Writing over the past years in the English-speaking framework of analysis about history and politics in Montenegro and the Balkans, I often used the term stabilitocracy in order to characterize as faithfully as possible the decade-long policy of the West towards our area. (See: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2016/12/23/montenegros-stabilitocracy-how-the-wests-support-of-dukanovic-is-damaging-the-prospects-of-democratic-change/; as well as: https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/srdja-pavlovic/content-of-form-nato-and-democratizing-of-montenegro) To my great satisfaction, numerous colleagues who deal with the Balkans have adopted this term of mine, and have recently started using it in a wider context. (See: http://www.suedosteuropa.uni-graz.at/biepag/node/245) With this text, I want to express my agreement with such a broad usage and, at the same time, clarify the original meaning of this term.
The fundamental postulate of stabilitocracy lies in the conviction of the creators of the foreign policy of Western liberal democracies about the protection and promotion (practically and at the level of rhetoric) of Western values as the supreme interest and ultimate goal.
Authoritarian and proto-democratic hybrid regimes that quickly understand and accept this basic postulate, and that are ready to protect and represent Western geo-political, security, military, economic or energy interests in their own countries, are, as a rule, spared pressure and punishment from countries of great powers, such as the United States of America, Great Britain, and the European Union, for all the mistakes they commit on their home turf.
For this reason, local autocrats can do whatever they want in their private prohibitions. Any criticism directed at them is usually dismissed as either the impotent anger of political losers, or an attempt by retrograde anti-democratic forces to win a political coup. As the examples of Montenegro, Serbia, Macedonia, Albania and Kosovo clearly show us, the West sees the ruling elites and ruling parties in these countries as problematic, but still functional and potentially useful service structures. They have been treated by the West as spoiled goods that nevertheless show some potential, and therefore require and justify further support.
Judging by the rare critical tones directed from the West towards the governing structures in these countries, an uninformed observer could conclude that their governments are democratic, their judiciaries independent, and their electoral processes free, fair and transparent.
Montenegro, which has been practically ruled by one man since 1989, is a good example of this carefully constructed optical illusion. Regardless of the optimism with which the official announcements of the government resound, Montenegro is still deeply divided along ethnic, national, religious, ideological, political and social lines. These divisions are most clearly manifested on the issues of historical revision of topics from the Second World War, dealing with the recent war past from the 1990s, as well as EU and NATO integrations. Opposition parties boycott the work of the parliament and are treated by the ruling structure as enemies of the state. Street protests motivated by social impulses have become part of Montenegrin everyday life.
In addition to everything, the administrations in Brussels, Washington and London still repeat the slogan about Montenegro as a "Balkan success story"! American officials are still loudly praising the government in Podgorica for its determination to persevere on the path of so-called Euro-Atlantic integration. One gets the impression that the West keeps its "eyes wide closed" when it comes to the deep economic, political and constitutional crisis in Montenegro.
The just ended tour of the American official Hoyt Ji was another in a series of efforts to find a modality to preserve the Montenegrin stabilitocracy, but also those in the Montenegrin neighborhood. It remains to be seen whether this visit will bring an old "dialogue partner" back to the scene, or perhaps promote a new "promising boyfriend".
Returning to the level of the model, it is important to say that the focus of both partners in the game called stabilitocracy is aimed at winning and maintaining control over a given situation, at any cost. For us mere mortals, however, this is about the hypocrisy of international politics. Historical experiences, as well as recent events, confirm that this kind of connection between the West and local autocrats is broken only if the West sees that the old partner does not serve its interests well, or if a new partner appears on the political horizon.
Both sides - the local autocrats and their helpers and mentors in the West - bear responsibility for the various products of this political discourse. The two parties support each other and enjoy life within the framework of a politically and financially profitable marriage.
Stabilitocracy allows the West to maintain decades of rhetoric about the promotion of democracy, free, fair and transparent elections, an independent judiciary, a strong parliament, the rule of law, the fight against corruption and organized crime, the protection of human rights, etc.
At the same time, this Western discourse allows the local partner to create a facade democracy while minimizing the role of parliament in the political life of the state, stealing elections, criminalizing the local political arena, appropriating dictatorial attributes, promulgating laws that serve to eliminate political rivalry, stifling critical thinking, and at the same time satirizing natural and economic resources of the state, and fills the pockets of his relatives and loyal associates. I will write about the local manifestations of stabilitocracy, in which the ruling elite plays the role of the powerful "West", and political opportunists, kleptocrats and businessmen assume the role of local authoritarians, on another occasion.
Both partners also engage in coordinated fear-mongering among the local population in an effort to resist increasingly vocal demands for change. Concerned Western commentators and lobbyists have recently been heard warning of "war clouds" that are once again looming over the Balkans! Local autocrats use these warnings to demonize their political rivals and declare any criticism directed at them as dangerous for the survival of the state and people. On the other hand, Western politicians and analysts actualize their permanent obsession with "war games" against the old enemy: Russia.
I believe that this narrative, apart from the framework of the discourse of stabilitocracy, should also be positioned within the propaganda machine of the New Cold War, because the instrumentalization of stereotypes (such as the one about the Balkan powder keg) is done with the aim of complete militarization of foreign policy and international relations.
However, it is important to say that both sides cannot bear the equal burden of responsibility for the consequences of stabilitocracy. Although there are no naive and innocent participants in this political-interest marriage, it is the West that always establishes the rules of behavior, the dynamics of relationships, and determines their nature and duration. It is the West that establishes the levels of complexity of a particular stabilitocracy because, by the nature of things, it is acting from a position of power.
Although the main topic of this text is stabilitocracy in the Balkan context, it should be said that today's use of this political discourse significantly exceeds its geographical, economic, cultural, political, ideological and religious frameworks. It should also be recalled that, although called differently, this discourse was and remains the most significant feature of the foreign policy of all American and Western European governments from 1945 until today.
Stabilitocracy has a long and bloody history. The twentieth century was covered with the proverbial political and physical corpses of former allies and so-called "dialogue partners". We only need to remember Chile during the time of August Pinochet, Argentina ruled by Juan Peron, Pahlavi's Iran, Egypt under Hosni Mubarak, or Iraq during the Saddam Hussein period, as well as a whole series of dictators from the Maghreb region. They, as well as many others, are a good illustration of the disastrous consequences of stabilitocracy as a leading principle in foreign policy. As my late friend, university professor Milan Dimić, told me - "The West has always supported dictators."
Staying within the framework of the Balkans, it is worth recalling that during the early 1990s, the then Serbian leader, Slobodan Milošević, was one of the "partners for dialogue," before ending up in The Hague as an indictee for war crimes. However, he was quickly replaced by the Montenegrin autocrat, Milo Đukanović, and the latter soon by the Serbian leader, Aleksandar Vučić.
As the leading principle of Western foreign policy in the Balkans, stabilitocracy deepens existing crises and further radicalizes political and social spaces that have long been polarized. The gap between Western rhetoric about democratization, the rule of law and respect for state institutions, on the one hand, and the local realities of authoritarian rule and endemic corruption, on the other, is really deep and seems almost unbridgeable. Much more often than we want to admit, the final result is a deep suspicion or even a complete rejection of the idea of integrative processes based on Western value categories and a lack of any trust in the institutions of the European Union.
Many argue that the governments of powerful countries have always valued stability the most and that the contemporary Balkan problem is neither a novelty nor an exception. It is true that stability has always been an important element in the foreign policy calculations of the West, as well as of every country in the world. However, I believe that it is wrong to take stability as an absolute category to which everything else is subjected. Such a view gives a false sense of security and stability, and a false hope that a local problem or desire for change can never threaten Western interests. The last few decades clearly show us that stabilitocracy, as a rule, produces everything and anything, least of all stability and security. Such a discourse also legitimizes existing anti-Western sentiments and helps create and develop new intolerances where none existed before.
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