The Middle East and the word "opportunity" rarely appear in the same sentence, and for good reason. However, there are reasons to believe that we are approaching an exception. The chance - if not to conclude a permanent peace, at least to end current conflicts and prevent new ones - is really knocking on the door. The question is whether political leaders will open that door.
Israel has destroyed the military capabilities of Hamas in the Gaza Strip and Hezbollah in Lebanon. However, continued military operations increasingly run into the limitations of the law of diminishing effect, as fewer and fewer remaining targets are of critical importance.
In addition, the continuation of the military campaign threatens the regional and global status of the country. The International Criminal Court's decision to issue arrest warrants for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defense Minister Yoav Galant is the latest signal that political isolation and economic sanctions could befall Israel unless it reverses course.
The arguments for a ceasefire on both fronts are strong. A recent agreement between Israel and Hezbollah requires Hezbollah (which has been so weakened that it has abandoned its insistence on linking the cease-fire in southern Lebanon to that in Gaza) to move its heavy weapons north of the Litani River, away from the border with Israel. The Lebanese army will patrol southern Lebanon, while the Israel Defense Forces will withdraw from the area and commit to not maintaining a presence there. Israel has been assured that, under certain conditions, it will still be able to take military action against Hezbollah to thwart the group's attempts to reposition itself along the border or if it is preparing to attack.
This agreement, if honored, will allow about 60.000 Israelis to return to their homes after more than a year of displacement. The ceasefire will allow Israel's overstretched military to recuperate and focus on other issues, including Iran, which is moving ever closer to developing nuclear weapons, which would pose an existential threat to Israel. The ceasefire will also spare Lebanon and its people from further destruction.
Although a cease-fire would give Hezbollah some time and space to regroup, which is why some in Israel are contesting it, endless military operations will not do much good. Hezbollah can be weakened, but not completely eliminated, as demonstrated by the unsuccessful Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon in the past. Israel's goal should be to restore deterrence, and the agreement makes it possible.
Gaza presents a much more complex challenge. It is unclear whether Hamas will agree to a cease-fire, but it is significantly weakened militarily and may have difficulty resisting a truce if Israel agrees to terms deemed reasonable.
But will Israel agree? He has to, because the truce will allow him to return more than a hundred hostages who remained in Gaza. According to Israeli intelligence, half of them are still alive.
In addition, as in the case of Lebanon, it is unclear what else Israel could achieve by continuing military operations in Gaza. Hamas is certainly not capable of launching another attack like the one on October 7, 2023. However, Israel's refusal to initiate a diplomatic process that would allow the Palestinians to realize elements of their national aspirations has allowed Hamas - with its insistence on endless struggle - to remain relevant.
The big question, then, is whether Israel will agree to a political process that opens up the possibility (however remote, conditional and vague in terms of territorial scope) of creating a Palestinian state. In the short term, such a process would pave the way for the deployment of regional stabilization forces in Gaza and the establishment of diplomatic relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia. In the long run, a properly established Palestinian state would allow Israel to remain both a Jewish and democratic country, as well as prosperous and secure.
Some in Israel prefer a different future - with Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip and the annexation of large parts of the West Bank. If their wishes are not fulfilled, they loudly threaten to overthrow Netanyahu's government. This is a risk that Netanyahu has carefully avoided, because once he loses power he will face a delayed trial and an official investigation into Israel's failure to prevent and respond to the October 7 Hamas attack.
Donald Trump, whose impending return to the Oval Office on January 20, 2025 is already beginning to influence developments, could prove to be the deciding factor. The Israeli right sees his return as an opportunity to achieve its maximalist goals and even calls 2025 the year of establishing Israeli sovereignty over the West Bank and a chance to reduce the Palestinian population in Gaza through "voluntary emigration. Trump, however, expressed his desire to calm tensions in the region.
Trump is able to achieve this goal. Thanks to developments in Lebanon, Netanyahu may have become strong enough to push aside his far-right coalition partners and form a new government without their participation, or even win a new mandate from voters. But even if that doesn't happen, Trump, whom the Israeli right considers a friend, can put pressure on Netanyahu and his government in a way that President Joe Biden could not. It will be more difficult for Netanyahu to resist Trump's pressure, and it will be much easier for Trump to create and maintain such pressure because he has the support of American evangelicals and certain American Jewish communities.
Richard Nixon comes to mind. As they say - Nixon didn't have to worry about Nixon, that's why he was able to make contact with Mao's China.
Today, the same can be said about Trump. He could build on the success of the ceasefire in Lebanon and demand the same in Gaza, thereby starting a potentially promising diplomatic process. This would be a huge achievement for the 47th president. There is a chance, it should be used.
The author is president emeritus of the US Council on Foreign Relations; he was director of policy planning at the State Department from 2001 to 2003.
Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2024. (translation: NR)
Bonus video:
