A specter haunts Europe, the specter of polarization

(6yka.com)

A specter haunts Europe, the specter of polarization. In polarized democracies, persistent hostility and lack of trust between political actors have negative consequences for democracy: they undermine the possibility of political agreements and can ultimately even threaten the functioning of democracy. However, polarization in Western and Eastern Europe has two different faces: in some countries the debate is polarized around political issues, such as the economy, while in several Eastern European countries the political dispute arises around corruption, the erosion of democracy and the rule of law. Thus, the response to polarization cannot be the same.

During this period, polarization is manifesting itself in the larger European democracies, such as Germany, France, and Poland. There, the political public is divided into extreme leftists and rightists, extreme conservatives and liberals, and their political hostility also opens up social divisions. When parties are polarized, the terrain for creating a parliamentary majority disappears. In some circumstances, such as the current situation in Poland, with a conservative president and a liberal parliamentary majority, the search for consensus becomes a challenge. Second, due to polarization, more and more citizens see the political opponent as illegitimate, which also makes them accept the denial of democratic norms in the fight against the political enemy.

In a number of other countries in Central and Eastern Europe, however, corruption is fueling the political debate. The problem that the students in Serbia point to exists in various forms throughout the region, namely in Bulgaria, Montenegro, Georgia, Hungary, Moldova, as well as in Slovakia. Perhaps the term "corruption" even trivializes the problem, because we are not talking about a bribe given to a traffic policeman, but about close links between the actions of politicians and organized crime, and about the massive misuse of public funds. Of course, each of these countries has both political actors and civil society, which are protesting against corruption and crime.

The criminal activities of politicians and "businessmen," to use that euphemism, can bring entire economies to the brink of collapse. Moldova has barely recovered from the banking scandal of 2014. At that time, the three largest banks stole 12% of GDP through fraudulent transactions, and the state stepped in, and is still suffering financial problems as a result today. One of the oligarchs behind the bank robbery, Ilan Shor, has actively engaged in politics. He is now fighting against the reformist president Maia Sandu by all means, for example by buying votes and financing campaigns. A little further away, in Georgia, the largest oligarch, Bidzina Ivanishvili, decided to enter politics, founded and financed his own party, "Georgian Dream," and turned the country into an authoritarian regime.

All these examples show many symptoms of polarization: they lead society to lose trust and legitimacy between political actors. However, there are significant differences between the two faces of polarization. Of course, after Moldova banned pro-oligarchic, criminal political entities, they complained that it was a ban on political opinion. However, when it comes to the second, criminal face of polarization, the battle is not about banning discussion on LGBT rights, as, for example, the banned parties in Moldova claim, the battle is about democracy itself.

This second type of conflict often moves from the parliamentary arena to court proceedings or the street. In Slovakia, the demonization of political opponents and investigative journalists culminated in the murder of prominent investigative journalist Jan Kuciak and his partner in 2018. Six years later, leftist-authoritarian Prime Minister Robert Fico was the victim of an attack. We don’t even need to mention the murder of Zoran Đinđić.

The term "polarization" has the scent of symmetrical conflict, but in all the countries mentioned, political threats and violence can primarily be attributed to one side. Two attacks in Slovakia testify to this: the attack on Fico seems to have been politically motivated, but the perpetrator is a bit politically confused and carried out the attack alone, while the murder of the journalist is linked to business actors and the secret service, who are in turn close to some politicians, and according to Slovak media, are even connected to the former/new Prime Minister Fico. Of course, there is a suspicion that Đinđić's murder also has a political background.

Dialogue is often prescribed as a remedy for the first, ideological type of polarization. However, this remedy for the second type of polarization can have very dangerous side effects. Namely, when the pro-democratic opposition or civil society is criticized for refusing dialogue and compromise with the government, it trivializes the problem and humiliates the victims of violence and crime.

In polarized democracies, persistent hostility and lack of trust between political actors have negative consequences for democracy: they undermine the possibility of political agreements, and may ultimately even jeopardize the functioning of democracy.

Sometimes ideology is used as a byproduct. Namely, former entity president Milorad Dodik used nationalism and the specter of separatism to distract from his abuse of power. In Hungary, Fidesz’s campaign against George Soros and LGBT rights was staged to divide the opposition, and to gloss over the poor state of the economy and corruption. It even appears that the Hungarian government deliberately escalated the migrant crisis in 2015 to put the issue at the forefront, thereby securing support from right-wing voters.

Milo Đukanović and the Montenegrin Democratic Socialists (DPS) had perhaps the most creative formula for a 30-year rule: the ingredients were clientelism, vote buying, and the issue of independence. Đukanović accused all other parties of being either pro-Serb or potential coalition partners with pro-Serb parties, and thus all but the DPS became traitors to independence. With that cocktail, legitimate alternatives disappeared, and the DPS was free to cooperate with the mafia, while it was sure to win the elections. Orban, Dodik, and Đukanović have one thing in common in their biographies: they all completely changed their ideology during their political careers. I would not rule out that this is an indicator that they are primarily using ideology as a strategic weapon.

However, Eastern European polarization also works without ideology. The Serbian SNS, for example, rarely talks about the party's history from the 1990s, but today everything revolves around the rather non-ideological promise of an "economic tiger". Of course, for this purpose, it uses its monopoly on national television and gathers voters through clientelistic networks. Nationalism is used only temporarily, to overcome crises. Last year, in the election campaign in Georgia, the ruling party emphasized its merit in obtaining EU candidate status. In doing so, it took over the opposition's main argument, overcoming the main political difference. However, this was a lie: even before the elections it was clear that the main obstacle to European integration was the ruling party and its abuse of power. Immediately after the elections, the government slammed the door on the EU.

Smaller Western European countries have historically developed a tried-and-tested - but currently very controversial in France and Germany - formula for combating polarization: depolarization through engagement and compromise. Politics in my home country, Switzerland, is based on this formula. But in combating the other face of polarization, this formula poses a dilemma for the opposition and for pro-democracy foreign actors. Of course, dialogue and pacts have once been very successful in countries affected by corruption and mafia structures, leading to the restoration of democracy and the rule of law. This was the case in North Macedonia in 2015, after major protests against corruption and wiretapping scandals. There, the government and opposition agreed in the "Prižin Agreement" to establish a special prosecutor's office, new elections, which led to a change of government. This, however, requires the willingness of the ruling party, or at least a significant faction, to make genuine reforms and step down from power. But dialogue and compromise must by no means be a panacea, as many international actors are using. Because whoever gets involved with organized crime risks getting blood on their hands. Thus, the pressure of the international community on political actors to withdraw through talks risks discrediting the opposition and civil society. Namely, the success of the dialogue in North Macedonia was primarily the result of the international community's pressure on the prime minister to resign and agree to a transitional cabinet and a criminal investigation. There are other reasons why dialogue is not an option: In Georgia, most of the opposition leaders have recently been behind bars.

The author is a professor of political science at the University of Belgrade and the Central European University in Vienna; he leads the EU project 'Horizon Europe' on international support for democracy in Eastern Europe