Ukraine has agreed to a 30-day ceasefire, largely to improve relations with the US president’s administration, which were strained during a verbal spat between Donald Trump and President Volodymyr Zelensky in the Oval Office on February 28. Russia rejected this ceasefire proposal. Instead, it proposed (in words only) a ban on attacks on energy infrastructure. Both sides have expressed a willingness to cease fire in the Black Sea, but Russia has linked these agreements to the easing of sanctions, so it is unclear when (or if) this ceasefire will begin, much less what it will include.
These half-hearted steps (if taken) may eventually lead to something more substantial. But it is equally likely that half-hearted steps will not lead to a comprehensive peace agreement. Russia can continue the war even if the Black Sea is not an active theater.
The main issue remains US policy. The Trump administration is combining pressure and incentives to persuade both sides to stop fighting. But the approaches are skewed: they are offering carrots to Russia and putting a lot of pressure on Ukraine.
No, it is entirely appropriate to offer Russia various incentives. These could include a willingness to resume high-level contacts; the return of embassy staff; support for partial sanctions relief if specific demands are met; and allowing Russia to continue pursuing its long-term goals regarding Ukraine.
It is unacceptable, however, to support Russia’s unfounded positions, including its claims to Crimea, as well as the Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and/or Zaporozhye regions, which are based on the results of illegal referendums by Russian occupation forces. It is one thing for Trump’s Kremlin envoy Steve Witkoff, a former real estate investor turned newly minted diplomat, to assess Russia’s position, but it is quite another for him to make that position his own.
More broadly, there is still no compelling reason to discuss final status. The goal now should be a temporary ceasefire, not a permanent peace agreement. Excessive ambition today is likely to become the enemy of the possible.
To end the fighting, the agreement must be as clear and simple as possible. A true ceasefire requires only two elements: the cessation of all hostilities and the disengagement of forces along the line of contact - ideally with a peacekeeping contingent between them.
All other issues, including the distribution of territory and population, should be left to the final status negotiations. In the meantime, both sides should be allowed to arm themselves or negotiate security measures with third parties. Measures supporting a ceasefire should not be hindered. Russia should be allowed to keep North Korean troops on its territory, and Ukraine can call in troops from European countries.
It is crucial that the United States continue to provide military and intelligence assistance to Ukraine. This is the only way to convince Russian President Vladimir Putin that further delay is not in his interest. In addition, assistance is needed so that Ukraine can contain new Russian aggression (even against the backdrop of a ceasefire). However, support does not have to be unlimited: over the past three years, the amount of this type of assistance provided by the United States has averaged about $40 billion per year, and this level is likely to be sufficient for the foreseeable future.
The goal should be this: to give Ukraine what it needs to deter and defend itself from Russian aggression, but not to liberate its territories. To claim, as Witkoff does, that there is no reason to worry about renewed Russian aggression is simply frivolous. The current war is Russia’s second attack on Ukraine since 2014, when it illegally annexed Crimea. Given Putin’s intentions, the question comes down to the size of the military potential.
The situation could reach a climax by the summer, when the arms sales to Ukraine authorized by Congress expire. The Trump administration will have to decide (if it hasn't already) exactly how the security relationship with Ukraine and American diplomacy will work.
When trying to understand what the Trump administration will decide to do, it is worth recalling the agreement his first administration reached with the Taliban in February 2020. This agreement was negotiated through the leaders of America’s Afghan partners — directly with the Taliban — and it paved the way for the Taliban’s swift takeover of Afghanistan from the Taliban just a year and a half later. We can only hope that the price President Joe Biden paid — domestically and internationally — for fulfilling Trump’s deal will make Trump himself think twice about abandoning Ukraine in the same way.
Trump should also remember that there will be no peace if he leaves Ukraine. Zelensky, now more popular than ever in his own country (thanks in no small part to the infamous Oval Office meeting), is unlikely to agree to a ceasefire or peace deal if it conflicts with Ukraine’s core interests. The country could continue to fight in one form or another for years, using either domestic weapons or those imported from Europe and Asia. Freed from U.S. restrictions on U.S. aid, Ukraine might even be tempted to launch more aggressive strikes inside Russia.
Russia would likely see the rift between the United States and Ukraine as an opportunity to exert pressure or even military escalation. Cutting military ties between the United States and Ukraine would not bring peace; on the contrary, it could lead to an escalation of hostilities.
The stakes are high, and not just for Ukraine. Events surrounding Russia will greatly affect the future of Europe, the likelihood of China using force against Taiwan, and North Korea against South Korea, as well as how America is perceived by its friends and enemies around the world.
The author is president emeritus of the US Council on Foreign Relations; he was director of policy planning at the State Department from 2001 to 2003.
Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2025. (translation: NR)
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