When I started teaching at Harvard in the mid-80s, the main preoccupation of American economic policymakers was Japan. A book Japan in first place Ezra Vogel, the leading Harvard expert on Japan at the time, set the general tone of the debate.
I remember being struck by the extent to which all discussions—even in academic circles—implied the right of the United States to preeminence on the international stage. The United States has set itself the task of preventing Japanese dominance in key industrial sectors through appropriate industrial and trade policies - not only because it is beneficial to the American economy, but also because America must not fall into second place.
Before that, I believed that aggressive nationalism was a characteristic of the old world, that it was reserved for insecure societies that felt threatened on the international stage and were still recovering from real or imagined historical injustices. Members of the American elite, rich and self-confident, valued patriotism, but their view of the world was primarily cosmopolitan. Still, zero-sum nationalism was not far from the surface, as became clear as soon as the US's place at the top of the global economic order was called into question.
After three decades of American triumphalism after the fall of the Berlin Wall, we are witnessing a similar process, this time much more pronounced. Now it is a consequence of the strengthening of China - which is a much more serious economic threat than Japan was in the 80s and whose further rise carries serious geopolitical risks - and the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
The US is responding to new challenges by trying to assert global primacy. For US policy makers, this goal is identical to the goal of maintaining a secure and prosperous global order. In their view, US primacy is crucial to promoting democracy, free markets and a rules-based international order. What could be more useful for peace and prosperity in the world? The belief that the goals of American foreign policy are always based on good intentions is the foundation of America's notion of its own exceptionalism: what is good for the United States is good for the whole world.
There is no doubt that in some cases this is true. But by accepting such a myth, American policymakers lose the ability to realistically see how they actually use their power. The United States has not shied away from overthrowing other democracies if it suited its interests and has a long history of meddling in the internal politics of sovereign countries. The invasion of Iraq in 2003 was carried out in violation of the UN Charter, as was the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
The insistence on a "free market" and a "rules-based international order" often serves the interests of American companies and political elites, rather than the aspirations of smaller countries. If current interests deviate from what international rules dictate, the US will simply ignore the rules (as in the case of the International Criminal Court and key International Labor Organization conventions).
Some of these tensions were evident in US Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken's speech on US-China relations. Blinken declared China to be "the most serious long-term challenge to the international order" and announced that "the vision offered by Beijing would distance us from the universal values that have brought so much prosperity to the entire world."
Blinken is right when he claims that many elements of the order established after World War II are not only American or only Western. However, he failed to convince us that for those universal elements of the world order, China represents a greater danger than the USA itself. For example, many of the problems in China's economic practices pointed to by American commentators concern areas where generally accepted universal rules do not exist - particularly in trade, investment and technological development.
Blinken announced that the US will "build a strategic alliance around Beijing to promote our vision of an open and inclusive international system." We have to ask ourselves again, who would oppose such a vision? But China, like many other countries, fears that the United States' initiatives are not always benevolent. Blinken's statement is interpreted by Chinese leaders as a threat to isolate and limit available options, while forcing other countries to stand with America.
None of this should be interpreted as equating US actions with Russia's invasion of Ukraine or human rights abuses in Xinjiang province or territory grabbing in the Himalayas or the South China Sea. Despite its flaws, the United States is a democracy where critics can openly criticize and challenge their country's foreign policy. But that is scant consolation for the countries that America treats as its pawns in the geopolitical competition with China, countries that often see no difference between the global moves of the great powers.
Blinken talks about China's authoritarian practices as the biggest threat to the rest of the world, which is another inverted reflection of America's faith in its own benevolence and exceptionalism. The fact that there is a democracy in a country does not guarantee that it will act in good faith in relations with other countries. Likewise, repression within a country does not necessarily lead to aggression directed outwards. China also claims it wants a stable and prosperous global order - but not under the sole control of the US.
Treating China as a threat and seeking to isolate it leads China to make moves that confirm the fears of American strategists. The United States organizes a club of countries ready to openly oppose China, so we should not be surprised that President Xi Jinping found an ally in Putin at a time when Russia was preparing to invade Ukraine. As noted by journalist Robert Wright, it is expected that countries kicked out of one exclusive club will join together and create a new club for themselves.
If anyone asks why the relative decline of US power is such an important topic, members of the American foreign policy elite respond with a rhetorical question: Would you rather live in a world dominated by America or a world dominated by China? It is true that most countries would prefer to live in a world dominated by no one, a world in which even small countries can preserve a certain measure of autonomy and develop good relations with everyone, without the obligation to choose a side and end up as a collateral victim of the conflict of great powers. It is time for American strategists to realize that a good part of the world has long ceased to view the global ambitions of the United States through its rose-colored glasses. The sooner they realize this, the better for all of us.
(Project Syndicate; Peščanik.net; translation: Đ. Tomić)
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