Montenegro, internationally recognized as a sovereign state since 2006, continues to display the characteristics of what Zoran Đinđić recognized as an “unfinished state”: a political entity with the formal attributes of sovereignty, but without functional internal coherence, a responsible institutional structure, and clear social legitimacy. Through this text, we will shed light on how institutional weakness, corruption, foreign political control, and historical continuities of totalitarian rule have prevented the consolidation of the Montenegrin state as a democratically mature and essentially sovereign and functional community.
1. HISTORICAL CONTINUITY OF INCOMPLETENESS: FROM 1945 TO 2025
Montenegro, in a formal legal sense, went through several political transformations between 1945 and 2020. However, each of these transitions – 1945, 1990s, 2006, and 2020 – took place without the real democratization of society and the building of a stable institutional order.
Instead of strengthening the sovereignty and internal legitimacy of the state, each change of government or regime deepened the feeling of dependence, fragmentation, state captivity, and strong political manipulation (fraud).
1945: Formation of Montenegro in a federation without sovereignty
In the post-war order of socialist Yugoslavia, Montenegro gained the status of a federal unit, but without real sovereignty. Decisions were made in Belgrade, the personnel structure of the party and administration was strictly centralized, and the Montenegrin state identity was shaped in accordance with the ideological narrative of the Communist Party. Instead of state continuity with pre-Yugoslav and historical Montenegro, a new identity framework was imposed: brotherhood and unity, Yugoslavism and party internationalism, and in the longer term, uncritical Stalinism.
1989–1992: Nationalist occupation
The fall of communism did not bring the emancipation of Montenegrin state institutions, but their complete reintegration into the project of great-state nationalism led by S. Milošević. The anti-bureaucratic revolution of 1989 was a parody of political change – the “new” leaders were in fact selected cadres of the old system. In 1992, Montenegro entered the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as a junior partner, in an illegitimate referendum, without equality and with an ever-deepening political and economic dependence on Serbia.
2006: Sovereignty as a declaration, not as a transformation
The 2006 referendum on independence opened a historic opportunity to redefine the Montenegrin state. However, instead of independence signifying a break with the practices of clientelism, partitocracy, corruption, criminal connections and institutional weaknesses, a new system was established, de facto totalitarian, one-party, which functionally retained many of the patterns of the previous regime, further weakened institutions and criminalized public policies and institutions. The DPS establishes an authoritarianism of “endemic corruption”, a “captured state” and ultimately a “mafia state”: institutions are nominal, power is personalized.
2020–2025: Changes without reforms
The 2020 parliamentary elections represent the first real transfer of power in the modern history of Montenegro. However, the transition was superficial and negotiated. The new government rested on ad hoc coalitions and external influences - especially the Serbian Orthodox Church, but also circles close to the previous government. The reforms were cosmetic, the state was weakened, and the external political control of the state from external influences was further strengthened.
2. INSTITUTIONAL MIMICRY: FORM WITHOUT CONTENT
Montenegro today functions as a system of institutional mimicry - where constitutions, laws, agencies, and electoral processes serve primarily as a facade to conceal informal centers of power.
Democratic pluralism is devoid of democratic practice, culture, and essence.
The multi-party system does not function as a real competition of ideas. The party apparatus - through employment and local networks - exercises social control.
Independent institutions exist on paper, but they are under party domination.
A captive state and an unillustrated system
The 2020 change did not lead to lustration. The ANB remained largely intact, functioning as a parallel system of power, non-transparent and outside of democratic oversight.
Executive branch outside institutional balance
Ruling parties govern the country through informal channels. Parliament and oversight functions are symbolic. Laws are applied selectively.
European integration as a form without content
The EU integration process serves as an alibi for internal stagnation. Chapters are opened administratively, without any substantive changes in the area of the rule of law.
3. NATION, IDENTITY AND SOCIAL FRAGMENTATION
Montenegro is a space of overlapping multiple identity matrices – Montenegrin, Serbian, Orthodox, Yugoslav, European, Bosniak, Albanian, etc. – but without an integrative narrative.
Identity pluralism without synthesis
Instead of an inclusive state and civic synthesis, elites instrumentalize identities. Identity is a means of political mobilization, not the foundation or bond of communal life.
The Serbian Orthodox Church as an instrument of external influence
The Serbian Orthodox Church operates as a parallel government with a strong political narrative. Its message denies Montenegrin independence and revives ideological continuity with 1918 and 1992.
Ethno-religious map as a dividing line
Censuses become political battlefields. Identities are quantified and interpreted as a source of legitimacy or threat.
Absence of an integrative idea
The Montenegrin state identity has not yet been affirmed as inclusive and politically sovereign. The state remains formal, without a symbolic core.
4. ECONOMY WITHOUT SOVEREIGNTY
The economy of Montenegro does not strengthen state sovereignty, but rather undermines it – dependent on tourism, borrowing, and foreign capital.
Rentier model and seasonal dependence
Tourism accounts for a quarter of GDP. The economy depends on seasonal income, is vulnerable to external shocks and does not generate local accumulation.
Foreign capital without control
Privatizations have been carried out without a strategy. Key sectors are in the hands of foreign investors politically close to governments or oligarchs.
Fiscal dependency and chronic indebtedness
The budget relies on borrowing and short-term revenues. Debt limits investment in education and health. Fiscal policy is reactive, not strategic.
Social injustice as a constant
Employment is political, administration is too cumbersome. Citizens are clients of the system, not free economic actors.
5. QUO VADIS, MONTENEGRO?
Montenegro no longer has the luxury of being unfinished. The cost of this unfinishedness is being paid by its citizens through poverty, division, and political hopelessness. It is urgently needed to:
1) Institutional modernization and full reconstruction
Lustration, depoliticization of the judiciary and intelligence services, decentralization, and parliamentary oversight of the executive branch are needed.
2) Political decolonization
Montenegro must free its politics from malignant external influences – both from the East and the West. The Serbian Orthodox Church must be regulated like all other religious institutions. The country must also be freed from the clientelism of political parties.
3) New social contract
A civic synthesis is needed: an identity that does not exclude, a social energy that comes from below, and solidarity instead of tribalism.
Epilogue
Montenegro must become a community of free citizens, not prisoners of identities and parties. The project of the state is not yet complete – but it can be, if there is political will and social awareness.
Prof. Eugen Popović is a pseudonym, the author's name is known to the editorial staff.
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