"If Montenegro closes the four chapters in December, the highway to EU membership will open before it. This is very important because in such a development, Podgorica would escape so much from all other candidates on the way to the EU, that it would not make sense to stop it. to wait for other candidates in order to form a package of countries for EU entry," a well-placed source in the EU who follows the Montenegrin file told "Vijesti".
According to the opinion of our interlocutors in the EU, official Podgorica should try to iron out relations with Zagreb directly, in face-to-face contacts, and not through intermediaries or by seeking the help of powerful allies in the EU and NATO.
A series of major geopolitical tectonic disturbances, from the Russian invasion of Ukraine, through China's hegemonic ambitions, to the return of Donald Trump to power in Washington, have contributed to the fact that the EU does not have a clear idea of how to extend and how to relate to the EU enlargement process. From whether to continue according to the principle of regatta and merit or transform the story of enlargement into a geostrategic priority of the Union and consequently make decisions based on political opportunism and not according to "merit-based" parameters.
The long-term fatigue of enlargement produced great consequences because practically nothing significant happened for a whole decade, that is, something that would have an echo on the continental level when it comes to enlargement. In the last two years, the narrative has changed, new perspectives have been opened, new principles have come into play, and everything has become more nebulous, in the sense that it may or may not.
In the EU itself, between the members, there is a battle whether to remain firm in the positions that the process of European integration is strictly linked to results, in principle you get tasks, fulfill them and move forward, or to change the strategy, insert new parameters, create a new way of evaluating progress . In this context, it is also important for the EU, especially its new institutions, for Montenegro to close four chapters, as this would be proof that the "merit-based process" is still functioning and that it is the best tool for enlargement policy.
In the next five years, negotiations for EU membership could be completed by several countries, not only Montenegro. Marta Kos, the candidate for the new EU enlargement commissioner, used the term "some countries" in a targeted and deliberate manner at a hearing in the European Parliament when she spoke about her five-year work plan in the EC and her ambitions to close negotiations with the candidate countries.
Here, it is important to note that the future Slovenian commissioner consulted with key figures in the EU regarding the mentioned formulation and received support that it was announced urbi et orbi. So, this is a very strong message to the countries in the Western Balkans, not only from the future commissioner, but from the most important part of the EU. Now the ball is in the court of the leaders and societies in the Western Balkan region, that is, in the next five years it will depend much more on them how far their countries will go in the process of approaching EU membership.
GERMAN TRAP FOR MONTENEGRO
However, in Podgorica, they would have to follow very carefully what is happening in Berlin these days and weeks, since the progress in European integration and the long-awaited closing of the four chapters could be blocked due to the dissolution of the Bundestag.
The political crisis in Germany should generally not affect Montenegro, unless unforeseen events occur and the Bundestag is dissolved in the next three weeks. Namely, the procedure for closing the four chapters with Montenegro has entered the routine phase in the EU institutions, from COWEB through COREPER to GAK, and there should be no problems because it is a diplomatic-ministerial decision-making level, where the approval of the Bundestag is not necessary.
A sudden obstacle could arise over the holding of the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC). It would be of a technical-procedural nature, because if the Bundestag is dissolved before the decision on the organization of the IGC with Montenegro is made, then everything would be postponed until the spring of 2025. As a reminder, all decisions on enlargement must be made unanimously in the EU bodies, and according to German positive law, any green light given by Berlin in the field of EU enlargement policy must receive the prior approval of the competent committee in the Bundestag. Therefore, if the Bundestag were to be dissolved, they would find themselves in limbo and everything would have to be postponed for a few months, that is, until the convocation of the new German parliament.
Montenegro must as soon as possible complete all necessary tasks for the convening of the new IGC in order to reduce the risk of becoming collateral damage of the sudden dissolution of the Bundestag. In any case, in the current convocation of the German parliament, there will be no problems for the approval of the Intergovernmental Conference with Montenegro, and this is another reason for Podgorica to fulfill its part of the tasks as soon as possible and to hope that Chancellor Olaf Scholz will keep his promise and not ask for a vote of confidence. to his government before December 16.
