The US and Russian delegations meeting in Istanbul say they are there to discuss normalising diplomatic relations, not the war in Ukraine. Their contacts, however, are an obvious consequence of US President Donald Trump’s attempts to reach an agreement to end the war. The problem is that, apart from Trump, who dreams of a Nobel Peace Prize, none of the parties to whom this war is important (not Russia, not Ukraine, not the European Union) want to end the conflict at this point. No one is happy with their negotiating position, and the reputation of each side is at stake.
Ukraine is facing an extremely unpleasant choice. Despite courageously resisting Russian aggression, President Volodymyr Zelensky is unable to achieve his desired goals: the return of all territories occupied or annexed by Russia (including Crimea) and full membership in NATO (with strong security guarantees). This was the case even under Trump's predecessor, Joe Biden, but Trump has completely rejected such demands, calling them impractical.
In addition, Trump went so far as to demand that Zelensky grant the United States access to Ukraine’s rare earth deposits as compensation for assistance provided during the war—but without any security guarantees in return. Zelensky, a former actor turned war hero of our time, faces an unenviable choice: either agree to serious concessions to the United States and Russia or continue to pay an ever-increasing price in Ukrainian blood and treasure for the illusory hope of “total victory.”
Europe is as ready as Ukraine to support a peace deal for now. European Union leaders have long argued that any outcome short of a complete victory over Russian President Vladimir Putin’s plans to restore Russia’s sphere of influence in the post-Soviet space would pose a threat to Europe; they also point out that even a weakened Russia would remain a source of problems. Now, of course, they realize that such an outcome is practically impossible, but they will likely continue to postpone the inevitable embarrassment of agreeing to a peace deal that would involve concessions to Russia.
Russia would have less to lose if it signed a peace treaty today, and Putin could end the conflict with little loss of face. Contrary to expectations, Russia has withstood harsh sanctions and other restrictions, and has also avoided destabilizing the regime. Moreover, while it has not fully annexed Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk, or Zaporizhia regions, it has managed to inflict significant territorial losses on Ukraine that will be difficult to fully recover. But perhaps most importantly, Trump is so eager to reach a deal that he could easily be willing to meet key Russian demands (for example, that Ukraine stay out of NATO), especially if Putin softens his opposition to preserving the Ukrainian military and shows openness to the idea of Ukraine joining the EU.
Still, Putin is in no hurry to conclude a peace agreement. Yes, the US and Russian authorities are praising bilateral peace talks, including meetings in Riyadh (Saudi Arabia) in February and March, as a diplomatic breakthrough. But judging by statements from Russian representatives (notably Sergei Beseda, an advisor to the director of the FSB, and Grigory Karasin, chairman of the Federation Council’s Committee on International Affairs), progress toward an agreement has been very slow.
One reason is likely that neither Ukraine nor the European Union are at the negotiating table, which narrows the range of offers Trump can make. But more importantly, Putin seems to be trying to define the boundaries of what is possible. This explains why, as part of the new Black Sea security agreement, Putin has demanded the lifting of sanctions and restrictions against agricultural producers and exporters, as well as certain financial institutions, including the state-owned Rosselkhozbank. Only when these conditions are met (and when the Kremlin has a clear idea of how far Trump is willing to go for his peacemaking ambitions) will it be possible to talk about a ceasefire.
Putin is taking other steps to ensure Russia’s success in negotiations with the United States. Notably, he recently sent his “investment envoy” Kirill Dmitriev (a former Goldman Sachs investment banker and Stanford graduate), who heads the Russian Direct Investment Fund, to the United States to present the economic benefits of resuming bilateral cooperation. In addition to praising Trump for allegedly preventing World War III, Dmitriev floated the tantalizing idea of giving the United States access to Russian Arctic resources and rare earth minerals, as well as joint flights to Mars and the Moon.
The meetings did not produce any concrete results, but Dmitriev said that both sides had taken “three steps forward” toward improving relations. In reality, he probably meant that American leaders were now more motivated to take advantage of the economic and financial opportunities in Russia, overcoming the obstacles created by the war in Ukraine. Less than a week later, Steve Witkoff, the Trump administration’s de facto envoy to the Russian president, appeared in St. Petersburg to meet with Dmitriev and, according to reports, with Putin himself.
The opportunities presented could be uniquely tailored to Trump. He is, first and foremost, a businessman, and I know firsthand about his long-standing desire to do business in Moscow. During a chance meeting in 1996, he told me that he would like to organize a “Miss Universe” competition in Russia (a goal he achieved in 2013), as well as build a “Trump Tower” in Moscow (which he has not yet realized). Could the Kremlin offer the US president the coveted Red Square property (or some lucrative business deal) in exchange for easing sanctions?
Trump currently claims to be “angry” with Putin — because the latter is in no hurry to accept his administration’s ceasefire proposals… But with the right combination of carefully crafted demands and tempting offers, Putin can take a dominant position. And so whatever happens during this rapid series of meetings will likely matter less than what comes next: whether Karasin and Beseda will once again reiterate the Kremlin’s harsh demands, or whether Dmitriev will wave economic “carrots” at Trump and his Washington circle.
The author is a professor of international relations at the New School, New York University.
Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2025. (translation: NR)
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