The reform of the European Union is once again one of the hot topics. This is because the Union increasingly understands that it will have to expand, which became clear after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. But the question of when the EU will be ready to receive new members can only be answered when Brussels works out how it will function when it moves from the current number of 27 members to 30 plus members.
In this context, the 60-page report entitled "Sailing on the High Seas: EU Reform and Enlargement for the 21st Century", published on September 19, is significant.
First of all, because the report was initiated by France and Germany, the two largest member states without which nothing in the EU really works.
For months, 12 organizations (calling themselves the "Group of Twelve") from two countries have been discussing what needs to change within the Union to accommodate new members. Or to put it more graphically: which parts of the house should be strengthened before the construction of additional rooms.
In some ways, this comes ahead of several top-level debates, starting with EU leaders in Granada on October 6, with the aim of making some decisions on next steps before a new meeting in Brussels on December 14-15.
Not everything proposed in the document will be taken into account, but it offers a good indication of some of the things an enlarged Union will need to do to remain politically relevant in the future.
And while this might be an exercise mainly for political enthusiasts in the member states, the six EU candidate countries in the Western Balkans, as well as Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, should take note as it will be a monumental task that will also affect them.
Or as the document uncompromisingly states: "The EU is not yet ready to welcome new members, neither institutionally nor politically". And then he further emphasizes: "Not all governments agree that the enlargement of the EU to the Western Balkans, Ukraine and Moldova is really a geopolitical necessity. Likewise, improving the EU's capacity to act or protect the basic principles of the EU does not necessarily have support in the entire EU."
It is no wonder that the document first places emphasis on strengthening the rule of law within the Union. It may not be openly discussed within the EU, but one of the main complaints in many western EU member states with the EU's eastward enlargement in 2004 and 2007 was the perceived growth of democratic backsliding.
Some examples are the current legal processes against Hungary and Poland, the investigation into the misuse of EU funds by the previous Czech government, or the refusal to let Bulgaria and Romania into the Schengen zone due to fear of corruption.
In order to avoid these issues in the future and potentially overcome some of them now, the document proposes to extend the scope of freezing EU funds for uncertain member states, which is already happening for Hungary, but on a limited scale.
But also to remove the unanimity rule in Article Seven of the procedure which could see EU member states lose key voting rights in the Council to a four-fifths majority and have automatic sanctions five years after a proposal to initiate the procedure. So far, Hungary and Poland, which are both under this procedure, have managed to protect each other with their right of veto.
Then follow all the proposed institutional changes to improve the function of the enlarged EU. A larger EU budget is necessary, with the EU able to raise more of its own funds through taxes rather than relying solely on contributions from member states. There is also the possibility of increasing the EU's common debt - something that was anathema to Germany in particular during the eurozone crisis, but has been accepted as a one-off measure to restart the EU's economy after the shutdown due to the pandemic.
The number of members of the European Parliament should not be increased beyond the current 751 - which means fewer MPs for all countries. Not every member state should have its own commissioner, which is the case now, or as a compromise - introduce "chief commissioners" and only "commissioners" with only the former being allowed to vote on issues. Having your own commissioner is a source of national pride, so it should not be expected that EU member states will be too interested in reducing the number.
But that is nothing compared to perhaps the most controversial aspect of the whole document: "before the next enlargement, all remaining policy decisions should be transferred from unanimity to qualified majority voting" (known as QMV, a voting procedure in the Council which means that a decision is taken if 55 percent of EU member states vote in favor, which represents at least 65 percent of the entire EU population). This would mean ending veto power in sensitive areas such as enlargement decisions, foreign policy and fiscal matters.
The European Parliament would also gain co-decision powers in some of these areas, which would mean nothing less than further federalization of the EU.
All of this would be achieved only by changing the treaty, which the member states have so far wanted to avoid because the agreement is complicated and opens up all kinds of political and legal challenges. So you get the idea - this is going to be tough.
So where does the expansion finally come into play? If the EU manages to undergo reforms, then it could happen soon.
Just as European Council President Charles Michel recently suggested, the authors recommend setting the goal that both sides (the EU and candidate countries) are ready for enlargement by 2030. It then lists nine principles that should "make the process more efficient, credible and politically driven".
Some of the principles are pretty obvious. The first, aptly named "fundamentals first", emphasizes "adherence to the rule of law and democratic principles". Nothing new.
The same applies to the second "geopolitical principle" which notes that it should be fully aligned with the EU's foreign policy decisions - that criterion already exists. Then there is the promise that the EU should provide more technical assistance to speed up domestic reforms and ensure more regular dialogue between the European Parliament and the parliaments of candidate countries. Nothing spectacular.
But then it gets interesting. "There is no accelerated admission" of certain countries, which Ukraine advocates, because it would "harm integration into the EU and undermine trust in other candidate countries."
But this does not mean that the expansion process will be slow. To get rid of individual EU member states having the opportunity to veto each opening and closing of all 35 EU accession chapters, which is common in today's EU, a full transition to QMV is proposed with only the final decision on the actual accession of a new member state taken with "double unanimity" - meaning all member states plus their national parliaments through ratification of the accession treaty.
The second principle calls for the "gradual introduction" of candidate countries into different areas of the EU, such as for example full participation in certain areas of EU policy such as energy or education, but with the "principle of reversibility" which implies the loss of this partial access if there is "back in the criteria for participation."
But perhaps the most intriguing of the nine principles is "conflict resolution," which offers some strong clues to countries like Georgia, Kosovo, Moldova, Serbia, and Ukraine that have territorial issues in one way or another.
It states that "for reasons of security and stability, countries with permanent military conflicts cannot join the EU. The same applies to countries that have a territorial conflict with another candidate country or EU member state."
It then says that "the accession of countries with disputed territories with a non-EU state will have to include a clause that those territories will only be able to join the EU if their inhabitants are willing to do so".
In other words, it's a lot to process. On all sides.
Bonus video:
