In Russia, there are enemies - everywhere.

In the 18th century, the Russian Tsar Peter the Great regularly punished his critics with torture, exile to Siberia, and the death penalty, sometimes for “inappropriate language” about his master. In the mid-1930s, Joseph Stalin used fabricated charges of treason and forced confessions to eliminate potential rivals, including many prominent “Old Bolsheviks” who were put on public trial. Today, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s fight against perceived enemies—both inside and outside Russia—resounds with disturbing echoes of this dark history.

Take the October 2022 indictment of Kremlin critic Ilya Yashin — and his 8,5-year prison sentence — for spreading “false” information about the Russian military. Yashin was also accused of harboring “hostility toward the (Russian) political system.” At the time, the overtones of Stalinism were shocking. Three years later, they have become commonplace.

In Russia, the number of terrorism-related cases has skyrocketed since the invasion of Ukraine. The number of convictions has also risen, from around 350 in 2021 to almost 500 in 2022 and over 1.000 in 2024. And this year, Russian courts are handing down at least five such convictions a day: already over 600, in the first six months alone. By the end of the year, the total could exceed 1.500.

In fact, the Russian parliament, which serves as a decoration, has made it easier to bring criminal charges against Putin’s critics: it has required non-profit organizations that receive “any assistance” from abroad to register as “foreign agents” and subject themselves to increased government scrutiny. The label “foreign agent” has always been a tool for punishing opponents of the Kremlin, and is now almost the equivalent of the Soviet term “enemy of the people,” which was a prelude to the purges.

This was clearly evident in early October, when nearly two dozen so-called foreign agents (actually exiled opposition figures from the Russian Anti-War Committee, founded after the 2022 invasion) were charged with terrorism. Among them was the former CEO of Yukos, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, who fled to London after serving ten years in prison on trumped-up charges of fraud and embezzlement.

As in Stalin's time, the current regime persecutes not only outspoken critics but also anyone the Kremlin deems to challenge its authority. Regional leaders, influential politicians, and high-ranking military officers, once trusted by the Kremlin, are now routinely arrested on criminal charges, usually related to corruption. Recently, even individuals loyal to the Kremlin have begun to be labeled as foreign agents, and one can only speculate about the reasons.

Perhaps pro-Putin propagandist Sergei Markov was overly supportive of Azerbaijan at a time when that country's relations with Russia were deteriorating? And did military blogger and Kremlin agitator Roman Alekhine go too far in complaining about Russia's slow progress in Ukraine? Was Alexei Shevtsov, the former mayor of Plyos, overly ambitious in his entrepreneurial endeavors?

As in the case of M. Khodorkovsky’s Yukos, the authorities confiscated Shevtsov’s assets, including his successful business called “izbing” (tourist vacations in traditional izba, log cabins). From the Bolsheviks to Putin, the real goals of these confiscations are the same. The first goal is to enrich the state. Since 2022, Russia has seized assets worth about 3,9 trillion rubles ($49 billion) from owners of private businesses accused of crimes ranging from embezzlement to treason. The second goal is to limit the ability of potential rivals to form an effective opposition.

As Putin’s regime punishes left and right, using the law as it sees fit, Russia’s elite are growing increasingly concerned. But you don’t even have to be Russian to be in Putin’s crosshairs. Stalin viewed virtually everyone outside the USSR as a potential obstacle to building “socialism in one country,” and Putin is also convinced that Russia is a “special civilization” under attack from a West bent on destroying it.

During the Ukrainian war, the Kremlin’s anti-Western rhetoric began to boil. But in October, it reached a new peak: the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) accused the UK of preparing a “heinous provocation”: a false-flag operation involving a group of Russians supporting Ukraine and possessing “Chinese-made equipment.” They were allegedly planning to attack a Ukrainian warship or a foreign civilian ship in a European port.

Such fabrications reflect not only geopolitical uncertainty but also cultural resentment. If Russians are portrayed as villains in British spy films, the British become villains in Russian intelligence propaganda.

It is not difficult to identify the reasons for the Kremlin's growing obsession with Russia's perceived enemies. The Ukrainian war is increasingly causing disillusionment, even among those who previously believed Putin's nationalist propaganda.

With inflation exceeding 8%, many Russians are struggling to afford basic necessities - food, fuel, medicine and utilities. Economic growth is slowing, and the budget deficit in the first half of the year rose to 4,88 trillion rubles, far exceeding the 3,8 trillion rubles projected for the whole of 2025. And all this for what? Almost four years have passed, and Russia has managed to occupy less than 12% of Ukraine's territory.

The Russians were promised a quick victory in Ukraine, but instead they were given a long and expensive conflict reminiscent of the Afghan quagmire that contributed to the collapse of the USSR. Putin understands all this and is now trying to eliminate any threat to his power through punishment and intimidation. Meanwhile, the war continues and the death toll rises.

The author is a professor of international affairs at the New School of New York University

Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2025. (translation: NR)