Joseph S. Nye Jr., one of America's greatest scientists/statesmen, has died at the age of 88. In addition to being a former U.S. assistant secretary of defense and chairman of the National Intelligence Council, a professor emeritus at Harvard University, and a longtime dean of the Kennedy School, Nye is also known as the creator of the term "soft power," which refers to a country's ability to influence others through culture, values, and economics, rather than force or coercion. His work has profoundly influenced the field of international relations.
Nye has written for Project Syndicate since 2002. column which provide insight into global developments, US foreign policy and changes in the nature of power, and News are, as a member of that project, published a large number of themThe following text was published on May 1, 2025.
It has been eight decades since atomic energy was first used in warfare. Yet the world has not experienced a nuclear Armageddon, but rather a surprising nuclear stability that continues to this day. Equally remarkable is that nuclear technologies have spread to many countries, but only a few have chosen to use them for weapons. The world has benefited from an effective non-proliferation regime—a set of rules, norms, and structures that (though not perfectly) prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. But can that regime survive in an era of rapid geopolitical change?
In the 1960s, US President John F. Kennedy predicted that by the 1970s, about 25 countries would possess nuclear weapons. Today, however, there are only nine, thanks to steps taken by governments to prevent their spread.
In 1968, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was signed, which recognized that five states already possessed nuclear weapons and included a pledge by the others not to develop them. For decades, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), based in Vienna, has sent inspectors to countries developing nuclear energy to ensure that it was used exclusively for peaceful purposes. During the 1970s, the administration of US President Jimmy Carter made it a priority to slow the spread of nuclear technology, including through the specially established Nuclear Suppliers Group, whose members pledged to limit the export of technologies for enrichment and processing of nuclear materials that were important to security.
The non-proliferation regime has become an important part of the world order, but some analysts believe that new threats are looming over it. Even the IAEA Director General, Rafael Mariano Grossi, has expressed concern about the future of the regime. The most prominent problem is Iran’s uranium enrichment program to more than 60%, well above the level required for civilian reactors. Grossi estimates that it would take Iran only a few months, not years, to build a bomb. Saudi Arabia has announced that if Iran does develop nuclear weapons, it will follow suit and withdraw from the NPT. Israel and the US are threatening to use force to stop Iran, but at the same time the US and Iran are conducting new negotiations to limit Iran’s nuclear program.
Behind this regional problem in the Middle East lies a global threat to the entire non-proliferation regime. After World War II, Germany and Japan gave up their nuclear ambitions because they entered into an alliance with the United States. The authority of American nuclear deterrence was sufficient to provide security for these countries, and the same applies to dozens of other countries - both within NATO and in East Asia. However, the Trump administration has weakened these alliances, which undermines America's deterrence capability as a whole and forces other countries to consider acquiring their own nuclear weapons. They know very well that Ukraine gave up Soviet nuclear weapons located on its territory, only to be attacked by Russia - a country that, incidentally, guaranteed Ukraine's territorial integrity through the 1994 Budapest Memorandum.
Some analysts argue that there is no reason to worry because the spread of nuclear weapons could have a positive impact on world politics. They believe that nuclear weapons contributed to prudence in relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, and that today they could stabilize the balance of power in different regions.
However, approaches based on the logic of "the more, the better" would only make sense under similar political conditions - that is: with stable command and control systems; without serious civil wars or destabilizing motives (for example, irredentist aspirations); with discipline that would curb the temptation to carry out a preemptive strike in the early stages of a conflict, when the new nuclear potential is still weak and vulnerable.
In many parts of the world, providing such conditions seems unrealistic. In most cases, the first consequence of acquiring a nuclear potential will not be greater security, but greater vulnerability and insecurity. Even a local, "tactical" nuclear strike would represent a serious violation of a global taboo that has lasted for 80 years.
The destabilizing role that non-state actors can play must also be considered. Even if the risk of a terrorist group obtaining a nuclear bomb is small, the very possibility of that risk creates serious problems. The fact that weapons-making materials can be stolen or sold on the black market to rogue states means that the threat posed by non-state groups does not depend solely on their technical capabilities. And even modern world powers are not immune to the negative consequences. The widespread and rapid spread of nuclear weapons could affect the global strategic balance and the prospects for a peaceful and just world order in the future.
It is clear that political and technical trends will change. But the main question concerns the future of American alliances and the entire deterrence system. Proliferation can lead to destabilization; nuclear weapons do not always strengthen the geopolitical position of the state that acquires them; great powers cannot completely avoid the negative consequences of proliferation - and all this means that the world must be seriously interested in preserving the non-proliferation regime.
In the current circumstances, arms inequality is acceptable to most states, because the alternative—anarchic equality—is even more dangerous. As long as states are better off without the bomb than with it, the policy of slowing the spread of nuclear weapons technologies will have a solid foundation. Realistically, the international regime does not have to be perfect to have a significant deterrent effect. However, once norms and institutions begin to weaken, the process can be difficult to reverse.
(Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2025; prevod: N. R.)
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