Alliance building among America's allies

The second administration of US President Donald Trump has made it clear from the outset that it will fundamentally reshape American foreign policy. Its National Security Strategy, released last November, states that "the days when the United States, like Atlas, supported the entire world order are past," a shift of great significance for many US allies and partners, for whom dependence on the United States has long been a central pillar of national security.

The latest articulation of this different American approach came last week, in a speech by Defense Secretary Pete Hegsett in Singapore to a gathering of defense ministers and experts: "We need partners, not protectorates," he said. "We seek alliances built on shared responsibility, not dependency. This is the maturation of our alliances in a new era."

This mindset, prevalent in American political circles, partly reflects a widespread belief that the United States’ security partners have not been shouldering their share of the burden for too long. There is some truth to this, as many of America’s allies have the economic capacity to spend more on defense. What has traditionally held them back has been domestic political considerations, but also the assumption that the United States will always defend them, no matter what. Such an attitude will no longer be accepted in Washington.

It also makes sense for America’s allies and partners to take greater responsibility for security in their neighborhood. The United States has unique and very broad global commitments across multiple strategic axes, including Europe, the Indo-Pacific, the Middle East, and the Western Hemisphere. This points to another important American goal: reducing the gap between America’s military capabilities and its commitments. This gap would become apparent if multiple crises were to emerge simultaneously, which is more than a hypothetical possibility given the number of potential and actual threats from state and non-state actors that the United States and its security partners face.

But the war with Iran has already clearly exposed the gap between American capabilities and commitments. The United States lacks not only the military systems it needs for the moment, but also the industrial base that would allow it to produce them quickly, cheaply, and in large quantities. In this regard, the United States would be wise to learn from Ukraine, which has positioned itself as a modern "arsenal of democracy" and is now a world leader in the production and use of unmanned aerial vehicles.

For these and other reasons - primarily due to the unpredictable nature of American foreign policy, which no longer views allies as privileged and worthy of unwavering support - America's traditional partners have begun to reexamine their own national security strategies. And they have many reasons to do so.

For starters, allies should spend more on defense, but how the money is spent is more important than how much. Increasing the share of GDP spent on defense is necessary, but not sufficient. Europe already spends significant amounts on military equipment, but the overall impact remains less than would be expected from the sum of individual national efforts.

The same could be said for Arab states facing the Iranian threat. In Asia, the "axis and spokes" alliance system, with Washington at the center, would have to give way to a networked approach, in which American allies cooperate more with each other and take on complementary roles in deterring and responding to aggression.

Effective defense cooperation requires systems tailored to local strategic circumstances, taking into account geographical specificities, available human resources, the capabilities and strategies of potential adversaries, as well as the external assistance that can realistically be expected. It also implies a willingness of states to integrate their defense capabilities, rather than each country developing and duplicating them separately.

Greater self-reliance can and should be part of strategic calculations, but complete self-sufficiency is rarely, if ever, a feasible option. It is much more realistic to build new and deepen existing partnerships. These can include joint production of military equipment and ammunition, intelligence sharing, and planning and training for joint military deployments and combat operations.

The most natural partners are in their own regions - Japan and South Korea, then European countries concerned about Russia, as well as Middle Eastern states concerned about Iran.

Partnerships, however, need not be limited to the immediate environment. Saudi Arabia is establishing new ties with Ukraine to leverage its extensive experience in the production and use of drones. South Korea, for its part, is investing in the production of missile systems in Poland.

It also makes sense for countries to reshape their security relationships with the United States, not to abandon them. There is no reason to break off the partnership, but there are many reasons to avoid such a scenario. However, for the relationship with the United States to work today, it is necessary to redefine the division of responsibilities, reexamine roles, and rearrange command structures so that partners have greater influence in decision-making.

All of this can also have a diplomatic dimension, aimed at reducing tensions with potential or actual regional adversaries - China or North Korea in the Indo-Pacific, Russia in Europe, or Iran in the Middle East. However, these potential or actual adversaries should be approached solely from a position of military power, which, as already noted, requires new and deeper partnerships. Attempting to meet any of them alone, without a favorable military balance of power and without effective deterrence, would be unwise, dangerous, or both.

In a world where the United States can no longer be relied upon in the same way it once was, the goal should not be stability at all costs, but stability based on terms that are consistent with national and Western interests. Such a goal is achievable, but only if America’s allies accept the new reality and act, both individually and collectively, to meet the challenge before them.

The author is President Emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations; he was Director of the Policy Planning Division at the State Department (2001-2003)

Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2026.