Two years ago, I learned eight lessons from the war in Ukraine. And while I cautioned at the time that it was too early to be confident in any predictions, they still hold up pretty well.
When Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, he counted on a quick seizure of Kiev and a change of government - similar to what the Soviets did in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. But the war is still raging and no one knows when or how it might end.
If one sees this conflict as a Ukrainian "war for independence", without focusing too much on the borders, the Ukrainians are already the winners. Putin denied that Ukrainians were a separate nation, but his behavior only strengthened Ukrainian national identity.
What else did we learn? First - old and new weapons complement each other. Despite early successes in the use of anti-tank weapons in the defense of Kiev, I have warned - and rightly so - that declaring the end of the tank era may prove premature as fighting has moved from the northern suburbs to the eastern plains of Ukraine. However, I did not expect the effectiveness of drones as anti-tank and anti-ship weapons, nor did I expect that Ukraine could drive the Russian navy out of the western half of the Black Sea. (Artillery and mines also played a large role as the conflict descended into World War I-style trench warfare.)
Second, nuclear deterrence works, but it depends more on the size of stakes than on capacity. The West is deterred, but only up to a point. Putin's nuclear threat has dissuaded NATO governments from sending troops (but not equipment) to Ukraine. But the reason is not that Russia has superior nuclear capabilities; rather, it will be because Putin has designated Ukraine as a vital national interest for Russia, while Western governments have not. Meanwhile, Putin's nuclear saber-rattling has not stopped the West from expanding the range of weapons it provides to Ukraine; So far, the West is managing to dissuade Putin from attacking a NATO country.
Third, economic interdependence does not prevent war. Some German policymakers assumed that cutting trade ties with Russia would be so costly that neither side could afford open hostility. But while economic interdependence may increase the costs of war, it does not necessarily prevent it. More precisely, if economic interdependence is uneven, then the less dependent party can use it as a weapon against the other.
Fourth, sanctions can increase costs but do not determine the outcome of war, in the short term. Let's recall that CIA director William Burns met with Putin in November 2021 and warned him, without success, of sanctions if Russia invades. Putin probably doubted that the West could maintain global unity on sanctions, and he was right. Oil is a fungible commodity, and many countries - not just India - are more than willing to import Russian oil at discounted prices, transported by irregular fleets of tankers.
As I expected two years ago, China's concern that it might become embroiled in secondary sanctions appears to have placed some limits on its support for Russia. Although China has provided important "dual-use technology" (suitable for military or civilian purposes), it has refrained from sending weapons. Given this situation, it will be some time before we can fully assess the long-term effect of the sanctions imposed on Russia.
Fifth, information warfare is important. Modern wars are not only a question of whose army wins, but also whose narrative wins. Careful American disclosure of intelligence about Russian plans to invade Russia proved effective in debunking the narrative that Putin wanted Europeans to believe. This greatly contributed to the solidarity of the West when, as expected, the invasion took place. Likewise, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy has done a remarkable job promoting his country's narrative in the West.
Sixth, both hard and soft power are important. Although hard power will trump soft power in the short term, soft power remains very important. Putin failed the soft power test early. The sheer barbarism of Russian forces in Ukraine led Germany to finally give up the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline - a result that even years of US pressure did not lead to. Zelenski, on the contrary, relied on soft power from the beginning. Using his acting skills to present an attractive portrait of Ukraine, he not only won the sympathy of the West but also secured the supply of military equipment that guarantees the acquisition of hard power.
Seventh, cyber capabilities are not a magic wand. Russia has, at least since 2015, used cyber attacks on Ukraine's power grid, and many analysts believed that due to cyber attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure and the government, the invasion would turn into a fait accompli. But while there were many (reported) cyberattacks during the war, none turned out to be decisive. When Ukraine's Viasat network was hacked, communications were transferred to numerous small Starlink satellites. Thanks to training and battlefield experience, Ukraine's cyber defenses and offense have only improved.
There is another lesson here - once a war has already begun, kinetic weapons provide greater timeliness, accuracy and damage assessment than cyber weapons. It should also be said that electronic warfare can still have a negative impact on the communication links necessary for the use of drones.
All in all, war is unpredictable. The most important lesson from the Ukrainian war remains one of the oldest. Two years ago, many expected a quick victory for Russia; and only a year ago there were high expectations for the triumphant Ukrainian summer offensive. But as Shakespeare wrote more than four centuries ago, it is dangerous when a leader cries "'No mercy' and lets the dogs of war loose."
The promise of a short war is attractive. Putin certainly did not expect to be stuck in it indefinitely. He managed to sell his war of attrition to the Russian people as a "great patriotic" struggle against the West. But the dogs he let off the chain can still turn and eat him.
The author is a professor emeritus at Harvard University
Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2024. (translation: NR)
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