Jakov and Milojko on their way to become the new Momir and Milo

Montenegrin political parties abuse the views of foreign embassies and from the Western Balkans much more than they can realistically influence the political processes in Montenegro. The example of Kosovo Prime Minister Aljbin Kurti, who directly opposed the USA and the EU, suffering symbolic rather than essential sanctions, best shows that the ambassadors and even the special representatives of the USA and the EU for the Western Balkans have as much influence as they are allowed.

The incumbent Milojko Spajić is in a much better position than his two predecessors, Zdravko Krivokapić and Dritan Abazović. Spajić, unlike the last two prime ministers, has a relative majority in the Parliament of Montenegro. Let us remind you that Krivokapić and Abazović had to get the support of international partners because they did not have the background in the electorate for the positions they held. Krivokapić was without a party and Abazović's URA had three deputies.

The "ambassador's umbrella" was needed by the DPS in all the previous years, because it was the only way they could have a free hand in the election process, from, to put it euphemistically, the election conditions of unworthy NATO member states and candidates for EU membership, to the (mis)use of voter lists, reliance on tourist voters, manipulation of identity cards, etc.

Spajić is the first mandate holder who did not need an "ambassador's umbrella". First, because he won the elections fairly, despite the slippage of the outgoing Prime Minister Abazović in the last week of the election campaign. Second, because the relations within the EU and in the USA have changed and no one on the two sides of the Atlantic can claim the right to decide who is eligible and who is not to be part of a government.

Let's start with the so-called countries. "Quintus". What kind of credibility do US representatives have when there is a real possibility that Donald Trump will win the elections next year, whose deputies, let's remind you, already have a majority in the House of Representatives of Congress? Compared to Trump, is any politician in Montenegro more distant from European and Western values? Is any politician in Montenegro on such good terms with Putin as Trump? Did Russian trolls help someone in Montenegro win the elections like Trump in 2016? Has any politician in Montenegro threatened NATO and questioned Article 5 of the North Atlantic Alliance like Trump?

How can Germany give lessons to someone in Montenegro about its European orientation when it is a country that literally stopped the European integration of the entire Western Balkans by putting a kind of veto on new expansions after the entry of Croatia back in 2008? How can any official from Berlin respect someone's Russophile when Germany was Russia's biggest economic partner, until the beginning of the Russian invasion in Ukraine? Who violated the sanctions against Russia after the seizure of Crimea in 2014 and who opposed the introduction of new ones, Germany or Montenegro? Did Germany or Montenegro build Nord Stream I and II that allowed Russia to bypass Ukraine and Poland? Did the former chancellor of Germany or the former prime minister of Montenegro defend and still defend Putin?

By what right would Great Britain be able to talk to someone about European values ​​and EU membership when it is a country that left the EU precisely thanks to propaganda supported by Russian dirty money and trolls from St. Petersburg? How can representatives of a country where conservative governments were supported by the Democratic Unionist Party, for whom the former Democratic Front parties are apprentices in terms of nationalism, clericalism, and homophobia, determine who is pro-European or pro-Western?

Can Italy teach Montenegro lessons when it has a prime minister who thirty years ago told fairy tales about Mussolini as a great patriot who fought for Italy and who until three years ago talked about Putin as a great statesman? Did any politician from Montenegro take a picture in the European Parliament wearing a T-shirt with Putin's face or the vice president of the current Italian government?

Can any representative of France have the nerve to influence the election of the government in Podgorica if more than half of the citizens of the Fifth Republic voted for Marine Le Pen, Jean-Luc Mélenchon and Eric Zemur, sworn enemies of the EU that have never existed in Montenegro even in darkest times?

Let's move on. Are there zones without LGBT population in Poland, a member of the EU, supported by the party in power in Montenegro? Is abortion prohibited in Poland or Montenegro? Are Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary opposed to EU federalization and deeper European integration, or Montenegro? In Bulgaria, a member of NATO and the EU, or in Montenegro, did any of the former ministers publicly express Russophile views, even when the invasion of Ukraine began? Has Montenegro banned the passage of weapons through its territory to Ukraine or Hungary? Or what could diplomats from the Czech Republic teach us about, whose decrees were signed, until recently, by President Miloš Zeman, a Russophile, homophobe and Eurosceptic who are not even found in the most radical parties in Montenegro? Would it be possible for one of the Romanians in Montenegro to give lessons on corruption despite Laura Koveši's pioneering work?

Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić and some ministers in the Serbian government continue to make propaganda and harmful statements, which reveal their weaknesses and very low, almost negligible, level of influence not only in Montenegro but also in BiH where they have not been able to replace Dodik for years. Any of their analysis of the situation in Montenegro and the position of the Serbs is counterproductive and causes the Serbs themselves much more harm than good, especially since they do not need help from Belgrade now. When she was supposed to, she was nowhere to be found.

Now we come to the internal problems surrounding the composition of the new government of Montenegro. A government that would be composed of PES, Democrats, parties of national minorities and ZBCG would be too heterogeneous and a gift for DPS because Milo Đukanović's party would be the only opposition in the parliament along with a couple of MPs from the Civic Movement URA. In this way, DPS would be in a very favorable position to return to the main door of the political scene. DPS still has strong financial support because the previous system has not yet been dismantled, and none of the ruling parties will be able to become dominant and build an economic and media counterbalance to DPS.

Also, the relations within PES should not be underestimated, especially between President Jakov Milatović and Prime Minister in pector Spajić. The entry of ZBCG into the government would strengthen Milatović's position in relation to Spajić and could be crucial in any future redistribution of power. Also, with ZBCG in the government, Spajić would be forced to spend a lot of energy to keep the coalition alive, bearing in mind the irreconcilability of BS and HGI with ZBCG, and Milatović would profit.

The threat that DPS will return to power without ZBCG does not stand. In most Montenegrin cities Democrats, SNP and PES are in coalition with ZBCG and it would be logical for them to vote together on all sensitive appointments in the judiciary and thus prevent DPS from paralyzing the Montenegrin judiciary again with the aim of saving their leaders from court investigations, processes and verdicts.

The way the two leaders of PES behave irresistibly reminds of the relationship between Momir Bulatović and Milo Đukanović during the nineties, before the split. The irony of fate is that Milatović's only slip-up since coming to the presidency was about the announcement on social networks on the occasion of the anniversary of Bulatović's death. In the past few months, it has been shown that Milatović is a more mature and serious politician than Spajić, which does not mean that he has a better political future. In any case, we are at the door of a new dualism: if the future government is successful, Spajić's power will grow, if there is a combination of horns in the bag, Milatović, with the behavior he has shown, will have, in football terms, a penalty to win real power that is not located in Cetinje than in Podgorica.

And finally, a word or two about the ZBCG coalition. The old guard of the former Democratic Front, starting with the leader Andrija Mandić, through Slaven Radunović and Jovan Vučurović, if they really think well of their political formation and the voters they represent, they should retire and leave the task of transforming the New Serbian Democracy into an acceptable party for western partners, among them certainly not the mayors of Nikšić or Budva. The story with Milan Knežević is a little different: he still has a chance to wake up like the Montenegrin Brad Pitt.