Victory in war can sometimes be easily defined. World War II ended with Allied troops taking control of Berlin and Tokyo, and removing the German and Japanese leadership. On the other hand, the Vietnam War ended in a clear defeat for the United States of America: North Vietnam conquered South Vietnam despite the senseless loss of 58,000 American lives. The Korean War is sometimes called a stalemate because it never formally ended.
But such definitions can be misleading. In Iraq, the US removed Saddam Hussein, but did not find weapons of mass destruction to justify their involvement, nor did they turn the country into a functioning democracy. Moreover, some cynics would say that the real winner was Iran, which became the most influential political force in Iraq.
On the other hand, although the demilitarized zone remains on the Korean peninsula, the southern half of the peninsula has developed into a vibrant, prosperous democracy with an annual per capita income of $35.000, while North Korea is a dangerous dictatorship with an estimated annual per capita income of $1.200 and multiple food shortage crises. Who won the inconclusive war?
This brings us to Ukraine, where the definition of victory depends on the military objectives and time horizons of the participants. In 2014, Russia invaded Ukraine under the pretext of protecting Russian-speaking citizens in Crimea and parts of eastern Donbass. Eight years later, Russia tried to complete the process by destroying Ukraine as an independent state. As Russian President Vladimir Putin wrote in 2021, he did not consider Ukraine an independent state, but part of the larger Russian world. He massed troops on the border with the intention of capturing Kiev within days and overthrowing the Ukrainian government, much as the Soviet Union had done in Budapest in 1956 and Prague in 1968.
He failed. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky rejected advice to flee the country and form a government-in-exile, and instead rallied his troops, saved the capital and foiled Putin's plan. Zelensky then used the soft power of attraction to gain foreign support and increase Ukraine's hard military power. The result of Putin's invasion was the strengthening of Ukrainian national identity and NATO, which gained two new members, Finland and Sweden, which previously had a long-standing policy of neutrality. Judging by Putin's original war aims, Ukraine has already won.
The problem, of course, is that Russian troops still control about a fifth of Ukraine's territory, and Putin has revised his war aims by demanding that Ukraine recognize his annexation of four eastern provinces (including some not fully controlled by Russian troops). The war appears to be at a stalemate, but Putin has turned it into a war of attrition. Although Russian casualties are huge, he may be counting on time being on his side, given Russia's larger population and economy. Ultimately, Ukraine's will to fight may wane, as well as Western support.
According to a recent poll, 26% of Ukrainians are open to a diplomatic solution, but are not ready to participate in sham negotiations with an unrepentant Putin. About 86% of Ukrainians believe that Russia is likely to attack again, even if a peace agreement is signed. Although both Russia and Ukraine have expressed readiness for negotiations, they are still very far apart. Last summer, Hungary's pro-Kremlin prime minister, Viktor Orbán, traveled to Moscow to try to mediate, but failed to change Putin's position. Meanwhile, Donald Trump continues to claim that he could solve the war in a day; but it is hard to see how this could be accomplished by anything but Ukrainian surrender.
Recently, Czech President Petr Pavel, a former NATO general who is a strong supporter of Ukraine, said that "talk about the defeat of Ukraine or the defeat of Russia will simply not happen. So the end will be somewhere in between.” Pavel warned that part of the Ukrainian territory will remain under Russian occupation temporarily, and "temporarily" can mean years. If Ukraine defines victory as the return of the entire territory occupied by Russia since 2014, victory is not in sight. But if its goal is to preserve its independence as a democracy linked to Europe, while retaining the right to ultimately return its territory, victory remains possible.
However, this possible victory also means that Putin must not be able to declare his victory. Ukraine should be given the support it needs to strengthen its negotiating position. Even if Ukraine cannot achieve its maximalist goals in the short term, the legitimacy of its position will be preserved in the long term, provided that Russian gains are not recognized.
This is sometimes called the Korean solution. The ceasefire and the demilitarized zone along the line of contact would be under the supervision of international peacekeepers, so Russia would draw many other countries into the conflict if it attacked again. While it may not be possible to get the agreement of 32 NATO members for Ukraine's formal membership in the alliance at this time, a group of NATO members called "Friends of Ukraine" could monitor the zone and promise to respond to any new act of Russian aggression.
Finally, Ukraine will also need help to rebuild its economy and access EU markets. Although the Korean solution would not satisfy Ukraine's maximalist goals in the short term, it would certainly deserve to be called a Ukrainian victory.
Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2024.
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