Since the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine at the latest, a new wind of European patriotism has been blowing in the European Union. After years marked by economic crisis, political upheaval and the exit of the United Kingdom from the EU, strongly united by a close military threat, the European political classes are once again walking the world with straight backs.
The Russian attack, the rise of right-wing populist parties and the increased circulation of fake news clearly show that, as the President of the European Commission, Ursula von de Leyen, says, we need a "more courageous Union", which fights "resolutely and in solidarity" for democracy, "day after day". .
But if we leave strong words aside, we see that European democracy is quite weak. In the last EU Parliament elections in 2019, voter turnout exceeded 50% for the first time in twenty years. In many Member States outside the core countries of the Union, the average reached 30% in the best cases.
Although the "umbrella" of European organizations including political parties, trade unions and civil society organizations has already become the norm, the EU is still a clearly hierarchical enterprise in which all important decisions are made in one dome. Although the freedom of movement within the EU increased the mobility of people, especially workers, outside the circles of the upper class and the mainstream media, European public opinion was hardly formed, let alone the formation of the European demos.
The only area of the Union where it seems to really work is the markets. Since the founding of the European Coal and Steel Community almost 75 years ago, European unity has been based on the supposed harmonization of economic interests in the form of common markets. And, at least from the entrepreneur's point of view, it was a good deal, as shown by the constant growth of the continent's GDP and the skyrocketing number of millionaires and billionaires. But can the common market alone - even equipped with Ursula's "Made in EU" weapon systems - keep the continent united?
Can not
In the mid-2000s, political scientist Peter Mair published a notable study on the EU. That study was part of a broader investigation into a trend he called "the undermining of Western democracy." In it, he described the EU as a political project that was "constructed as a protected sphere in which political articulation is possible without respecting the procedures of representative democracy." Thus, while the EU is not "undemocratic" to the extent that it is open to consultation with lobby groups, civil society, trade unions, etc., it is clearly "undemocratic" and incapable of "operating within conventions and known representative governance modalities".
In Mair's analysis, the most important observation was that the EU has two overlapping political "channels of representation": on the one hand, it is the European Parliament, whose representatives are elected in elections, but which is mainly an advisory body; the second channel consists of national governments that hold most of the key positions in the EU institutions.
Paradoxically, issues related to the concrete institutional framework of the Union were discussed in the European Parliament, although it has absolutely no authority to change them. At the same time, "deeper" issues, for example: to what extent European institutions could intervene with member states, were mostly discussed at national levels, although this is exactly where the European Parliament should have powers. As a result, Mair concluded, "decisions made through those two channels are increasingly irrelevant to the logic and outcomes of the system." Citizens go to the polls, governments are formed, but the fundamental political frameworks within which those governments operate are no longer decided. those, but the institutions to which they are bound by contract.
Mair did not experience the explosion of so-called populism, but if he did, he would only experience confirmation of his claims. Barely ten years after the publication of his study, the socialist force from Greece, Syriza, came to power in their country. Syriza's program included a significant increase in social spending and investment, tax cuts on low incomes, and even a kind of housing right. Even outside of times of crisis, this program would (for the EU) be ambitious.
However, faced with the power of European institutions, the party proved unable to maintain its position even for a few months. Syriza could pass as many laws as it wanted, but not if Greece wanted to remain part of the United European Markets around which its economy has grown for the past fifty years. Their allies in other countries could applaud them from the sidelines, but nothing more.
Syriza was not the only left-wing experiment, but it was the most disastrous and therefore the most memorable. Other governments in which the left participated did not fare so badly, but neither did they face the same existential decisions as Syriza. Having reached a strategic impasse, tensions within the European left rose. In France, Spain and Greece, the parties that fueled the rebellion in the 2010s turned on themselves and eventually split. There was no such rebellion in Germany, but last fall the party that could have led it split up.
Meanwhile, the structures of the European left, which have never been particularly active, are struggling to be heard publicly. No one, not even the rare parties that resist the negative trend, such as the Austrian Communists or the Belgian Labor Party, have yet found a way to impose themselves politically on the markets of an EU member state.
