Montenegro will most likely close only one chapter in June, and that will be a kind of warning to the ruling coalition, but also to the entire Montenegrin society and political elite, whether in power or opposition, that they risk missing the chance of a generation. This was reported to "Vijesti" by EU sources dealing with the Western Balkans dossier and Montenegro.
Montenegro has become too unpredictable, too unstable, and that is the worst possible advertisement for the process of rapprochement. Predictability, reliability, keeping one's word, deadlines and promises are of fundamental importance for progress in the process of European integration.
In the original plan from last year, when optimism was boiling on the Brussels-Podgorica route, Montenegro was supposed to close five chapters in the first semester of 2025. Then that number dropped to three, then to two, and now we are getting closer to the possibility of closing only one chapter.
However, according to one of our interlocutors in EU institutions, there are still good chances for Montenegro to make up for some of the lost time in the second half of the year and return to the fast track of EU entry by the end of this decade, or to close negotiations by the end of 2026 or in the first half of 2027.
In Podgorica, there seems to be a lack of awareness, both in the political and social milieu, that the opportunity that has presented itself to Montenegro will not be on the table for much longer, and it seems that the consequences of losing yet another train to the EU are not understood. It is not enough to verbally express a commitment to European integration, to raise a flag or to pin an EU badge on your lapel. It takes the full commitment of the ruling coalition, but also of the entire society, to successfully complete one of the biggest Montenegrin jobs in history, if not the biggest...
While various centers of power – old, new, emerging or fading – are fighting on various fronts to achieve economic, political, tactical gain or a privileged position in various business arrangements and political combinations, Montenegro is passing by an opportunity that it is not known whether or when it will appear again. Due to the political, economic or personal interests of groups and individuals on the Montenegrin political and business stage, all other citizens of Montenegro risk being left without the benefits of EU membership, which would benefit everyone except criminal, corrupt and anti-Western structures.
In Podgorica, there seems to be a lack of awareness, both in the political and social milieu, that the opportunity that has presented itself to Montenegro will not be on the table for much longer, and it seems that the consequences of losing yet another train to the EU are not understood.
The so-called momentum, or the favorable wind for EU enlargement that had metaphorically blown over the past three years, from the beginning of the Russian aggression in Ukraine to the US presidential election, has disappeared. Donald Trump's return to power in America and the devastating first hundred days of his second term in the White House have dramatically changed the attitude of the EU, or rather key member states, towards enlargement. One of the greatest collateral damage of the openly hostile policy of the Trump administration towards the EU is precisely the process of enlargement to the Western Balkans.
The new situation in relations between the two shores of the Atlantic has brought to the forefront the urgent need for the EU to redefine relations, accelerate the process of internal reforms, and consequently completely sidelined the enlargement policy. The Western Balkans have been practically removed from the list of broader priorities once again.
The only discussions, here and there, were about Serbia and the political crisis that has been shaking Belgrade for several months, the use of a sound cannon on March 15th during peaceful student and citizen demonstrations, the increasingly frequent expulsion of EU citizens from Serbia because they are not to the liking of the ruling regime, and the intention of Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić to be in Moscow on May 9th for a military parade that has been transformed into a propaganda stage for displaying the power of Russian President Vladimir Putin over the past two decades.
Meanwhile, a government has been formed in Germany, headed by Friedrich Merz. The new German chancellor not only does not share his predecessor Olaf Scholz's commitment to the necessity of rapid EU enlargement to the Western Balkans, but has also made it clear that he does not want to push the enlargement story until the EU is reformed and the unanimity rule is abolished.
Without Scholz at the helm, the Social Democratic Party has fully agreed to the line of the stronger partner in the ruling coalition, the sister alliance of the CDU/CSU. In other words, EU enlargement to the Western Balkans has dropped off Berlin's list of geostrategic priorities and returned to the usual trough of the so-called merit principle, fulfillment of conditions and respect for the Copenhagen criteria.