WHY DOESN'T MONTENEGRO IN THE EU FIT THE VUČIĆ REGIME AND THE DPS
The conflict between President Jakov Milatović and Prime Minister Milojko Spajić puts Montenegro's European path on a slippery slope because it opens the door for opposing nationalist currents, both Serbian and Montenegrin, to try to achieve their maximalist goals.
In the eyes of people who follow Montenegro in the EU on a daily basis, the blame for the non-cooperation between Milatović and Spajić lies with both of them. There are slight differences in who is given a greater or lesser share of the blame, but these are nuances that do not change the essence. Insisting on the differences between Spajić and Milatović and their distancing with less and less desire to find common points or compromise, at least in the name of a common goal, which is the entry of Montenegro into the EU, opens up space for players who have other priorities and are permanently working to destabilize the country.
The New Serbian Democracy and the Democratic People's Party, on one side, and the DPS on the other, each in their own way following party agendas, are abusing European integration for political calculations and paving the way for consolidation of power, i.e. a return to power. Both sides are very careful not to be accused of obstructing the European path, while they are doing exactly that in a perfidious way, raising tensions over Montenegrin-Serbian issues. It is not a climate in which the country can move quickly towards EU membership.
The next few weeks are crucial and Montenegro should not make a single wrong step or allow "sliding starts" from the neighborhood or the opposition camp. There are various forces that want to slow down Montenegro on the European path. Some for geopolitical reasons or better positioning of other states or power centers, others to clear the way to the conquest of power and for this purpose they are ready to give everything they need for external support, at the price of putting Montenegro in an unequal or unenviable position before solving tricky interstate disputes. questions.
In particular, Serbia does not want Montenegro to "escape" from it to the EU, but equally, the DPS does not want the current ruling coalition to introduce Montenegro into the EU. For the current regime in Belgrade, the entry of Podgorica into the EU would be the collapse of its regional and foreign policy, while the DPS would lose the meaning of its existence if the PES, Democrats, NSD, DNP, SNP, BS and Albanian parties would introduce Montenegro into the EU, because the complete narrative would on which rests that party fell into the water.
There are still no irreparable consequences from the aggravation of conflicts on identity issues, but this kind of division of society firmly holds Montenegro in the jaws of permanent instability, and it is potentially one of the most insidious obstacles on the EU's path.
ALBANIA AND SERBIA ARE OPENING CLUSTERS IN DECEMBER?!
Albania has great chances to open VI cluster, much bigger than Serbia III. In the event that Belgrade is left empty-handed again, and Tirana takes the first big step in the negotiation process, Albania would have the opportunity to reach and overtake Serbia for the first time on the way to EU membership.
Prime Minister Edi Rama "pushed" quite strongly all available resources in Tirana to do everything necessary to open the mentioned cluster. The big difference compared to previous years is that in Albania they are now working seriously, it is no longer just talk and making promises. In the EU, they have the impression that in Tirana they have realized that this is the period when they should jump on the train and they are working with high quality, dedication and diligence. Both results and progress became visible.
The Hungarian Presidency of the EU and the outgoing EC managed to gather the largest number of member states, as of 2020, ready to support the opening of a cluster in the negotiations with Serbia. However, it is necessary to send a few more positive signals from Belgrade that would testify to the determination of the Serbian authorities to catch the train for EU membership.
There is no need for dramatic major changes in Serbian foreign policy, such as the introduction of sanctions against the Russian Federation, but a couple of symbolic steps in harmonizing with the EU's foreign policy are necessary. For the Baltic republics and the Nordic countries, the biggest stumbling block remains Belgrade's relationship with Moscow. In this sense, the moves of the authorities in Serbia are still contradictory: every time they make a good step forward, they are followed by counterproductive moves that bring us back to the starting point.
Cluster III includes the information society and the media, and in this context it would be of great help if the solution for the Regulatory Body for Electronic Media (REM) was at a satisfactory level and in accordance with European standards. In other words, the new REM should be diametrically opposed to the previous one in terms of personnel, but also in terms of style and professionalism.
However, it should always be kept in mind that Serbia rarely misses an opportunity to miss an opportunity, especially a European one.
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