The Israeli government has decided to expand its military offensive against Hamas - an operation that, it has been emphasized, could include the "conquest" of Gaza. The plan is brutal, conceived with full awareness of the consequences that its implementation will have, including the loss of the lives of the remaining Israeli hostages held in Hamas' underground tunnels, the deepening of the humanitarian catastrophe facing two million defenseless Palestinian civilians, and the elimination - rather than the resolution - of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. But there is something that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu could not have foreseen: the deterioration of relations with US President Donald Trump.
By choosing to drag the exhausted Israeli nation and military into an endless occupation of Gaza, Netanyahu is sacrificing vital strategic interests for the country, including the normalization of Israeli-Saudi relations, which until just a few years ago seemed highly likely as part of America’s overall Middle East strategy. Netanyahu has no problem with that, as he cares only about one thing: ensuring the survival of his government.
Netanyahu has long viewed Trump as America’s dream president—someone who would bridge any remaining distance between Israel and the United States, thereby strengthening his own position in power. But as unpredictable as he is, Trump remains steadfast in his ambition to end the era of American military involvement in the Middle East. And no one—not even a close ally—can force Trump to do anything he doesn’t want to do.
Trump will do nothing to prevent Israel from continuing its perpetual war in Gaza, as long as it does not jeopardize American interests. (As a true friend of Israel, former President Joe Biden might have tried to save it from itself.) But Trump will also not allow the United States to be drawn into Netanyahu’s plans.
Trump and Netanyahu also fell out over Iran. In 2018, Netanyahu persuaded Trump to withdraw from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the nuclear deal with Iran that the United States and other world powers had reached with Tehran three years earlier. But as soon as Trump withdrew the U.S. signature from the JCPOA, Iran resumed its pursuit of a bomb, and upon his return to the White House, he found himself faced with a situation in which a country with the status of an American enemy was moving closer to acquiring nuclear power. Netanyahu had expected the Americans to give him a green light, and he expected to get it immediately, to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities; instead, Trump initiated negotiations with the Islamic Republic.
For Trump, reaching a quick agreement on something that he could then present as his big victory has always been more important than the substance of the agreement reached. But he certainly feels pressure to secure better terms in this particular case than those secured in 2015 by his political opponent, then-President Barack Obama. For this reason, it suits Trump perfectly to use the Israeli military threat as an element of pressure in the negotiations - waving the possibility of a US military offensive against Iran would be less credible - but he will not tie his political destiny to the worldview shared by Netanyahu and his theocratic-fascist allies.
Then there is Trump’s approach to the Houthis, Iran’s proxy forces in Yemen. Israel has managed to weaken the ring of Iranian proxies surrounding it, but the Houthis have proven to be a tough nut to crack, repeatedly firing ballistic missiles at targets in Israeli territory. In early May, one such missile, procured from Iran, hit Israel’s main airport, resulting in the cancellation of a large number of international flights.
The US has been adamantly on Israel's side in its confrontation with the Houthis, and has itself carried out airstrikes on their sites in Yemen, responding to the group's efforts to disrupt shipping in the Red Sea. Then the Trump administration suddenly announced a ceasefire agreement: the Houthis would stop attacking ships in the Red Sea in exchange for a halt to US airstrikes. Israeli officials were reportedly "completely shocked" by this.
In mid-May, Trump embarked on a major tour of the Middle East, but Israel was not on the list of countries he would visit. The trip focused on trade and investment—and, as usual, making deals that would make Trump, his family, and his friends big bucks. The deals, worth more than $2.000 trillion, according to the White House, guarantee Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates investments in the United States and their purchase of American weapons. In addition, the United States could agree to help Saudi Arabia develop a commercial nuclear program, something the country has long desired (and which could serve as a first step toward developing its own nuclear weapons).
Until now, Israel's relations with previous US administrations have been characterized by a "no surprises" approach to national security issues, and an unquestioned US commitment to preserving Israel's military superiority in the region. Trump's moves toward Iran and the agreements reached to sell US weapons to the Gulf states represent a dramatic reversal of that status quo. Israel was not consulted on this, and it is inconceivable that its military superiority would be preserved if such large arms deals were implemented. Israel has long been the central pillar of US foreign policy in the Middle East; now that role has been taken over by the Saudi Crown Prince, Mohammed bin Salman. And all the "credit" for this historic turnaround goes to Netanyahu.
Under the Biden administration, such deals would have to be tied to some grand strategic plan that would include normalizing Saudi-Israeli relations and establishing some kind of Middle East military alliance, similar to NATO and based on Israel’s commitment to some form of Palestinian statehood. Such an agreement would gain broad support in the US Congress and open the door to a defense alliance with Saudi Arabia. Such a sweeping deal, however, would almost certainly cost Netanyahu the support of the most extreme parts of his ruling coalition. Since such an option is not available to Netanyahu, Trump is pushing ahead without him. There is too much money in the Gulf for Trump to be bothered with Israel’s domestic political situation.
Neither Trump nor the Gulf monarchs and emirs want war, even with Iran. Middle Eastern leaders — including former al-Qaeda operative and current Syrian President Ahmed al-Shara, whom Trump also met during his Middle East tour — want economic development, not conflict. They too have no patience for an Israeli prime minister who sees only threats where they see opportunities.
The author is Vice President of the Toledo International Peace Center; he was the minister of foreign affairs of Israel
(Project Syndicate; prevod: radar.rs)
Bonus video:
