Can Montenegro survive democracy?

Montenegro twenty years since independence - where are we now? A difficult question that carries with it numerous antinomies. Before we try to "judge" reality, it is necessary to answer two previous questions: was the referendum decision correct and can Montenegro survive democracy?!

We will leave aside arguments that rely predominantly on emotions. Although we are partly entering the field of "alternative history", the context is still "alive" enough, and certain processes and decisions fall within the domain of common knowledge, so that their character as facts can hardly be disputed.

If Montenegro had not chosen an independent path, it would not be closer to the European Union. It would also not be a member of NATO. These are the facts. Would the standard of living of citizens be better and would democratic and institutional development be at a higher level? Of course, we cannot know this for sure, but we can reasonably assume that this would not be the case. There is no room for a deeper elaboration due to the length limitations of the text, so we will stick to the thesis that it might not be worse, but it certainly would not be better.

What is the basic contradiction that "suffocates" us?

The connection between crime and the state, the party's capture of society and the attempt to gain complete (or sufficient) control over it, corruption, the loss of ethical ideas, or the acceptance of amoralism as a value orientation - all these are phenomena that are often highlighted. I assume that many, mutatis mutandis, will put this in focus - and rightly so. However, we believe that one piece of the puzzle is missing.

It is about projecting identity aspirations, both through normative statements and through political practice. One side believes that the national question must be rounded off, and that it is necessary to correct the “mistake” inherited from King Nikola to the communist leadership. The other, however, claims that Montenegro can be a state, but that in its character and overall identity it should be dominantly Serbian - as part of the Serbian integralist idea. All this is accompanied by extremist views that, we must admit, are not particularly interesting to us - not because of quantity, but because of destructiveness, because for them the “other” does not exist. The dominant process, however, is conducted between actors who would like to attract the “other” to their ranks.

All of this is an introduction to the answer to the second question. A country that until 2020 had not experienced a change of government in elections, with the described identity gap, is facing a serious problem. We can say that we are still recovering from that shock - which represented a change for both the previous government and the opposition. Will democracy strengthen us or will it be a prelude to the dissolution of the state - let's get back to the question. The short answer: it depends.

From whom? From what?

Membership in NATO and future membership in the EU, in our opinion, are indisputable values. However, the deep answers do not lie exclusively in integration processes. And this is not only because we see, which is good, that these are not perfect systems whose foundations are based on the dogma of progress, but also because a community based on the principle of an open society must enter into wider wholes with its own identity.

Some say that the consensus created after World War II, in which every strong idea, from national to religious, was declared, because of its capacity for conflict, if not a heresy, then a danger that must be kept under control, has collapsed. The global market that does not recognize the nation-state, according to this view, has suffered a defeat. However, we could not fully support this thesis. It is true that the nation-state is returning, but is it in a big way? We are certain, however, that the need for a sense of pride and belonging can no longer be suppressed.

Are we capable of creating a unifying idea through which we will be able to proudly say that we belong? A positive answer to that question simultaneously opens the door to solving another dilemma. This will require a political elite with a strong sense of the public good, capable of learning from its own mistakes through dialogue and acceptance of others.

We were a "military camp", a "romantic community - an idea"; we must also become a functional democracy with strong institutions. Otherwise, we will not be on the historical stage - through our own fault.

The author is a lawyer