Recent talks between representatives of the United States, Russia, and Ukraine on ending the war in Ukraine, held in the UAE, ended, not surprisingly, virtually where they began. But the attempt sheds light on how the United States views Russia’s place in the international system—particularly what their bilateral relations might look like after the war. Like so much else about President Trump’s foreign policy, this vision appears to be defined by commercial interests.
Trump's willingness to put aside issues of respect for human rights or the rule of law as he focuses on making business deals could resemble Realpolitik, but its transactional approach should not be confused with realism. While realist foreign policy takes into account constraints, power dynamics, and long-term interests, the transactional approach reduces international politics to a patchwork of narrowly defined bargains. Similarly, while realism calls for extracting maximum benefit from norms, alliances, and institutions, transactionalism advocates their avoidance or even destruction.
At a time when the order established after World War II seems to be crumbling, the aforementioned traditional concept of realism may sound idealistic, and transactional arrangements may seem more pragmatic. Unburdened by the responsibility of building institutions and maintaining alliances, and unfettered by principles, a transactional leader - by this logic - is able to achieve results even in challenging circumstances. But the long-term outcomes of such an approach are likely to be far from desirable.
This is almost certainly the case with America’s emerging approach to Russia. The Trump administration seems to view the end of hostilities in Ukraine less as an end goal and more as an opportunity to begin a reconfiguration of economic and political relations with the Kremlin. The gradual lifting of sanctions, technological restrictions, and market barriers would, in this view, allow America to continue to shape desired outcomes at will.
The key point, however, is that such changes will be applied selectively, with the actors involved forced to negotiate an agreement on an individual basis. (...)
Since commercial interests have always been paramount to Trump, he assumes that the same is true of leaders like Russian President Putin; and that political agreements are therefore more likely to last if they are embedded in commercial arrangements that raise the cost of abandoning such agreements, or violating them. This also explains why there is a belief within the Trump administration that a partial normalization of Russian-American relations would automatically mean a weakening of Russian ties with China.
According to this “reverse Nixon” strategy (Nixon worked to win China over to distance it from the USSR, while the Trump administration wants the opposite: to pull Russia away from China, ed.), it does not matter that there will be no ideological rapprochement; drawing Russia into some parts of the infrastructure used by the West - financial settlements, technological standards, supply chains - will be enough to weaken Russia’s alliance with China. Power, in this view, rests less on alliances and more on controlling the architecture of connectivity. The Russian elite should therefore be drawn into Western economic and commercial frameworks through a multitude of narrowly defined, overlapping agreements.
It is far from clear whether these assumptions have any basis in the case of Russia. Four years of war, rigorous sanctions, and capital redistribution have further consolidated what was already a highly personalized regime. Personalization increases the internal costs of compromise and narrows the space for making deals on a lasting basis. What appears to be an attractive financial calculation could prove politically untenable for the Kremlin, forced to take into account the mood of a population that has suffered a million casualties in the Ukrainian war so far (...)
Even if such agreements are made, the idea that a stable and prosperous system could be built on them is unrealistic. In circumstances where personalities are prioritized over processes, influence over legitimacy, speed over sustainability, transactional policymaking undermines predictability and creates room for rule-breaking.
This is not good news for the US: it is precisely by acting as a country that uses authority to ensure that everyone adheres to common rules that America has been able to gain and maintain a leading position, providing it with numerous advantages over several decades. But it is even worse news for Europe.
The gradual integration of Ukraine is the EU's central geopolitical project. A Russian-American arrangement that would make Ukraine little more than a bargaining chip would risk emptying the project of its meaning before it is consolidated. How can the EU anchor Ukraine within its institutional framework if Ukraine's future is merely a reflection of a transactional settlement reached by two external powers?
Europe is trying to adapt to this new, more disorderly world through diversification and “risk reduction”. Recent trade agreements with India and Mercosur (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay) are manifestations of this approach. But while these partnerships are strategically necessary, they also come at a political cost. The resistance in some European countries to agreements like the one with Mercosur points to the limits of a “narrow-minded” globalization (…) that promises resilience but generates anxiety on the domestic front.
More importantly, diversification does not eliminate dependency. The US remains the EU’s largest export market, absorbing one-fifth of its total exports. In addition, Europe remains dependent on US capabilities for defence, intelligence, finance, internet technology, cloud computing, AI and advanced semiconductors. Attempting to end these dependencies by embracing European alternatives or by forming coalitions of middle-ranking countries is unlikely to bear fruit.
In this new era of transactional international politics, not everyone is left short-handed. While Trump looks for excuses to claim quick wins, China is playing for the long haul, reinforcing Sinocentric technological standards, solidifying supply chains, expanding financial and digital infrastructure, and continuing to strengthen its military and innovation capabilities. This will put it in a very good position to profit from the destruction of the American-led global order.
In a world of asymmetrical power dynamics and deep interdependence, the only path to stability is one that rests on binding rules, credible institutions, and enduring alliances. Trump’s rejection of this simple truth—and reflected in his administration’s treatment of Russia—presages an era of unpredictability from which China will emerge as the clear winner.
The author is a visiting professor at Georgetown University; she was Minister of Foreign Affairs of Spain and Senior Vice President and Chief Advisor of the World Bank Group
Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2026. (translation: radar.rs)
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