Last week, Montenegro found itself in the company of "friends of Moscow" in the most important Italian daily "Corriere della Serra". Podgorica is included in the "Eastern Four", together with Slovakia, Hungary and Serbia, which have Russophiles in their governments in the ruling coalition.
In addition to the mentioned four countries, the countries where the Russophile parties recorded a great rise in the elections or in public opinion polls were also marked. Among them are Austria, the Czech Republic, Romania, Bulgaria, Moldova, Georgia and the German province of Thuringia. The reason for drawing the map of Russia's friends was the last election results of Russophile parties in Austria, Romania, Georgia, Moldova and the German provincial elections.
It should be noted here that the "photograph" of states with sympathies towards the Kremlin or with Russophile parties in ruling coalitions is incomplete and, to put it euphemistically, inaccurate.
In the Italian government, just like in Montenegrin, we have Russophile parties. Matteo Salvini's League is as, if not more, Russophile than the New Serbian Democracy, the Democratic People's Party or the Socialist People's Party. Not to mention that in the strongest party of the ruling coalition Brothers of Italy and Forza Italia, we have a hard core of Russophiles. So, if someone says that Montenegro is a friend of Moscow, then they have to put Italy in the same basket.
Also, in contrast to Slovakia, Hungary and Serbia, where leaders with clear sympathies for Putin hold the main speech, this is not the case in Montenegro. Prime Minister Milojko Spajic can be criticized for a lot of things, but he cannot be labeled as a Russophile politician, either out of conviction or pragmatism, like Robert Fico, Viktor Orban or Aleksandar Vučić.
Furthermore, "Corriere della Sera" is limited only to the success of the Alternative for Germany (AFD) in Thuringia, and it also won more than 30 percent of the vote in Saxony. At the national level, before the elections for the Bundestag in February, according to all public opinion surveys, the AFD is in second place, behind the Christian Democrats, with around 20 percent support.
France was also forgotten. Marine Le Pen's national gathering is, individually, the strongest political party with over 25 percent of support in the electorate of the Fifth Republic. And the radical-left "Unconquered France" by Jean-Luc Mélenchon should also be included among the Russophiles. In translation, one third of the French vote for Russophile parties.
In the three largest and most important EU countries, pro-Moscow parties are either in power or are the largest opposition party, with a trend of further growth.
In the European southeast, from the Carpathians to the Black and Adriatic seas, Russophiles have absolute power in Bratislava, Budapest, Belgrade and Tbilisi, in Montenegro they are the minority partner in the coalition majority, while in Austria, Romania (first round of presidential elections), Bulgaria won the most votes in the last elections. The Freedom Party of Austria and the Citizens for the European Development of Bulgaria of Boyko Borisov, despite the relative majority in the national parliaments, are not in a position to form ruling coalitions. In Moldova, President Maja Sandu won only thanks to diaspora votes.
The rise of Russophile parties or parties that have a favorable attitude towards Moscow has several common denominators, both in Eastern and in Central and Western Europe. A good part of the positions have, apparently, nothing to do with Russia, but they are unmistakably in line with the image that the Kremlin wants to project on the internal and external level.
The first characteristic is that Russian propaganda, open through Russian media outlets and perfidious through social networks, spreads various forms of hatred and fear: from that towards foreigners, members of other religions or ethnic groups, liberal society, sexual and other minorities. At the same time, traditional, conservative values and vulgar nationalism are propagated along with anti-European or Eurosceptic rhetoric.
If you take all parties with a Russophile sign, you will notice that they all have almost the same attitudes towards foreigners, Muslims, sexual minorities, soft drugs, abortion, vaccines, liberal economy and society, and of course, they are all unmistakably "patriotic". They are not interested in the individual but the people, the nation, the state. The present is not important, but the future, and there is no place for the European Union in it, or it is portrayed as a dysfunctional, expensive, bureaucratic organization with the aim of limiting the freedoms, sovereignty and rights of states and peoples. Moscow's desire to establish exclusively bilateral relations in Europe in which it, as the largest, would dominate is hidden behind it. It is one thing when Moscow has to communicate with Tallinn as the capital of Estonia, and quite another as part of the EU and NATO.
Russian influence is more obvious in attitudes towards the Russian invasion of Ukraine. All Russophile parties are great "peacemakers" when talking about the Russian invasion of Ukraine. However, they are not advocating that Moscow withdraw its forces and return the occupied territories to Ukraine, but that Kiev accept the Kremlin's conditions and practically "capitulate", all under the guise of concern for the Ukrainian people who suffer great human losses and the destruction of economic and natural resources.
The third common denominator is the spread of anxiety over numerous conspiracy theories and a possible third world war, i.e. nurturing the idea that Russia is ready and capable of starting a nuclear war that would probably mean the end of humanity as we know it. The goal of such a narrative is to create an atmosphere in which the West should meet Moscow on all issues in order to avoid a nuclear disaster and Europeans to preserve their conformity.
It is a very targeted campaign. Due to the structure of alienation, EU citizens are naturally oriented to defend privileges, achieved well-being and rights or pretend to have an open path to them, as was the case with previous generations.
However, much more than Russian propaganda and the work of its willing or unwilling proxies in the media and parties in the countries of the Old Continent, the strengthening and popularity of Russophile formations and tribunes was influenced by those who declaratively declare themselves to be pro-European and essentially lead politics and have flaws like everyone else. Russophile formations.
It is mathematically provable that behind the rise of all, Russophile leaders and parties, are the reigns of the so-called of pro-European parties and leaders who, during their rule, were mired in corruption, abuse of position, crime, nepotism, immobilism, while fulfilling little or none of their election promises.
We have such examples in Orban, who returned to power after eight years in the opposition because the socialists, verbally 100% pro-European, were desperate; in Serbia, President Boris Tadić served Serbia in the hands of Aleksandar Vučić with a disastrous choice of his closest collaborators and a lack of statesmanship; in Georgia, Mihail Saakashvili had a mouth full of the EU and NATO, and on the domestic front he behaved like "little Putin", which enabled Bidzina Ivanishvili to take over power. We will find the same scenario in Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania and Moldova. Behind the coming to power of Russophiles or the strengthening of their influence is always, to put it euphemistically, the non-European behavior and rule of those who present themselves as pro-European.
The Montenegrin story is not much different either, although it has a strong identity component and a paradoxical circumstance. Namely, the DPS was not ousted from power only because in Montenegro at that time, as in Russia, it was not known where the government, judiciary, police end and where crime, mafia organizations, corruption and nepotism begin. The crucial element was identity.
However, the Russophile forces in the ruling coalition - because of which Montenegro ended up in inglorious society - in order to stay in power or at least to prevent the return of the DPS, they must support Montenegro's fast track towards EU membership. In other words, between love for Russia and animosity towards DPS, the European Union comes as a collateral gain.
Zen philosophy teaches us to wait and see what happens. Membership in NATO does not solve internal problems and, judging by the experience of Hungary and Slovakia, neither does joining the EU. However, in the fight against Russophiles and false pro-European forces, as well as for the construction of the rule of law, it is much better to be inside than outside. All the more so since in Montenegro we have Russophiles in words and those in actions wrapped in pro-European rhetoric.
Bonus video:
