I borrowed the title for this column from a collection of scientific papers (sociological, philosophical, legal...) edited by Peter L. Berger, a professor at Boston University. The works are relatively current (published 15 years ago and soon translated into Serbian) and diverse (competent authors review the current life of several important world religions). The common denominator of this undertaking, or something like a tentative conclusion, is already contained in the subtitle that reads: "Revival of religion and world politics". Seven different authors agree on many things, first of all in the statement that religiosity has been reborn all over the world as a general human need for the beyond. Such a revival in the spiritual currents of contemporary humanity inevitably has multiple consequences on world politics, especially on its secularist line, which had long ago crossed paths with... well, crossed paths, suffice it to say. The sacred concept from which she distances herself is contained in the verb.
I highly recommend the book. In the political sphere, where the rule of law and a democratic society are being built, in addition to patriotic fervor and anthemic songs, we need wisdom and objectivity. And in the field of social relations on the border between the political and the spiritual - especially. I believe that we need increased attention and deep reflection on the overall experience of humanity.
The statements of the authors represented here state: the desecularization of the world. For the purposes of my persuasion to read the mentioned book, it is important to highlight the key differences in concepts secular i secularization, as I understand them, based on what I have read. Namely, the first one is tied to a certain worldview, theoretical position, and it could also be reduced to the type of relationship, to the achieved democratic standard of social order (but also to general social opinion) which, at the level of institutions, separates the state, positive-legal and the sacral, ecclesiastical . While the second term refers both to the historical process of unraveling ("disillusionment" as Charles Taylor would say) of the world, state and society, as well as to certain ideological convictions of individuals or groups, which do not stop only at the legal distinction between state and church institutions, but - in its radical forms - and to the complete marginalization and persecution of religiosity (both religious institutions and religious topics) from the public sphere. Persecution in the only, according to them, permissible sphere, exclusively private. Usually, we attribute the recognizable "ism" to such ideologies, so that we can more easily recognize exclusivity and ideological totalitarianism in "secularism".
At the same time, I understand that not all secularism is necessarily linked to some totalitarian political involvement and manifestations of open persecution of religion, but in the intellectual sphere it can remain at the level of tolerantly expressed wishes and assessments. Such is, say, the vision that the (sufficiently widespread and long-lasting) development of science and technology, and the earthly well-being achieved in connection with it, will make all spirituality and ecclesiasticism superfluous. This is exactly the kind of prejudice of modern man that the authors of this collection discuss, among whom Peter Berger is the most explicit when he says: "The religious impulse, the search for meaning that transcends the limited space of empirical existence in this world - is an unchanging constant of human existence." Berger believes that both religious people and any reasonable atheist or agnostic will agree with this position. He further adds that "human existence, deprived of transcendence, represents an impoverished and unsustainable state".
Although initially motivated by scientific research to explain the rise of religious fundamentalism in the world, at the end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century, this group scientific endeavor came to the insight that simply "the assumption that we live in a secularized world" is not correct. If the state institutions in the vast majority of countries are organized secularly, on the well-known principles of separation, religion has not left the public space, nor the space of basic human needs. Nor can it ever be "locked" into the realm of the exclusively private and personal. If modernity (with all that it entails) has seemingly greatly shifted the position of the sacred from the focus of modern man, from his everyday life and from life's priorities, on the other hand, it simultaneously awakened a rebellion against secularization and the need for the renewal of spiritual life. And on all meridians. And when they are not reduced only to the private - spirituality and sacredness inevitably (p)remain political references. Although religious institutions do not have the power to make legally binding decrees and decisions, a large number of European and North Atlantic political actors (parties and individuals) proclaim their support for the defense of Christian values. In the Islamic world it is even more unequivocal.
Contemporary philosophy has long since noticed that various atheistic ideas of progress, such as the modernist vision of scientific and technological expansion, or the communist belief in a future classless society, are only substitutes for spiritual eschatological visions of the Heavenly Kingdom. That is why Karl Levit will characterize Marx's "Communist Manifesto" as a kind of "prophetic and eschatological" work. God and Spirit have been replaced by class struggle and matter, but the biblical construction of future salvation has survived. Today, it is clearer than, say, half a century ago, that these replacements do not have the persuasiveness or longevity of the original religious visions. I consider it appropriate to use the picturesque qualification "pale copy" at this point. In this unrealized ideology of "future progress", I see one of the reasons why modern man's religiosity returns "through the big door" to modern life. Issues of social solidarity, moderation, environmental protection and similar topics become much safer in the hands of those who see life (both other's and their own) as an "undeserved gift from God", than those who unwillingly and selfishly spend it as their own property. Hence, there are more and more philosophical theses that we could rightly call a post-secular way of looking at things. They are dominated by the understanding that we can rely on religious practices and perspectives as the foundations of the fight against the forces of global capitalism, but also as sources of authentic ethics of multicultural citizenship, humanity and equal respect. Or, to put it in the vernacular, between a believing Christian and a believing Muslim, or if you want between a church and a mosque, there cannot be as many misunderstandings as can be created by interpreters of the aforementioned religions who do not practice their spiritual life.
However, if the fact that the modern world is not and cannot be secularized indicates the indestructible vitality of religion, this does not mean that we should question the secular assumptions of our civilization and state institutions. If for no other reason than that because of the secular principles laid down, say, in the Bible itself. It could be said that at least the Old Testament, from cover to cover, identified God's and earthly monarchy, embodied in the anointed David and the later expectation of David's descendant, the Messiah - the Savior. However, before David, in the first chapters of the First Book of Samuel, a drama takes place when the people of Israel are looking for a king and the prophet Samuel refuses to proclaim/choose him, considering such a request almost - blasphemous. One might say, an insignificant episode compared to the monarchist intonation of everything that follows, and even such a prayerful reading as the Psalms. However, that Samuel's drama is not insignificant and it gets its full meaning in the New Testament, when God's mouth will clearly point out the distance between God's and earthly kingdoms in several places. The Lord Jesus Christ will say before Pilate that His "kingdom is not of this world". Before that, the apostles will be advised to distinguish what should be given to the "emperor" and what should be given to "God". And then the apostle Paul, in the Epistle to the Hebrews, will say that we Christians "have no lasting city in this world, but we wait for the one who is to come" (Hebrews 13, 14).
Of course, everyone knows that from Constantine the Great onwards, a whole political philosophy and theology of "Holy Empires and Holy Emperors" arose, both in the Christian East and in the Christian West. A lot could be said about that, but I will stop here on the many times repeated thought of the blessed Metropolitan Amfilohi, who was convinced that the massacre suffered by the Russian imperial family Romanov, by God's will, ended the "Constantinian era" in the history of the Church. Indeed, this is a thought that could be discussed, but I personally think that today, after everything, it is more crystal clear that neither the Christian Church nor the modern state is of any use to institutional interweaving, nor the tutelage that the state would have over the Church, or vice versa. Returning to the initial thesis of this text, I must add: all this does not mean that the Church does not have its place in the public, on every issue that it considers a good reason to announce itself, and in a way that does not violate any state regulations.
The Church can and must act publicly; anyone can come to the temple or monastery, respecting the order there; even people from civil and political life can meet in the monastery gates, and hold discussions there on any issue. Legally binding decisions and civil regulations can only be made by state institutions. Two plus two equals four.
Bonus video:
