Can electoral changes lead to political and social changes

In an attempt to answer the dilemma presented in the title of this text, my initial thesis is that, even in key, developed countries of the post-democratic and post-capitalist "collective political West", such as France and Great Britain, changes in elections are only a necessary but not a sufficient assumption. for a serious political and social turn. Even when they are the result of overwhelming social dissatisfaction formed within a long-term and fundamental crisis, and when the governing parties win only a fifth of the votes in the elections. Why is it like that? I will offer six elements in support of the presented thesis.

First, because in a world of more widespread megathreats (Rubini), imperial struggles for redistribution of power or technofeudalism (Vauroufakis) in which there are already perverse inequalities, changes cannot come about through (counter)revolution in one country. We live in the times of the replacement of the state by multinational capital and the consequent replacement of society by the nation and political goals by political communication.

Macron in his own trap

At the same time, in the framework in which the real power, in favor of the international super-rich, is largely displaced from national borders, there is no space for political leaders (in power) with mobilization potential and credibility to initiate key changes. The figures of the leaders are pale, even boring. In this respect, the (over)ambitious figure of the ex-socialist Emmanuel Macron, prone to taking risks, is rather a confirmation of the rule than an exception. Macron did marginalize the socialists and degolists as key players on the stage, but the effect of his "flash" and liberal turn to the right and simultaneous flirtation, through the immigration law, with the ideas of the National Gathering, is their threatening "normalization" and growth. The idea that the left and the right will continue to split did not come true this time, so Macron found himself in his own trap.

The third reason is the centripetal rule of politics in democratic societies that, entering the political mainstream in order to spread their influence, former radicals de-radicalize. At the same time, the parties of the constitutional circle, trying to stop them, take over (diluted) parts of their political agenda - issues of migration, terrorism or climate change.

Previously, the key question is how radical, extreme right or left are, for example, the formation of Marine Le Pen and, on the other hand, Jean-Luc Mélenchon's Unconquered France as part of the New Popular Front?

Do "extremists" advocate leaving the EU and NATO (to which France returned in 2009)?

Didn't Macron himself, in relation to the majority of the French, find himself in the position of a radical by advocating for the direct involvement of France in the conflict in Ukraine, which would easily lead us from the second cold to the third world war?

Fatigue in Britain

Does anyone therefore believe that the return of Labor, after 14 years of Conservative rule and their worst election result in the last century, will bring any significant changes in Great Britain, except partially on the internal level? Especially, if the centrist, post-Blerian politics of the new leader Keir Starmer is far from the radical position of the former leader Jeremy Corbyn, who has now entered parliament as an independent candidate. It is obvious that the change in power in Britain is primarily the result of fatigue with the almost Balkan long rule of conservatives faced with multiple crises, the impoverishment of the majority and the destruction of the national insurance system, Brexit and frequent changes of leaders marked by numerous scandals.

On the other side of the English Channel, is Mélenchon in France for the "abolition of private property, the family and the state" (Engels), or are the mega-rich "happy-go-lucky people" from Davos closer to that position today, except for themselves?

Fourth, what does the research finding that Le Pen is strongest in economically devastated areas, and not where migrants are most numerous, say about the deeper economic and social causes and motives of the dangerous leaning of the working class and the middle classes towards the extreme, but no longer extreme, right? Or that the even less developed east of Germany is the area of ​​greatest influence of the radical right AfD and Sara Wagenkroft on the left. It is an old rule that class exploitation and devastation are easily covered up by finding enemies in foreigners and others.

Choice design as a barrier to change

Fifth, the fact that in the British electoral system of the relative majority in which "first takes all", the obtained third of evenly distributed, "winning" votes finally brings Labor even almost two-thirds of the seats in parliament, while at the same time with a solid (and dangerous) 14 percent of the votes gives only a few parliamentary positions to Faraž's far-right reformists, raises the question of the role of the institutional system in blocking changes.

We live in the times of the replacement of the state by multinational capital and the consequent replacement transfers of society by the nation and political goals by political communication.

Honestly, I don't know who is the author of the cynical statement that if anything (importantly) changed in the elections, those in power would stop organizing them. Or they would set out to set them up, or at least limit their inherently unfavorable effects in advance. I know, however, that Giovanni Sartori is the author of the thesis that the electoral system is the key manipulative tool of politics, that is, the (asymmetrical) translation of citizens' will into political mandates.

Electoral strategies

The threat that Marine Le Pen and her protégé Jordan Bardela would win an absolute majority of seats in France was real. As expected, this did not happen, because by combining the center and the left, they were convincingly first in the first, and finished third in the second round of voting. Coalition tactics and political dynamics are therefore the sixth, most concrete mechanism for blocking radical changes.

When it comes to elections and the electoral system, otherwise centralized France has a two-ring majority electoral system with all 577 local constituencies giving their own MP. If no one in the first round, in which at least a quarter of the voters participated, receives a majority of the votes, which this time only happened in about seventy places - the "fortress" of certain parties and candidates, it goes to the second round with the candidates who won at least 12,5 .XNUMX percent of the vote. Most often with three of them.

The legislator's intention is that in the first round the traditional political colorfulness of France will be reduced to a manageable and not overly fragmented parliament in the second round. The second (un)hidden intention is to eliminate the radical third, undesirable player by playing a game of threes and making pre-election alliances. We've looked at the game of stopping the unwanted third as a scenario before.

After the second round of voting, the political landscape of France opens up the question of what are the possible contents and institutional framework of cooperation of the anti-Le Pen coalition if, for the left, Macron is an arrogant representative of the rich globalists?

Constitutional design

The French Fifth Republic is, with some exaggeration, a "presidential monarchy". If we leave aside the question of whether the tailor-made uniform of Marshal De Gaulle is too big for the political format of one E. Macron, the fact remains that the president can, for example, push through a law that does not have the support of the majority in parliament. Like the one about raising the retirement age from 62 to 64, which in traditionally combative and "unconquered" France caused a wave of civil protests and labor strikes. It still represents a demand that connects the platforms of the New People's Front of the Left and the National Gathering of the Right.

Even if there is a cohabitation of Macron and someone from the left New People's Front, the matter, bearing in mind the scope of the president's powers, especially those related to France's Euro-Atlantic alliances, will be extremely reducing for the Prime Minister and the Government. It is clear then why Le Pen sought an absolute majority in parliament. Waiting to finally get hold of the key position of president in the next election round. (...)

(radar.rs)