the European Union as if she planted a legal-political bomb under the Union.
If nothing else, then because it made it much more difficult to continue the game of hide-and-seek in which one member - actually two, and sometimes even more - persistently ignores the principles on which the EU was founded and on which it survives as a certain global liberal-democratic model, although since that of the same "imperial Brussels" is very happy to receive more than lavish donations and all kinds of other (so far mostly unconditional) help.
Even before Poland, Orban's Hungary took a similar path, and there are still those who flirt with these patterns, precisely in Central and Eastern Europe.
It is interesting that exactly the same, if not worse, processes can be registered in Serbia, but there is no "earthquake", especially not one that would be felt beyond its borders.
The recent proposal of the Law on Internal Affairs - temporarily withdrawn, which is not yet any guarantee that its controversial parts have been abandoned - showed the desire of at least a part of the current government, which is very powerful and influential, to organize Serbia on extremely "illiberal" principles, rather as a country of fear and repression rather than freedom and tolerance.
Not long after, a legal proposal arrives which practically introduces a very widely understood "verbal delict" (badly remembered from the one-party era) and it is so bizarrely defined that it introduces such incredible "crimes" that even the legislator in the "dictatorship of the proletariat" could not or didn't want to come up with.
How is it possible that all of this, at least in the opinion of the majority of the critical public here, "Vučić is passing in Europe", how is it that all of this remains under the otherwise sensitive radars, how is it that there is no political storm?
First of all, Serbia does not have the importance of a single Poland, and neither does Hungary. Second, Serbia is not a member of the European Union. It turns out that both facts, in themselves fundamentally unfavorable for Serbia, are actually very useful for the autocratic government structure that has been established since the arrival of the Serbian Progressive Party at the head of the state and its key institutions.
A certain cynicism seems to exist on both sides. From the "European" side, it is clear that EU enlargement will not happen for a long time, for reasons of a basically internal and structural nature, and Serbia would probably not progress dramatically even if it were the most exemplary in every respect. From the "Serbian" side, this kind of freezing of the integration process seems like a great excuse to continue with the collapse of all institutions and standards that were barely restored after the complete collapse of the state in the XNUMXs.
Then again, not even the statement that all authorities are "going crazy" in the face of such obvious decadence and degeneration of the overall democratic life in Serbia is quite accurate or fair. The very fact that Serbia has not "opened chapters" in the European integration process for a long time speaks volumes, that is, it shows that the process is frozen, so to speak, and that, in this part of the work, is the sole responsibility of the Serbian side.
Admittedly, theoretically, she could "look through her fingers" for this or that, but no one will do that today, nor does anyone have a political or any other interest in it, except for the already "renegade" Orban, who is advocating Serbia's admission to the EU. would have another faithful ally in the internal dissolution of the Union and especially in its reshaping according to the taste of populists and "sovereignists". Which, in fact, means that every vote of Orban and his relatives for Serbia actually moves Serbia away from the supposed goal.
Should we explain why this goal is "alleged"?
Structured and directed in this way, the government has no reason to introduce Serbia into the European Union, even if it were somehow mysteriously possible. It would by no means be in its interest to truly harmonize with European standards, and long-term resistance would probably not be sustainable because, let's remember, Serbia is not Hungary or Poland. Which, after all, in all probability are themselves awaiting the end of the populist-sovereignist adventure in the foreseeable future.
Now, the second question is whether anyone in Belgrade thinks in such a long-term and "strategic" way, or does everything boil down to "do everything, do everything, and give it your all" as long as it is possible and allowed and there is how and from what, and tomorrow how be.
When you take a closer look at the more than colorful team that Vučić gathered around him and gave them very pompous titles and positions in every possible branch of government and comfortably close to the government, you get the unsettling feeling that most of them did not devote even a second of their until yesterday anonymous lives to thinking. about anything except, in Nušić's words, "blue fish, pecked dynasty and swastika thigh".
Quite enough for the needs of the one who put them together, because there is no reason for them to think about anything else, when there is someone who will think for everything. And everything he comes up with somehow always turns out in such a way that he comes out of it stronger and more untouchable, and Serbia weaker and poorer.
Bonus video:
