Boycott Effendi

The story about "active boycott" (no one is transparent enough to understand what this "activity" was) came primarily from the opposition scene itself, i.e. from those opposition parties that decided to boycott (and stayed with that decision even when they were convinced that others would not agree to it)

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Illustration, Photo: Reuters
Illustration, Photo: Reuters
Disclaimer: The translations are mostly done through AI translator and might not be 100% accurate.

I have long been fed up with God and the people, and with myself, repeating one fact: the "white tickets" brought/returned Nikolić and Vučić to power. Not because there were many of them, white ballots, because there weren't, but because there were just enough of them and they were just so well distributed according to public opinion and the electorate that they perfectly served the purpose of the useful idiots of the new dictatorship.

Some of the prominent white papers in the meantime have more or less realized what they have done. Some others are determined to persevere in the conflict with the facts.

Now the toxic story of the white papers has been repeated with the "boycottists".

Interestingly, among these first ones (repentant "white tickets") practically no one called for a boycott of the local elections on June 2.

Among the latter, it was more colorful.

There is, however, another difference between these two paranormal phenomena that is much more important.

Namely, the story of an "active boycott" (no one is transparent enough to understand what that "activity" was) came primarily from the opposition scene itself, i.e. from those opposition parties that decided to boycott (and stayed with that decision even when they were convinced that others would not agree to it).

What concrete consequences did that have on the outcome of the election?

We will look at the example of the three largest cities. First, Nis: it is clear to everyone that there was a narrow opposition victory, which the regime will probably manage to neutralize with its machinations.

The progressives duly went to the polls, and the pro-oppositionists stayed home just long enough to deny their city a convincing victory, which the regime would hardly be able to topple (at least the same was true in Čačak, let's not go any further).

In Belgrade, the influence of the "boycotters" was the strongest, so the consequences were the most severe.

The city as a whole unexpectedly easily remained in the hands of the clique. Without the boycott syndrome, it would at least be like in Nis, which would be another song - which the so-called the progressives might not be able to write the end.

By municipalities, it seems that the opposition will only take the Old Town; the calculation without the boycott shows that at least Savski venac, Vračar, Novi Beograd, Zvezdara, maybe Voždovac, Čukarica would have been added to it; therefore, almost everything that is located within the area marked with road signs "Belgrade".

Finally, Novi Sad: undoubtedly the biggest disappointment of the so-called of the opposition public, at the same time so mysteriously and inexplicably that everyone kept quiet, as if no one was even trying to publicly analyze what happened and why. A perfectly united opposition, everything in its place, a visible anti-regime mood, the image of the most oppositional city acquired through concrete actions...

Even Miloš Vučević changed his mind, fearing the defeat of his own people, and on the day of the election he made a very conciliatory, almost timid statement.

And then – nothing?!

What are the factors of this (un)expected failure? One: the impact of the boycott; the math is clear.

The second is that Novi Sad did not have its Dr. Dragan Milić, inside or outside the main opposition list, and he would have been very useful.

The third, which is a kind of taboo: it's great that the opposition revealed the regime's "call info center" hogwash at the Fair, and surely many of us enjoyed watching them destroy those poor people who are ashamed of their own faces, BUT... there is that part of the public, call he is petty-bourgeois or whatever you want, he is not very pleased with any "violent" scenes. That's the "mentality" of Kanda, and with that mentality, war wisely, because you will lose, but you intended to win.

Fourth, the insane (non)division of Novi Sad into municipalities, which was abolished by Milošević's Gauleiter in 1990, and the democratic authorities did nothing to restore it when they could.

If Novi Sad was divided into municipalities like other big cities, now the opposition (here I am using municipalities from the 1980s) would have taken at least Stari Grad, Liman and Detelinara, most likely also Podunavlje and Slavija, and that is again - almost the entire city. No "environment" parts.

Is it a little?

Okay, I know, "you fight for 2-3 municipalities, you need to overthrow the dictatorship".

It should.

Only, they are much easier to build than to tear down. That, and only that, should have been thought about in 2012.


Bonus video:

(Opinions and views published in the "Columns" section are not necessarily the views of the "Vijesti" editorial office.)