The enemies of my enemies are not my friends
On the other hand, right-wing parties have made noticeable political progress in recent years. Unlike the attacks to which Syriza was exposed when it won power in 2015, Giorgia Meloni, a politician with proven neo-fascist political experience, has been accepted, albeit reluctantly, into the citadels of European power centers.
This should come as no surprise: in the end, the far-right agenda, when its sharpest nationalist and anti-federalist edges are toned down, is generally reconcilable with the interests of economic elites. It may not be the preferred option for most of the business elite, but it is better than leaving power in the hands of unpredictable forces that might try to regulate the labor market or do something "worse than that."
Unlike some other countries where the extreme right softens its rhetoric a bit as it gets closer to power, this is not the case in Germany and the AfD continues to not soften its rhetoric. There is now a very real possibility that a far-right organization such as the AfD could participate in several German federal states in the coming years. Not without reason, in recent months more than a million people took to the streets to protest against this possibility.
Many forces that opposed the political center are now forced to defend that same center against the (extreme) right, in part because their own attempts to challenge the establishment have failed. Thus, left-wing activists protesting alongside leading CDU and SPD politicians (who are protesting the consequences of their own policies) have become a target for ridicule. In the same - contradictory - situation are Melénchon's supporters who voted for Macron in 2022 to avoid Le Pen or members of the Polish opposition who supported Donald Tusk despite his neoliberal program and his sometimes xenophobic rhetoric, in order to finally get rid of the hated Law and Justice .
Sometimes it seems that there is no alternative to an alliance with the liberal elites. But that, as political scientists Arthur Borriello and Anton Jäger said, is like "entrusting the management of a fire brigade to a group of arsonists". Even if they manage to put out the fires fueling right-wing populism, it's only a matter of time before they start another fire and the cycle begins again, usually with less and less success for liberals. Therefore, socialist forces must always try to counter this cycle by developing independent political offers and (as far as possible) away from centrist parties.
There is no going back from the EU
The impasse in which the left has fallen and the seemingly unstoppable rise of the right point to the sad reality of Europe after 2015: it is a Union in which the power of capital - both in the economy and in politics - is indisputable. The wave of mass protests and the electoral successes of the left in the 2010s in any case proved insufficient to sustainably challenge this power, while the right channels its "populism" outside the field of capital's interests, and towards issues of migration and culture war (Kulturkampf).
Even the EU's spending and investment programs - enacted in response to the latest crises and leading some to speculate prematurely about the death of neoliberalism in the Union - are actually an expression of neoliberal power. Whether it is a short-term program like Next Generation or the suspension of the Stability and Growth Pact, these measures are systematically presented as exceptions that will ensure the long-term stability of the order. So although there are signals that suggest a modest opening in the area of fiscal policy, there is a lack of political forces that could make that policy fundamentally transform.
The parties of the left are currently in decline and will not be in a position to challenge the power of the market even after the upcoming European elections. However, this does not release them from the obligation to think thoroughly about how the change might work, even in principle. The Greek experience, in any case, has shown that it cannot work.
In the event that the left wins power in one of the EU countries, the possibility of it forming a viable alternative to the current situation will largely depend on whether an alliance of member states will emerge that would be capable of renegotiating the Union's treaties and giving it at least a left-wing social democratic character. If this is not possible, the only option would be to leave the eurozone, which could open up considerable room for maneuver in the economic policy for individual countries in the long term, but would immediately bring with it huge economic challenges that, at the moment, no one seems to be able to overcome. .
So there is no way to bypass the EU for the medium and long term socialist project. However, this cannot be done within the current design of the EU. The key would be (to the extent possible) to create social alliances in the members themselves, which would be able to counter the inevitable advance of the right and the babble of the center with something significant. Only when the balance of power on the ground - on the streets and in state parliaments, but above all in the world of work - turns out to be significantly different, thoughts about a "different Europe" of any kind could be little more than wishful thinking.
(jacobin.de; prometej.ba; translation: D. Vujica)
Bonus video:
