Recent elections in France and Britain and the current presidential campaign in America reflect the dilemmas left-wing parties face as they try to forge a new identity and present a credible alternative to the far right. Dissatisfaction with neoliberalism and hyper-globalization after the global financial crisis in 2008 was first exploited by the far right. Ten years ago, one could justifiably speak of the "abdication of the left".
It is worth noting that today the left is in a better position. In Britain, the Labor Party recently won a major victory, ending 14 years of Conservative rule. In France, the leftist New Popular Front (NFP) coalition has a much better chance of stopping the rise of the far right than centrists aligned with President Emmanuel Macron. And American President Joe Biden managed to take his country to uncharted territories through new industrial and environmental policies, even though he is lagging behind Donald Trump in the polls.
As the Democrats' difficulties in the United States show, the left still has a lot of work to do. Biden's age and apparent failure to convince the public of his mental capacity became a big part of the problem. But part of the problem is the mixed messages Democrats are sending about what they really stand for and who they represent.
This is a problem that also plagues other parties of the left. As Thomas Piketty has shown, left-wing parties have broken away from their traditional voter base, the working class, and veered towards the educated elite.
The left has yet to form an identity that corresponds to the current reality. How should it be repositioned? Should it focus on redistribution, as the NFP in France seems to have done? Should it support fiscal responsibility, like the Labor Party in Britain? Should he lead an industrial policy like Biden's and for what purpose? How should it address issues such as immigration, the environment, or transgender rights, which the cultural elite view very differently than the general public?
If the left wants to regain political power, it must return to its roots and start representing the interests of working people again. This means that the focus must be strictly on creating good, secure, productive jobs for non-degree workers. A growing sense of economic insecurity, the erosion of the middle class and the disappearance of good jobs in lagging regions are the main reasons for the rise of far-right populism. Only by reversing these trends will the left be able to be a convincing alternative.
The problem is that the old strategies don't work. Industrial workers who joined unions formed the core of support for left-wing parties in the first decades after World War II. They were also the foundation of the middle class.
Today, in the United States and Europe, the share of workers employed in industry is steadily declining. The largest part of the workforce is employed in the service sector. When Biden takes office in January 2021, manufacturing's share of total US employment has already shrunk to 8,5%. And today it fell below 8,2%, despite his administration's best efforts to revive the industry. Some European countries, such as Germany, have a higher share of industrial employment, but none of these countries have been able to avoid decline over time.
The parties of the left have not yet fully recognized this fact. All their talk about re-employment, competitiveness, digitization and green transition doesn't ring true when it comes to jobs. The policy of protectionism when it comes to China is not a solution either. Strategies that focus on production have much less political appeal in a situation where the majority of workers are not in industry and have no realistic prospects of employment there.
There are also problems with redistributive policies. There are strong arguments for a more progressive tax system and raising tax rates for the highest earners. Increasing social benefits and improving social protection would be helpful, especially in the US, where social safety nets remain weak. However, monetary benefits do not compensate workers for the loss of dignity and social recognition that are the product of the disappearance of good jobs. And they cannot repair the breakdown in social life that occurs when factories close or move elsewhere.
The left needs a compelling program to create good, productive jobs throughout the economy—especially in lagging regions and for workers without a college degree. The target group for such a program is not a worker in the automotive industry or steel mills, but rather one in the care or retail sector.
In addition, innovations that are suitable for work must be at the center of this agenda. Increasing wages and simultaneously increasing the number of jobs requires organizational and technological innovations that increase the productivity of less educated workers. Unlike automation and other forms of labor-saving technology, work-friendly innovations help ordinary workers perform a wider range of more complex tasks. An example is digital tools that enable expertise.
As innovation and productivity play a central role in this agenda, policies similar to the successful industrial policies of the past seem to be needed now. We can call it industrial policy for the service sector - or, even better, productive policy for workers. This builds on existing cross-sector partnerships at the local level and innovative programs at the national level, but with a focus on services and technologies that are suitable for a less educated workforce. My colleagues and I have proposed options for such programs in the US, France and the UK.
The "New Left" must directly confront both the new structure of the economy and the productivity imperative. Only then will it become a true political movement of the future and a credible alternative to the extreme right.
The author is a professor of international political economy at Harvard University; is the president of the International Economic Association
Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2024. (translation: NR)
Bonus video:
