Every day we learn about more and more examples, to use the language of contemporary political culture, of "cancellation" (cancellation) of Russians. Almost in parallel with the expansion of sanctions, various institutions, groups and individuals throughout Europe are expressing Russophobic attitudes: plays based on Russian authors and performances of compositions by Russian composers are being cancelled, "Russian" cats are banned from performing at cat competitions, social networks are raids against Russian shops and restaurants, and messages appear on the doors of apartments where Russians live. In short, we are witnessing a significant growth of hatred towards Russians. It is quite clear that the trigger for unacceptable outbursts of hatred towards a nation is the invasion of Ukraine. However, a trigger alone is not enough for an explosion of hatred. There must be some stocks of traditional ideological material, the need for a new political identity and an "objective" historical assignment.
In this week's wider survey of public opinion in the United States of America, respondents were asked, among other things, what they thought best describes Russia. 42% of them answered that it is communism, 13% think that it is socialism, and only 11% that it is capitalism. Of course, the respondents' ideas about communism and socialism should be taken with considerable caution, as well as the fact that some dimensions of those ideas are quite specific to American political culture. However, the figures are nevertheless quite indicative and are probably transferable to a certain extent to the European context. The invasion and destruction of war alone are enough to activate hatred, however, it must have a certain ideological background, even if only implied. The most accessible archive is then the Cold War archive. Especially since the idea of communism or socialism is crucially based on a strong state and a great leader. And it is about the criteria that Putin meets. Even the war itself is being understood as an alleged attempt to restore the Soviet Union. Anti-communism with orientalist overtones was taken out of mothballs by the Russian invasion and became one of the backbones of Russophobia. For Putin, anti-communism does not represent a particular obstacle. Considering the far-reaching implications of the war, that new-old ideological material will certainly contribute to shaping new ideological frameworks in the coming period.
Despite the expansion of the European Union and NATO to the east, Europe remained strongly divided. The "civilized" West still looked arrogantly at the newcomers from the East who could not learn democratic rules of conduct. Such a gap took its political form in recent years in the so-called culture war between Brussels and the countries of the Visegrad Group, especially Poland and Hungary. The political regimes in those countries were considered similar to Putin's Russia, and "domicile" representatives of the extreme right such as Marine Le Pen, Matteo Salvini and AfD were labeled as additional enemies of the European project and Putin's helpers. But after the invasion, a new European unification took place. The right, especially the Eastern European one, benefited from the fact that it could once again strongly embrace the European identity as opposed to the Russian, Eastern one, while this unification gave the liberal forces the opportunity to position itself as a strong protector of European interests and thus, at least temporarily, get rid of the labels of flabby bureaucracy and " woke hysteria”. And by the way, at the same time, he should not lose that liberal identity because he is simply fighting against an autocrat who massively tramples on human rights. The unofficial coalition is unlikely to last long, but the lines of division will certainly not return to their original starting points. Until then, it will provide legitimation for Russophobia.
In addition to the historical stock of ideological material and the search for a new political identity, the third level of "inspiration" for Russophobia is represented by the aforementioned "objective" assignment. This assignment is made by the strong economic sanctions that the West initiated in response to the Russian invasion. The sanctions are quite strong and aim at economic and financial exhaustion of the country. Admittedly, the sale of oil, gas and grain is exempted because an additional increase in energy prices would cause political turbulence in the West itself. The first problem with sanctions is that it is not certain that they will have any effect on stopping the invasion for a variety of reasons. Another problem is that they do not discriminate: in other words, their powerful consequences will be felt first by ordinary, poor Russians. And somehow we suspect that the bet is that additional material scarcity will push them to overthrow the government. However, regardless of all the problems with the effect of sanctions on Russia, the effects in the West itself are quite evident. Not only does their economic nature suggest "objectivity" - an objective punishment for the evils committed - but also their non-discriminatory determinant - the strongest attack on the common people - gives legitimacy to all those "spontaneous" and individual Russophobic reactions.
The fight against Russophobia and the "cancellation" of Russians is one of the most important political tasks. Especially against that line of argument that claims that they have themselves to blame for electing Putin. The "guilt" of the people is not determined by the sum of voting decisions outside of any context. And especially if we know that this context in the nineties was largely created by the West by advocating the doctrine of shock and privatization. Russia reached the GDP of 1989 only in 2005. In that period, we should look for the reasons for the emergence of Putin as a political figure and the accompanying oligarchy, and not in some dark communist past.
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