When Russian President Vladimir Putin launched an all-out invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, he knew he would disrupt Europe’s security order. Yet it was more of a tactical move than a carefully crafted strategy, and he could not have foreseen what would follow. While Donald Trump’s return to the White House caught Europe off guard, it could still prevent Putin from emerging victorious.
For now, Putin appears to hold all the cards. Transatlantic relations are collapsing, while Donald Trump’s isolationist administration criticizes European allies and questions his commitment to NATO. Worse, Trump appears to be moving the United States closer to Russia when it comes to the war in Ukraine. Although he has threatened to impose new sanctions and tariffs on Russia until a ceasefire and peace agreement are reached, he has blamed Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky for the conflict and has suspended military and intelligence assistance to Ukraine (which appears set to resume soon).
Yet Europe still has a chance to turn the tables. It is already abandoning its post-Cold War "end of history" mindset, in which the rule of international law was sovereign, European armies were for peacekeeping, not warfighting, and the United States could be counted on to ensure European security.
Finland and Sweden may have been the first to realize that "history has returned," and their entry into NATO - in 2023 and 2024 - has significantly strengthened the northern wing of the Alliance. Now, the European Union also seems to be embracing the new security reality, having just announced an arms plan worth $840 billion.
Even Germany, for which the return of history is particularly challenging, is preparing to rearm: future Chancellor Friedrich Merz and his likely coalition partners have reached an agreement to create a 500 billion euro ($544 billion) infrastructure fund and relax fiscal rules to allow for greater investment in defense.
The significance of this move should not be underestimated. Since the end of World War II, Germany has eschewed the use of hard power in favor of soft power, serving as the engine of European integration and a pillar of a rules-based world order. Starting in the 1960s, this included pursuing a policy of “constructive engagement” – a foreign policy approach known as Ostpolitik – first towards the Soviet Union and then towards Russia. This explains why former Chancellor Angela Merkel accepted Russian energy supplies, despite opposition from other EU members and the United States.
Putin's all-out invasion of Ukraine dealt the final blow to Ostpolitik. Just a few days later, Merkel's successor Olaf Scholz announced an "epochal change" (Zeitenwende) in German defense and foreign policy. But it would be Friedrich Merz who would oversee a true break with Germany's post-war past - a change that would force the country to confront the most difficult and destructive ghosts of its history.
For starters, there is the fiscal revolution. German austerity was a source of considerable tension in the European Union, especially during the eurozone debt crisis of the early 2010s. But Germans, and Angela Merkel in particular, remembered all too well how hyperinflation paved the way for the rise of Adolf Hitler. That is why her first government in 2009 introduced a constitutional limit on structural budget deficits of 0,35% of GDP per year, known as the “debt brake” (Schuldenbremse). In this context, Merck’s planned reform of borrowing rules – including changes and possible abolition of the debt brake – represents a radical shift in German priorities.
More broadly, Merck appears ready to embrace a leadership role in Europe. Although Germany is the EU’s largest economy, it has long hesitated to take real leadership on the continent, especially in the area of security. The combination of Russian revanchism and American isolationism, however, has made such a stance untenable. As Europe’s most populous country, located at its “geostrategic center,” Germany, as Merck puts it, must “assume greater leadership responsibility” in the area of defense as well.
Any attempt to make Europe safe starts with Ukraine. Right now, Trump wants to do both: to “negotiate” a peace deal—which will almost certainly mean Ukraine’s capitulation to Russia and its economic exploitation—and then to step aside and let Europe implement it. But what good is a peace broker who offers no guarantees?
To avoid a repeat of the Munich Agreement of 1938—when France and Britain forced Czechoslovakia to cede territory to Hitler, paving the way for World War II—Europe must act quickly to improve Ukraine’s position on the battlefield and, therefore, at the negotiating table. Fortunately, making up for lost American financial aid will not be as difficult as Trump would have us believe: so far, Europe has provided significantly more support, in dollar terms, to the Ukrainian war effort than the United States. But filling the arms gap will be a far greater challenge—and likely impossible in the short term, when it matters most.
Once a peace agreement is reached, Europe will have to take on the role of its guarantor. This means providing an effective deterrent against new Russian aggression. A credible nuclear umbrella will be essential. That is why Friedrich Merz has proposed replacing American nuclear warheads in Europe with French and British alternatives. There is even talk of Germany becoming a nuclear power.
When NATO intervened in the Kosovo war in 1999, then-German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder declared that sending ground troops into a country once occupied by Hitler's Wehrmacht was “unthinkable.” Today—as Merz seems to understand—the unthinkable has become necessary.
Only to the extent that it sets aside its moral and political inhibitions can Germany (and Europe as a whole) continue to play its most important role: that of a global peacemaker and defender of democratic principles.
The author is Vice President of the Toledo International Peace Center; he was the minister of foreign affairs of Israel
Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2025. (translation: NR)
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