THE ENIGMA OF RUSSIA

The new Raspucin

Yevgeny Prigozhin attacks the Russian military leadership and claims that ordinary Russians, increasingly frustrated by the lack of progress in the war in Ukraine, could revolt. Is Vladimir Putin's regime in real danger?

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Photo: Shutterstock
Photo: Shutterstock
Disclaimer: The translations are mostly done through AI translator and might not be 100% accurate.

Russia's war against Ukraine is, to put it mildly, not going according to plan. And Yevgeny Prigozhin, the head of the private military company "Group Wagner", strongly and publicly criticizes the Russian army. How does Prigozhin manage to go unpunished today, when the Kremlin aggressively suppresses any dissent?

Since launching his "special military operation" on February 22, President Vladimir Putin has talked about different goals. Originally, he wanted to "denazify" and "demilitarize" all of Ukraine (by taking control of it), and then set himself the goal of "liberating" the Donbass region in the east. In addition, he also spoke about the defense of Russia's "historical borders" and claimed that the West forced him to attack Ukraine.

The explanation for all these changes in rhetoric lies in the dynamics on the battlefield - above all, the multiple failures, mistakes and miscalculations of the Russian armed forces. Put simply, Putin is trying to save face. But achieving that goal is complicated by Prigozhin, on whom Putin, who hoped for military success, is increasingly dependent.

In a lengthy interview with pro-Kremlin political blogger Konstantin Dolgov (published on May 24), Prigozhin harshly criticized the special military operation. He said that Russia, instead of denazifying it, made Ukraine "a nation known throughout the world." And that instead of "demilitarization" Russia militarized Ukraine: "If (the Ukrainians) had 500 tanks at the beginning of the special operation, now they have 5.000. If 20.000 fighters knew how to fight, now there are 400.000 of them."

Prigozhin directly blames the Russian elites for this, especially the top military leadership, accusing them of not being sufficiently committed to the war. He warns that ordinary Russians, disappointed by the lack of progress, could rebel. In his opinion, the only solution to the problem is to intensify military efforts, introduce a state of emergency, declare a "new wave of mobilization". Otherwise, it may happen that "we lose Russia".

Prigozhin is not wrong when he questions the commitment of Russian elites to the war effort. In early June, Konstantin Zatulin, a deputy of Putin's United Russia party in the State Duma, expressed a similar sentiment, saying that many of the goals of this operation "have no meaning anymore" and that none of them have achieved results. He claims that Russia must regroup and move on, but in his words one could also hear confusion about what is happening up there in the Kremlin. Virtually the entire cabinet (including Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, who is Prigozhin's favorite target), would like to avoid further escalation, and it is not excluded that the military may be working on a strategy that would make this possible.

It is a pragmatic decision. The Russian ruling class generally believes that the country will have a hard time "winning" this war. The longer it fights, the more it will look like North Korea, a country ready to sacrifice everything (standard of living, security, and even sovereignty, due to its increasing dependence on China, which wants its resources) to achieve its leader's obsessions.

And that outcome suits Prigogine perfectly. He wants the Russians to give up material comfort (although he himself earns huge sums from the war) in the name of the mythical "unified state-civilization" represented by Russia and the "Russian world". In Prigozhin's opinion, the refusal of the Russian elites to be full-blooded patriots has no justification, especially due to the increase in the number of dead civilians as a result of Ukrainian attacks on Russian territory. He is not the only one who thinks so.

And although tireless propaganda did not convince ordinary Russians to participate in the war, it intensified their anger. When I was in Moscow in January, it was still possible to freely express dissatisfaction with the actions of the Kremlin, at least in a relatively private environment. But now, as in Stalin's time, the enemy is everywhere. Friends and neighbors check in on each other, and waiters in cafes eavesdrop on guests.

Some of those angry Russians are beginning to see enemies everywhere and would not mind the complete militarization of Russia's political and economic system. They are still in favor of Putin, but the longer the war goes on, the more they begin to doubt his power. Does this mean that the rebellion that Prigozhin talks about (and which, by all accounts, he desires) becomes more likely?

To answer that question, it is necessary to consider Prigozhin's influence, which relies on a terrifying list of military successes and atrocities of the "Wagner Group". Besides, angry Russians may like his merciless rhetoric ("a dog deserves a dog's death," he said commenting on a video of the sledgehammer execution of a former Wagner mercenary who defected to Ukraine).

The fact that Prigozhin can criticize the war campaign without any consequences (Dolgov was fired after an interview with him) only increases the mystery surrounding him. In Prigozhin's hometown, there are now guided tours to visit not only Nabokov's and Pushkin's Petersburg, but also Prigozhin's.

Prigozhin, however, does not use his influence to attack Putin. On the contrary, when he criticizes the Russian military and political elite, he diverts attention from the man at the top. In addition, Putin probably agrees to a considerable extent with Prigozhin's views. Having been in power for almost 25 years, Putin does not have the capacity to lead a revolution. But the war in Ukraine (and his often outlandish rhetoric) show that Putin may be the instigator.

Although he is not part of the system, Prigozhin serves it. In this sense, he reminds a lot of Grigory Rasputin, the "mystic monk", who before the revolution of 1917 befriended the last imperial family (the Romanovs) and greatly influenced them. In both cases, the country was not stable, and the man at the top of the government was not capable of proper leadership, not even to issue orders. Marginal elements began to fill that void, but they did not try to guess the boss's wishes and fulfill them, but instead imposed themselves as a force to be reckoned with while popular discontent grew in the background.

It is possible that Putin identifies with Prigozhin and appreciates the contribution of the "Wagner Group" in the attempt to destroy Ukraine. But he must understand that Prigozhin's independence, boldness and ambition are undermining the social peace that is essential for the survival of the regime.

Having become the target of the decadent elite, Rasputin met a terrible end. Prigogine could be on a similar path.

(Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2023; translation: NR)

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