The liberum veto (free veto) was one of the strangest features of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth of the 17th and 18th centuries. Used in the powerful Sejm, it was a kind of rule of unanimous decision-making. She allowed any of the deputies, at any time, to exclaim Sisto activity (Latin for "cease activity") and thus veto any bill, or force the session to adjourn.
The basis of everything was for that time a rather new idea that all nobles of the Commonwealth were truly equal and therefore had equal rights, which meant equal voting rights in the legislature.
In today's Europe, the two political organizations that dominate the continent - the European Union and NATO - resemble the Polish-Lithuanian Alliance in this respect. However, in recent decades, the EU has managed to shift decision-making in many areas from unanimity to what is called qualified majority voting.
This means that the law can be passed in the Council if it is supported by 55 percent of the 27 member states, which represent 65 percent of the population.
In discussions about the club's future, many are strongly advocating that such a voting system be used in more, if not all, political decisions. The same was proposed to NATO, in order to facilitate and speed up the daily functioning of the military alliance.
However, in order to move in that direction, unanimity is needed. And for many, especially smaller countries, there is a lack of will to give up this privilege. And why shouldn't it exist? In what other sphere would the objections of small countries like Malta or Cyprus suddenly have the same weight as those of France or Germany?
But it is not just about smaller nations. Can the proud, larger nations, which for centuries have conducted an independent and proud foreign policy, suddenly accept that their will and power on the open sea and in the great salons will be suddenly restrained or even thwarted? And for everyone, unanimity can be the most important tool for blackmail, to get exactly what you want - both domestically and internationally.
Basically, this is both the biggest philosophical question and the most serious growing pain of the EU and NATO: are these organizations just a fairly loose collection of sovereign nation-states, or are they headed for something larger and more federal?
In June, this issue will repeatedly come to the fore, while both the EU and NATO struggle with the veto issue in key areas of foreign policy. In NATO, the most pressing issue is Turkey's veto of Finland and Sweden's request to join the club. Although it initially indicated that it had no problem with membership of the Nordic duo, Ankara blocked the process, much to the chagrin of almost everyone else who did want quick accession. Initial hopes in Brussels that the accession protocols had already been signed in early June have been dashed. The working assumption at the moment is that the final signature could be made at the NATO summit in Madrid at the end of the month. But even this may seem optimistic.
Turkey continues to play hardball, trying to extract as many concessions as possible from Stockholm, Helsinki and others. This includes the lifting of the arms embargo, the potential extradition of Kurds whom Ankara sees as terrorists, and perhaps even gift-wrapped American fighter jets.
This position also encouraged Croatian President Zoran Milanović to play with a potential veto, if changes are not made in the electoral law of Bosnia and Herzegovina that would favor the Croatian minority in that country.
Within the EU, breakthrough talks on several issues, planned for June, will be even more intense. The perfect case study, of course, is the freshly negotiated Russia sanctions package that took member states more than a month to agree on - largely thanks to numerous veto threats.
Most of the media focus has rightly been on Hungary, as Budapest has threatened to derail everything if it doesn't get what it wants. And it was handsomely rewarded. The Russian Patriarch Kirill is not on the blacklist, Russian oil will continue to flow to Hungary through pipelines without a specific period of downtime, and the country can also receive urgent Russian oil from the sea, which will otherwise be banned in the Union.
Of course, there was tension among the other EU member states regarding Hungary's game plan, but the penalties that could be imposed are small. The last resort would be to strip Budapest of its right to vote in the council, but that requires - yes, unanimity - among the other 26 members. It's still hard to see Poland, despite its frustration with its former ally's behavior, pushing that button anytime soon.
And yet, Hungary is getting away with it because others are also making exceptions. In this package of sanctions alone, many are relieved that the labeling of mixed Russian oil is not clearer. Thus, Bulgaria abandoned its ban on marine oil, Croatia on vacuum gas oil, the Czech Republic can still resell refined Russian oil, and Cyprus succeeded in overturning a proposal banning Russian citizens from buying property.
All of the EU's punitive measures against Russia since the outbreak of war in Ukraine contain these kinds of loopholes, after capitals threatened to end the entire operation.
The EU is far from done with the job this month. Whether Ukraine gets candidate status for EU membership will ultimately depend on whether all 27 members are on board when it is discussed at an EU summit later this month - and that will be a tall order. At the same summit, Albania and North Macedonia will see if Bulgaria's veto on the opening of EU accession negotiations can be lifted. Even here the odds don't look too encouraging.
It takes us back to the past. Many historians have noted that the liberum veto contributed to the weakening of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Especially considering foreign powers, accused of bribing members of the Sejm, to use the veto and paralyze the proceedings. Ultimately, this resulted in the destruction of the entire Commonwealth and its division by stronger and more centralized powers in Europe in the late 18th century.
One of the legacies of this period is the use of the term "Polish Parliament". In some European languages it is a synonym for a state of chaos, disorder and general indecision. In other words, there are many historical parallels here that Brussels could pay attention to.
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