The West still doesn't understand Russia

Russia's full-scale attack on Ukraine has been going on for four years, and Western observers still do not understand the Kremlin's strategy. Some believe that it does not exist at all, that Russia's behavior is irrational, that is, unpredictable. Others argue the opposite: Russia is implementing a carefully thought-out long-term plan of revenge, in which the seizure of Ukrainian territories is only the first step. Both explanations are wrong.

Russia did not launch its brutal war against Ukraine and dismantle the security architecture in Europe on a whim, and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s reflections on that war as a clash of civilizations (an existential struggle against the West that wants to destroy Russia) are not just a theatrical performance. At the same time, this rhetoric does not prove the existence of a fully formed imperial ideology, much less a comprehensive project of global transformation.

Putin sees Russia as a force and a civilizational counterweight to Western liberalism, but he has no coherent plan for reshaping the world, let alone the capacity to do so. It is this weakness that shapes the decisions Russia makes. Not quite as strong as the coalition it opposes, it has focused on destabilization rather than domination.

The resulting "strategy" is neither accidental nor carefully thought out; it is unstable and prone to escalation. And it is consistent with a hierarchy of priorities that the West clearly does not fully understand. Putin's main priority (and this is the prism through which all foreign policy decisions in Russia are viewed) is always the same - preserving the regime and sovereign control, which, above all, requires elite cohesion and internal stability.

Putin’s second priority is to maintain Russia’s control over its neighbors, including preventing NATO and the European Union from encroaching on them. To that end, he is prepared to demonstrate great force and pay an incredible price, including economic decline, international isolation, and a huge number of dead and wounded. It is no coincidence that Putin invaded Ukraine after that country announced its intention to deepen ties with the West. More than territory, the Kremlin wants to control the orientation of the countries it continues to consider part of its sphere of influence.

Preventing the consolidation of a world order that is "hostile" to Russia ranks third on this agenda. Russia lacks the economic clout, alliances, and ideological appeal to build an alternative system. And it cannot impose a new order by force. What can it do? Being a nuclear power with large reserves of energy resources and a high degree of risk tolerance, it can act as a "saboteur," employing hybrid tactics that are cheaper and easier to mass-produce than traditional weapons.

When it comes to Europe, this does not mean conquest but an attack on the internal cohesion of European countries. Pressure on energy markets, cyber operations, and support for polarizing, pro-Russian politicians - all of these serve the same goals in Europe as the bombing of Ukraine: to make rapprochement more difficult, increase fragmentation, and hinder coordinated responses.

In relation to the US, Russia relies on a measured game on the edge. Nuclear rhetoric and arms control diplomacy are instruments that should force Russia to be recognized as an indispensable player and a great power, but not for the sake of prestige but to avoid marginalization. The task is also to achieve negotiating significance, not integration into the Western-led world order.

In the Middle East and in a number of regions in Africa, Russia’s actions have been largely driven by opportunism. The intervention in Syria has solidified Russia’s regional authority without great cost. A transactional partnership with Iran increases that country’s ability to challenge Western hegemony (which indirectly benefits Russia), but does not preclude competition for regional influence. From Putin’s perspective, the task is not to shape the regional order, but to expand Russian influence with little investment, while maintaining a flexible stance.

Viewed through this prism, Russia’s behavior is explained as much by restraint as by ambition. Putin escalates when Russia’s core interests are threatened, and acts transactionally when they are not. Reputational damage to preserve the regime and strategic depth is a price he is willing to pay. In the meantime, investing in fragmentation opens up new opportunities for Russia to exercise its influence.

The West’s inability to accurately understand the Kremlin’s intentions leads to policy errors, including insufficient preparedness for escalation, an excessive focus on limiting territorial expansion, and a misplaced belief in the power of sanctions. When the legitimacy of the system is based, among other things, on claims that external forces are allegedly seeking to destroy Russian civilization, economic pressure measures by these same external forces only increase confidence in the regime’s claims. In this sense, sanctions actually help Putin achieve his main goal - the survival of the regime. In addition, the possibility of a diplomatic “reset” is still often discussed, as the tension is sometimes misunderstood as a problem of tone in communication, rather than a conflict of strategic goals.

The consequences go beyond Europe and North America. Middle powers and developing countries must build resilience, including through cooperation. Here too, Russia’s push to expand its influence opens up opportunities for transactional interaction. Where Russian interests are of a means to an end rather than existential in nature, other countries can limit its influence and sometimes extract concessions.

Yet, interaction with Russia carries risks. Fragmented systems are easier to penetrate. Polarized societies are easier to pressure. Weak institutions are easier to block. Russia understands this well and has proven its ability to disrupt coordination, deepen divisions, and exploit institutional weaknesses to its own advantage.

Russia cannot create a complete alternative world order, but it can undermine the cohesion within the existing one. Therefore, world leaders must prepare for new disruptions, which requires strengthening resilience, expanding cooperation, and protecting alliances of sovereign states from external pressures.

I. Bondarenko is a researcher and human rights activist at Memorial

D. Slit is a senior policy advisor at the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change.

Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2026. (translation: NR)