Few will miss the year 2022, marked by a long-term pandemic, progressive climate changes, galloping inflation, slowing economic growth and, above all, the beginning of a costly war in Europe and the danger that a violent conflict may soon break out in Asia. Some of it was expected, but a lot of it was not, so from all these events it is necessary to draw lessons that were ignored out of fear and at one's own risk.
First, the war between countries that many scholars consider obsolete is anything but. What we are witnessing in Europe is an old-fashioned imperialist war through which Russian President Vladimir Putin seeks to destroy Ukraine as a sovereign, independent entity. His goal is to ensure that a democratic, market-oriented country that aspires to close ties with the West does not succeed on the borders of Russia, because such a possibility could be attractive to the Russians as well.
Unfortunately for him, instead of achieving the quick and easy victory he had hoped for, Putin discovered that his own military was not as powerful, and that his opponents were much more determined than he and many in the West had expected. The war has been going on for ten months, and there is no end in sight.
Second, the idea that economic interdependence is a bulwark against war because neither side has an interest in destroying mutually beneficial trade and investment ties has lost its persuasiveness. Political reasons come first. In reality, Putin's decision was probably influenced by the European Union's strong dependence on energy supplies from Russia, which led to the conclusion that Europe would not oppose him.
Third, integration, which has inspired Western China policy for decades, has also suffered a setback. That strategy was also based on the belief that economic ties - in addition to cultural, academic and other exchanges - would stimulate political development, and not the other way around, that is, it would lead to the emergence of a more open, market-oriented China that would be more moderate in international relations.
None of that happened, but one can debate whether the failure was caused by the very concept of integration or the way it was implemented. However, one thing is obvious: China's political system is increasingly repressive, the economy is moving in the direction of the state, and foreign policy is increasingly assertive. Fourth, economic sanctions, which in many cases are the preferred instrument of the West and its partners as a way to respond to government violations of human rights or aggression abroad, rarely lead to significant changes in behavior. Even Russia's blatant and brutal aggression against Ukraine could not convince most governments to isolate Russia economically or politically; Western sanctions may be undermining Russia's economic base, but they are nowhere near convincing Putin to change his policies. Fifth, the phrase "international community" must go down in history. She is gone. Russia's right of veto in the Security Council has rendered the United Nations powerless, and the recent meeting of world leaders in Egypt dedicated to the fight against climate change was a fiasco.
Beyond that, little can be said about the global response to covid-19 and little has been done to prepare for the next pandemic. Multilateralism remains of great importance, but its effectiveness will depend on the formalization of closer agreements among like-minded governments. Multilateralism based on the principle of "all or nothing" usually brings - nothing. Sixth, democracies obviously face their own problems, but the problems faced by authoritarian systems can be even more serious. Ideology and regime survival often determine decision-making, and authoritarian leaders are often reluctant to give up failed policies and admit mistakes because that would appear to be a display of weakness and would encourage aspirations for major changes. Such regimes must constantly count on the threat of mass protests, as in Russia, or on the reality, as we have recently seen in China and Iran. Seventh, the potential of the Internet to expand individuals' opportunities to criticize governments is much greater in democratic countries than in closed systems. Authoritarian regimes, such as those in China, Russia, and North Korea, can isolate their society, monitor and censor content, or both. Something similar to the "splinternet" appeared - several separate networks. However, social networks in democratic countries tend to spread lies and misinformation that increase polarization and make governance much more difficult. Eighth, as before, there is the West (a term rooted in shared values rather than geography), and alliances remain the most important instrument for strengthening order. The United States and its transatlantic NATO partners responded effectively to Russian aggression against Ukraine. The US has also established close ties in the Indo-Pacific region, in order to counter the growing threat coming from China, mainly through the activation of the Four (Australia, India, Japan and the US), AUKUS (Australia, Great Britain and the US) and the expansion of trilateral cooperation with Japan and South Korea. Ninth, US leadership is still important. If the US wants to remain influential, it cannot act unilaterally in the world, but the world will not unite to solve common security and other problems if the US is passive or relegated to the background. What is often needed is America's willingness to be at the forefront, not in the background.
Finally, we must be humble about our knowledge. It is very sad to note that a year ago some of these lessons were predictable. We learned not only that history repeats itself, but that, for better or for worse, it retains its ability to surprise us. With that in mind, onward through 2023!
The author is the president of the US Council on International Relations
Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2022. (translation: NR)
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