The future Chancellor Merz will push the story of gradual accession that would not be irreversible and the possibility that the Western Balkan countries will remain in limbo between candidate status and full membership for the time being. In this context, Merz intends to revive and breathe new life into the so-called Berlin process that Angela Merkel started as a kind of surrogate for EU membership of the Western Balkan countries. Therefore, Germany will not make it a problem for the Western Balkan countries, once they meet the conditions, to enter the Single European Payment Area (SEPA) or to introduce a regime of faster and easier movement of people and goods (the first step towards entering the Schengen area) or to gradually join the EU Single Market.
In any case, next year the so-called “Multiannual Financial Framework” of the EU from 2028 to 2034 will be drawn up. This is a multi-year EU budget in which money is allocated for its functioning and activities, including possible enlargement. This will be the first indicator of whether the EU is really thinking about EU enlargement or not, or whether and how much money it will allocate for the enlargement of the Union.
Due to political, economic or personal interests of groups and individuals on the Montenegrin political and business stage, all other citizens of Montenegro risk being left without the benefits of EU membership, which would benefit everyone except criminal, corrupt and anti-Western structures.
Hanging over the aspirations of the Western Balkan states like a “sword of Damocles” is the open possibility of the extreme right, namely Marine Le Pen’s National Rally, coming to power in France. Regardless of whether Le Pen runs in the presidential race (she is currently ineligible for the next presidential election due to a ruling that revokes her right to stand for election for five years) or her “dolphin” Jordan Bardella, the arrival of either of them at the Elysee Palace, together with Merz in Berlin, would definitely close the door to enlargement indefinitely.
That's why Montenegro, if it really wants to join the EU, must finish the job by the end of 2026 or in the first half of 2027. Only in that case would it not risk being collateral damage in the new balance of power within the EU.
Albania has not caught up with Montenegro, let alone overtaken it in the process of European integration. Such a narrative, apart from being bombastic for the internal political use of those who advocate it, does not stand on its feet because Tirana is only at the beginning of the negotiation process. At best, Tirana can try to catch up with Montenegro and catch the last train to the EU by the end of the decade, which is not ruled out.
Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama has turned the conclusion of EU membership negotiations into a key campaign argument for the May 11 elections, playing on the card to secure another term as prime minister. In the past two years, Tirana has done literally everything that is asked of it, and Rama himself has “forced” the entire state apparatus to work day and night to meet the conditions for EU membership.
Unlike Montenegro, and especially Serbia, in Albania there is no dilemma about EU membership, so there is also the necessary social consensus that has created the atmosphere for the implementation of the most difficult reforms in the field of justice and the establishment of the rule of law. Albanian citizens are aware that it was only thanks to the EU that a special prosecutor's office was formed to fight organized crime and corruption. The arrest of Tirana Mayor Erion Velijaj and the very good results of the new prosecutor's office have accredited Albania as a country that is seriously working towards EU membership.
Albania's move towards EU membership is much more problematic for Serbia and its president. Even the current government is aware of the negative consequences that unifying Albania's NATO and EU membership could have for Belgrade while Serbia becomes a Russian-Chinese drain on the Old Continent.
The political and diplomatic blindness of the Serbian government, which refuses to understand the importance of sitting at the tables where decisions are made about our continent, whether we are talking about the EU or NATO, has led Belgrade to rightly fear Tirana's membership in the two most important organizations in Europe with the Kosovo issue still open.
Tragicomic performances, in the style of "my mouth praises me", look like Serbia presenting itself as the leader of the region, while it is the only country in the Western Balkans that does not want to be a member of the EU and NATO and has diametrically opposed goals to its neighboring countries. It is not only about the issue of Kosovo, the balance of power and the leadership position in the region, but also about the personal vanity of President Vučić, since Edi Rama and Albania would become the flagships of the Western Balkans, not only because of membership in the EU and NATO, but also because Tirana is Turkey's main player in the Western Balkans.
Also, unlike Vučić, Rama does not intend to go down in history as the ruler who ruled his country the longest, but as the prime minister who brought his country into the EU. And that is the whole difference between politics and statesmanship. The former think about the next term and elections, while the latter think about future generations. This also applies to Montenegro.
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