The available documents and previous analyzes of the international expert public unequivocally indicate that in the war operations on Croatian territory during the early 1990s, Montenegro was an active participant in military aggression. Whether we like it or not, we have to deal with that reality and clearly define ourselves according to the role of Montenegro at that time.
The activities of the JNA at the time, the coordinated action of Belgrade and Podgorica in preparation for the crossing of the Croatian border and the attack on Dubrovnik, the party's incitement to war, as well as the enthusiastic response of citizens to the call to wear uniforms, are some of the elements on the basis of which the aggressive behavior of Montenegro at that time is defined. Therefore, the recent move of the Croatian authorities, which in one of the parliamentary documents marked Montenegro as an aggressor during the early 1990s, is not surprising.
The anniversary of the siege of Dubrovnik is a good occasion to remind ourselves of the nationalist hysteria and warmongering that were a basic feature of public life in Montenegro in those years. I will never forget the calls of the editor of the evening state TV Dnevnik not to spend German marks to buy Italian shoes because we will need them to pay for bullets to defend ourselves against the "black shirts" and "Tudjman's soldiers." I will never forget the pensioner who, in front of the iconic Feniks cafe, angrily spat in my face: "Ah, you write for Monitor." So you're a Liberal. You are from Tuđman! You are the Ustasha, mother you.... .” I will never forget the gruesome scene in front of the church of St. George on Christmas Eve and the drunken, red-hot car that roared: "Comrade Slobo, send the salads / there will be meat, we are slaughtering the Croats!"
With these reminders, I want to emphasize that the issue of the responsibility of Montenegro, i.e. its citizens, its political and military leadership at the time, leaders and members of the political parties at that time for the aggression against Croatia at that time and the nine-month siege of Dubrovnik cannot be viewed independently of the ideology of nationalism and the Great Serbian hegemonic discourse from in the early 1990s. The then Montenegrin government and most of the opposition subjects, with the honorable exception of the late LSCG, SDP and Civic Forum, were active builders and guardians of that ideology and that discourse. While the current government tries to cover its dirty tracks, part of the opposition system is today, more than ever before, proud of its former role.
This ideology gave birth to plans for territorial expansion, and the Montenegrin siege of Dubrovnik was only one of its bloody manifestations. It should be said that in those years, both the ideology of nationalism and its operational application on Croatian territory enjoyed the support of a significant segment of the Montenegrin population, so we cannot exclude it from the process of determining responsibility. Of course, it remains to be determined whether it is a matter of criminal, political, command or moral responsibility.
This issue has been removed from the agenda of talks on Montenegrin-Croatian relations for years. The elites of the two countries benefited politically and materially from the marginalization of this problem. That was the reason to insist on the narrative of good neighborly relations, the absence of unresolved issues between Montenegro and Croatia, as well as on regional cooperation that should be based on the so-called a new beginning.
The Croatian government has now decided to deviate from the earlier agreement on non-aggression, so Montenegro is mentioned in parliamentary documents as one of the aggressors. It remains to be seen what is the reason for this sudden change of course by the government in Zagreb and whether this latest parliamentary slap to the authorities in Podgorica has a business, territorial, or other background. Experience teaches us that issues of regional reconciliation and post-conflict resolution in our region are rarely the real basis of parliamentary declarations that frustrate interstate relations. The Czech case is that the actualization of the issue of wars from the 1990s is used as a model of pressure, in order to force concessions in other fields.
This move managed to unite political opponents in Montenegro in a unique way. As in the early nineties, the Croatian government once again became a common enemy. Twenty-two years after the fratricide was stopped and regardless of all the political disagreements, the former wartime allies have again found a common denominator: escaping responsibility for the consequences of the policies they created in the early years of the Yugoslav wars.
The elite in power does this by putting all the responsibility on the top of the then JNA and the political leadership in Belgrade. Despite significant evidence that leads to a different conclusion, the authorities in Podgorica still insist on the story of the deceived and insufficiently informed Montenegrin leadership that naively did the dirty work for Slobodan Milošević. In the Montenegrin mob of whitewashing the past, the government has enthusiastic collaborators in the non-governmental sector, which, at least declaratively, deals with issues of reconciliation and determining responsibility for the war events of the 1990s. The current calls to not ideologize the story of reconciliation are a continuation of an earlier concentrated attempt, such as the RECOM initiative, to absolve the political elites, including the one in Montenegro, of responsibility for war destruction and crimes committed on the territory of the former SFRY.
Those opposition actors who, from the first day of their political engagement, treated the wars in the former SFRY, the aggression against Croatia and the Montenegrin siege of Dubrovnik as acts of defense for all of Serbia - have not moved from that nationalist framework. The head of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Montenegro wholeheartedly supported their ideological static (consistency?) all these decades and regularly granted them forgiveness of sins. However, they now find themselves in an awkward position. At the same time, they strongly condemn the parliamentary resolution that marks Montenegro as an aggressor, but also try to present this document as a logical product of the decades-long rule of the DPS, which weakened and discredited Montenegro, leaving it at the mercy of former war enemies. There is no mention of common platforms from the 1990s. They are, in fact, criticizing the DPS for losing that war and for having put Montenegro in a position where it now has to deal with accusations of crimes through its incompetence and lack of nationalist inspiration and the brutality that accompanies that inspiration.
Truth be told, for the generations born after the siege of Dubrovnik, it is not easy to ask the question: "What did you do in the war, Dad"? Bearing in mind the educational system that reduces the recent past to a few sentences in textbooks, the young generation does not see why they would ask such a question. In addition, many of the exponents of the ideology of expansionist nationalism and many of the implementers of conquest plans are still dominant figures in the political, economic and cultural life of Montenegro. Although this question must be asked, it is obvious that Montenegro, unfortunately, has neither the strength nor the courage to face an honest answer.
Bonus video:
